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Seng'jui's Preface to the Chung-lun 
(The following translation is essentially that of Robinson in Early 
Mädhyamika in India and China, pp. 206-207, with some minor alterations). 
The text is found in T. Vol. XXX, p. 1 (prefacing the Treatise) and in the 
Ch'u-san-tsang-chi-chi (T. 2145, pp76-77). 
In the Middle Treatise there are five hundred verses, composed 
by the bodhisattva Nagarjuna. It is named 'Middle' to proclaim 
its actual (object). It is entitled 'Treatise' to complete 
the wording. The actual is not understood except through 
names;. therefore they designate it 'Middle' in order to 
declare it. The wording is not completed except through 
explanations; therefore they adopt 'Treatise' to make it clear. 
When the actual is declared and the wording is clear, then in 
the bodhisattva's course the intuition of the bodhimanda 
shines brilliantly, and the suspension-cords are untied. " 
Craving and delusion arise from misconceptions, and by them 
the three domains are submerged. One-sided understanding 
springs from knowledge (characterized) by aversion, and 
through it their resolve errs from the goal. Thus we know 
that great bodhi resides in vast intuition, and small know- 
ledge is bound by the constricted mind. If the intuition is 
not vast, then it does not suffice-to raze the existent and 
the inexistent, to unify the religious and the profane. if 
knowledge is not consummate, then with it one cannot traverse 
the Middle Path and obliterate the two limits. That the 
religious and the profane are not unified and that the two 
limits are not obliterated is what grieves the bodhisattva. 
Therefore the great man Nagarjuna equalized them with the 
111 
Middle Path, enabling students who have erred from the goal 
(meaning) to look at the metaphysical pointer and totally 
change. He encompassed them with (the principle of) identity 
with transformations, and caused the clients of metaphysical 
understanding to lose their plans and deliberations in the 
morning's clear rays. 
How vast it is! It may truly be said to put in order and make 
level the road to (along) the "hollow stairs" and to open out 
the metaphysical gate within the cosmos, to fan the wind of 
prajnä among the dry twigs, and our the sweet dew on the 
withered and downcast. When the hundred-beamed (cedar- 
beamed) mansion arises, it makes the tumble-down thatched 
cottage seem mean. When you behold how grand this treatise 
is, then you know how inferior one-sided understanding is. 
How fortunate it is that this land of China has suddenly had 
Mount Grdhraküta moved to it to be its chief mountain, and 
that biased minds in outlying areas receive the flowing light 
of its surplus of kindness. From now on, for the first time 
the worthies who discuss the Tao can converse about the 
reality, (the actual). 
It is said that in all the states of India there are none who 
venture to engage in studies who do not pore over this treatise 
and take it for their canon. Very many of them have moistened 
their quills and written commentaries. The one that we are 
now issuing is the commentary by the Indian brahman named 
Pin-lo-chia (or Pin-chia-lo), in the Chin language, '31ue- 
Eyes'. Though he believes and understands the profound Dharma, 
a his language was not elegant and ýpposite. The Dharma-master 
17 
(Kumäxajiva) has edited and emended all the errors, 
deficiencies and redundancies in it, interpreting it 
according to the Stanzas, so that the principles are defin- 
itive, though in some places the language is not entirely 
excellent. 
The Hundred Treatise disciplines outsiders and shuts out 
falsehoods. This text frees insiders (Buddhists) and 
dissolves their obstructions. The Great Perfection of Wisdom 
Treatise is profound and vast. The Twelve Topics is concise 
and to the point. When you examine these four, it is indeed 
as if the sun and moon entered your bosom. There is nothing 
that is not mirrored forth clearly. 
I have handled (this book) and have pored over it and have 
not been able to let it out of my hand. So, forgetting my 
lowness and ineptness, I have expressed my insights and 
feelings in a preface, and have put a table of contents at 
the beginning. But how can I hope to explain it! It is 
merely to express delight at my own sentiment of"agreement. 
THE MIDDLE TREATISE 
Translation 
1 
(1b11 The Middle Treatises 
Verses2 by the Bodhisattva Dragon-Tree (Nagarjuna). 3 
Commentary by the Brahman Blue-eyes. 4 
Translated by Kumarajiva, Master of the Tripitaka under Yao 
of Ch'in. 
5 
lvl 
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Chapter 1. Contemplation of Causality6 16 verses 
No arising and no ceasing 
No permanence and no severance 
No identity and no difference 
No arriving and no departing? 
To the one who can expound this matter of causality 
And completely extinguish all sophistries8 
I bow my head in reverence: 
The Buddha, greatest of all teachers. 
Question: Why was this treatise composed? 
Reply: There are some who say that all things arise from the 
god 'Great Self-Being'. 
9 Some say that they arise from Visnu, 
some say that they arise from combination, 
10 
some say that they 
arise from time, 
11 
some say that they arise from the world- 
nature 
12 
some say that they arise from transformations, 
13 
some say that they arise spontaneously 
14 
and some say that they 
arise from atoms. 
15 
Because they hold to these various errors 
they fall into false views such as that things have no cause, 
or some wrong cause, that they are permanent or that they are 
cut off, and so on. In various ways they expound 'I' and 
'mine', but they do not know the true Dhazma. The Buddha, 
desiring to terminate all such false views and to make known 
the Buddha-dharma, first taught the twelve causal links16 in 
the Sravaka-Dharma; 
17 
but also, for the benefit of those who 
have already applied themselves, who have the great mind and 
who are capable of receiving the profound Dharma, he expounded 
in the Mahayana-Dharma18 the characteristics of causality, 
namely that all dharmas neither arise nor cease, are not the 
same, do not differ and so on; they are utterly empty and 
devoid of anything which exists. As is stated in the 
Prajnaparamita Sutra, 
19 
'The Buddha told Subhuti: When a 
Bodhisattva is established in the seat of enlightenment, 
20 
he 
views the twelve causal links as like the inexhaustibility of 
empty space'. 
(1b29) After the Buddha's decease, in the second five hundred years of 
the patterned Dharma, 
21 
men's faculties became dulled, they 
became deeply attached to all dharmas, and sought for settled, 
fixed characteristics 
22 
in the twelve causal links, the five 
23 
skandhas, the twelve avenues, 
24 
the eighteen realms, 
25 
and so 
on. They did not know the Buddha's intention and were merely 
attached to words and letters. Hearing utter emptiness taught 
in the Mahayana-Dharma they did not Iaiow the reason for things 
being empty, and so conceived doubts and views, such as 'If all 
things are utterly empty how can you differentiate sin and merit, 
karmic recompense and so on? If this were so, there would be no 
r 
worldly truth and no truth of the supreme meaning'. 
20 
They 
seized hold of the characteristic of 'emptin'ess' ' and produced 
voracious attachments, generating all sorts of errors about 
utter emptiness. It was for such reasons as these that the 
Bodhisattva Nagarjuna composed this Middle Treatise. 
lvl No arising and no ceasing 
No permanence and no severance 
No identity and no difference 
No arriving and no departing 
1v2 To the one who can expound this matter of causality 
And completely destroy all sophistries 
I bow my head in reverence: 
The Buddha, greatest of all teachers. 
28 
1/2 With these two verses he reveres the Buddha, and expounds in 
brief the supreme meaning. 
Question: Dharmas are innumerable. Why do the negations 
refer only to these eight things? 
Answer: Although dharmas are innumerable, by-the brief 
exposition of eight things he effects a comprehensive negation 
of all dharmas. 
(1c14) As to 'no arising', the commentators expound the characteristic 
of 'arising' in various ways. Some say that cause and effect 
are identical, some say that cause and effect are different, 
some say that the effect pre-exists in the cause, some say that 
the effect does not pre-exist in the cause, some say that things 
arise from themselves, and some say they arise from other things, 
while some say that they arise from both together. Some say 
that arising exists, while others say that arising is non- 
existent. Such ways of expounding the characteristic of 
arising are entirely wrong, and these matters will be enlarged 
?9 
upon later. Since no fixed characterstic of arising is tenable, 
there is no arising. As for 'no ceasing'; if there is no 
arising, how can there be ceasing? Since there is no arising 
and no ceasing, the remaining six are also negated. 
(1c21) Question: If 'no arising and no ceasing' imply a 
comprehensive negation of all dharmas, why does he repeat the 
exposition with regard to the other six things? 
Reply: It is in order to bring out the meaning of 'no arising 
and no ceasing'. There are some people who do not accept no 
arising and no ceasing, but do believe in no permanence and no 
severance. A deep enquiry into no permanence and no severance 
shows them to be the same as no arising and no ceasing, and 
why? If a dharma really exists then clearly it cannot be non- 
existent. If it formerly existed and now does not exist, this 
constitutes severance. If its nature existed before, then this 
would be permanence. This is why he teaches 'no permanence and 
no severance', to lead into the meaning of 'no arising and no 
ceasing'. 
(2a3) There are some people who, although they hear these four ways of 
negating dharmas, nevertheless establish dharmas through the 
4 r, 
other four ways, but these are also mistaken. If all dhai as rp 
were one there could be no causal relations, while if they 
were different there could be no continuity of characteristic 
These things will be refuted in various ways later on. There- 
fore we declare again 'no identity and no difference'. There 
are some people who, although recognising these six ways of 
negating dharmas nevertheless establish dharmas in terms of 
arriving and departing. As for ' arriving' , they say that 
dharmas come from the god 'Self-Being' (Isvara), from the 
world-nature or from the atoms, and so forth. As for 
'departing', they say that dharmas return to their place of 
origin. 
(2a8) Moreover, the myriad things do not arise, and why? It is 
because of direct worldly perception. 
3° As we see with our 
worldly eyes, corn does not arise at the beginning of a kalpa, 
31 
and why? Without the corn at the beginning of the kalpa there 
could be no corn now. If there were corn existing now apart 
from that at the beginning of the kalpa, there would have been 
an arising, but in fact this is not so, and therefore there is 
no arising. 
Question: If there is no arising, then surely there must be 
ceasing? 
Reply: There is no ceasing, and the reason for this lies in 
direct worldly perception. As we see with our worldly eyes, 
the corn which was there at the beginning of the kalpa did not 
cease. If it had ceased there would be no corn now, but in 
fact there is corn, and therefore there is no ceasing. 
Question: If there is no ceasing then surely there must be 
permanence? 
Reply: There is no pezmanence, and the reason for this lies in 
direct worldly perception. As we see with our worldly eyes 
things are not permanent; for example, when the corn sprouts 
the seed decays, and therefore there is no permanence. 
Question: If there is no permanence then surely there must 
be severance. 
Reply: There is no severance, and the reason for this lies 
in direct worldly perception. As we see with our worldly eyes 
things are not cut off. For instance, the sprout grows out of 
the corn, and therefore there is no severance. If there were 
severance there would be no continuity of characteristics. 
32 
(2a20) Question: If this is so, then all things are one. 
Reply: They are not one, and the reason for this lies in 
direct worldly perception. As we see with our worldly eyes, 
things are not one; for example, the corn does not constitute 
the sprout and the sprout does not constitute the corn. If 
the corn constituted the sprout and the sprout constituted the 
corn, they would be one, but in fact this is not so and 
therefore they are not one. 
Question: If they are not one, then surely they must be 
different? 
Reply: They are not different, and the reason for this lies 
in direct worldly perception. As we see with our worldly eyes, 
things are not different. If things are different from each 
other why do we classify things as shoots of corn, stalks of 
corn and leaves of corn rather than as shoots of a trees, 
stalks of a trees or leaves of trees? 
33 
Therefore they are 
not different. 
(2a26) Question: If there is no difference then surely there must 
be arriving? 
Reply: There is no arriving, and the reason for this lies in 
direct worldly perception. As we see with our worldly eyes, 
things do not arrive; for example, the sprout inside the grain 
of corn does not arrive from anywhere. If there were arriving 
the sprout would have to come from some other place, like a 
bird coming to roost in a tree; but in fact this is not so, 
and therefore Lire is no arriving. 
Question: If there is no arriving then surely there must be 
departing? 
Reply: There is no departing, and the reason for this lies 
in direct worldly perception. As we see with our worldly eyes, 
things do not depart. If there were departing we should see 
the sprout departing from the corn, like a snake coming out of 
its hole'; but in fact this does not happen. Therefore there 
is no departing. 
(2b4) Question: Although you have commented on the significance of 
? no arising and no ceasing', we should like to hear the 
exposition of the one who composed the treatise. 
Reply: 
1v3 Dharmas are not self-produced, 
34 
Nor do they arise from others, 
Nor from both, nor without a cause, 
Therefore we know there is no arising. 
1/3 As to 'not self-produced'; things do not exist by arising from 
their own substance but invariably depend upon a host of 
causes. Moreover, if they did arise from their own substance 
then each single dharma would have two substances. One would 
be the produced and the other would be the producer. If things 
were produced from their own substance without extraneous 
causes, then they would have neither causes nor conditions. 
Furthermore, arising would in turn have an arising, and there 
would be an endless regression of arising. 
(2b1O) Where there is no self there is also no other, and why? The 
existence of "other" depends on the existence of "self". If 
there is no arising from self then there is also no arising 
from other. Arising "from both" involves two errors, namely 
arising from self and arising from other. If there were no 
causes and yet the myriad things existed, this would be 
permanence, 
35 
and this is not correct. Where there is no 
1 v4 
1/4 
cause there is no effect; if there were no causes and yet 
there were effects, then giving alms, keeping the precepts 
and so forth could drag you down into the hells, while the 
ten evils and five rebellious acts36 could lead to rebirth 
in the heavens, because there would be no causal link. 
Further: 
As no self=nature of dharmas37 
Is found in the midst of causes 
So, because there is no self-nature 
There is also no other-nature. 
powevelt') 
No self-nature of dharmas is found in the midst of causes. 
because of the combination of causes, we get 
nomenclature38 Self-nature means the same as self-substance. 
In the midst of causes there is no self-nature, and since 
self-nature does not exist there is no self-production. Since 
self-nature does not exist, other-nature does not exist either, 
and why? Because the existence of other-nature depends on the 
existence of self-nature. An "other-nature", for that other, 
is in fact a self-nature. If self-nature is refuted, then 
other-nature too is refuted, and therefore there cannot be 
production from other-nature. If self-nature and other-nature 
are refuted, then the idea of both together is refuted. To 
say "without a cause" is a great error. Arguments invoking 
cause can be refuted; how much more if you say "without a cause": 
Arising cannot be established in any of these four ways, and 
therefore there is no arising. 
C 
Question: An Abhidharmist39 would say that dha s arise from 
four kinds of causes, so why do you say that there is no arising? 
What are these four causes? 
1v5 Causal condition, sequential cause 
Objective cause, predominant cause. 
Four causes produce all dharmas 
There is no fifth beyond these. 
40 
1/5 All causes which exist may be summed up as four causes, and 
through these four causes all things are produced. 'Causal 
condition' refers to all active dharmas. 'Sequential cause' 
refers to the dharmas of all past and present thoughts and 
mental configurations except the very last thoughts and mental 
configurations of past and present arhats. 
41 
'Objective cause' 
and 'predominant cause' apply to all dharmas. 
Reply: 
1v6 Do effects arise from causes? 
Or do they arise from non-causes? 
Do these causes have effects? 
Or do these causes have no effects? 
1 /6 If, as you say, there are effects, do these effects arise from 
causes, or do they arise from non-causes? 14 as you say, 
there are causes, do these causes have effects or do they have 
no effects? Both of these are wrong, and why? 
1v7 When an effect arises from a certain dharma, 
This dharma is called a cause. 
If such an effect has not yet arisen, 
1c 
How can we not call it a non-cause? 
1/7 All causes are indeterminate, 
42 
and why? Because if their 
effects have not yet arisen, then they are not yet called 
causes. I is only because we see with our eyes effects 
arising out of causes that we declare them to be causes. They 
become causes by virtue of the effects. Since the effects 
follow after and the causes go before, when there is not yet 
any effect how can we call somethin ga cause? It is like a jug, 
produced through the combination of water and earth. It is 
because we see the jug that we know water and earth to be the 
causes of the jug, but if the jug were not yet produced, how 
could we not declare the water and earth to be non-causes? 
Therefore effects do not arise from causes, and if there is no 
arising with causes, how much more so without causes? 
Further: 
1v8 An effect already given in a cause 
Can neither exist nor not exist 
If previously non-existent, what would the cause produce? 
If already existent, why would the cause be needed? 
1/8 There is no prior existence of effects in causes, nor prior 
non-existence. If an effect already existed, nothing could be 
called its cause, since the effect was already existent. 
Similarly, if the effect was all the time inexistent we could 
not describe something as its cause, since it would not have 
produced any further entity. 
11 
Question: You have refuted causality comprehensively, but now 
we wish to hear these causes negated one by one. 
Reply: 
ßv9 If neither an existent effect is produced - 
Nor an inexistent one is produced, 
Nor an existent-and-inexistent one is produced 
How can you say that there are causes? 
43 
1/9 If causes could produce effects, then these would be of three 
kinds; either existent, or inexistent, or both existent-and- 
inexistent. As was argued in the previous verse, if the effect 
were already existent within its cause, then we could not say 
that it was produced, because it existed already, and if the 
effect were previously non-existent, then we could not say that 
it had been produced, since it did not exist, and because it 
would be similarly uncaused. As to 'existent-and-inexistent' 
effects being likewise not produced; 'existent-and-inexistent' 
means half existent and half inexistent, yet to speak of both 
at once is wrong. Moreover, existence is the opposite of 
inexistence, and inexistence is the opposite of existence; how 
could there be one dharma with two characteristics? Since 
these three ways of seeking for the characteristic of to 
producer of an effect' lead nowhere, how can you assert that 
there are "causal conditions"? 
As to the 'sequential condition'; 
lv10 Where an effect has not yet arisen 
There cannot have been cessation. 
Yet how can a ceased dhazma be a cause? 
nü 
Therefore there is no 'sequential cause'. ' 
12 
1/10 All the dharmas of thoughts and mental configurations are 
produced consecutively in the three periods of time. 
45 
The 
cessation of the dharma of a present thought or mental 
configuration constitutes the sequential cause for a future 
thought. Yet for what does it constitute a sequential cause 
if the future dharma has not yet been produced? And if that 
future dharma is already existent, it is already produced, so 
what use does it have for a sequential cause? 
There is no time when the dharmas of present thoughts and mental 
configurations are at rest. If they are never at rest, how can 
they act as sequential causes? If they were at rest, then they 
would be inactive dharmas. 
46 
Why is this? Because active 
dharmas always have the characteristics of cessation. 
47 
If they 
have ceased, they cannot act as sequential causes. If you say 
that a ceased dharma still exists, then this implies 
permanence, but if there is permanence then there can be no sin 
and merit, 
48 
and so forth. If you hold that the moment of 
cessation can act as a sequential cause, then the moment of 
cessation must be half ceased and half not-yet-ceased. Apart 
from these there is no third dharma to be called the moment of 
cessation. Moreover the Buddha has taught that "all active 
dharmas cease in successive instants. There is not one single 
instant when they abide", so how can you say that a present 
dharma is both on the point of cessation and not on the point 
of cessation? If you assert that one instant does not include 
this on the point of cessation and not on the Doint of 
cessation, you deny your own dharma. 
49 
Your AiLidharmist 
speaks of a dharma of cessation, a dharna of non-cessation, a 
dharrna of on the point of cessation and a dharma of not on the 
13 
lvl 1 
1/11 
1v12 
point of cessation. The dharma of on the point of cessation 
includes present dharmas which are about to cease; the dharma 
of not on the point of cessation includes, with the exception 
of present dharmas which are about to cease, the remaining 
present dharmas plus past, future and inactive dharias; these 
are termed not on the point of cessation dharmas. 
reasons there are no 'sequential causes'. 
As to the 'objective cause'; 
According to the true and subtle Dharma 
Taught by all the Buddhas, 
In this Dharma without causes 
C*n How can there be objective causes? 5U 
For these 
The Buddha teaches in the Mahayana that the characteristics of 
dharmas - whether they have form or do not have form, whether 
they have shape or do not have shape, whether they have out- 
flows or do not have outflows, whether they are active or 
inactive, 
51 
and so forth - all these characteristics enter 
into the Dharma-nature; 0 everything is entirely empty and so 
there are no characteristics and no conditions. It is just as 
if everything flowed into an ocean and merged into one essence. 
52 
You may believe in the true Dharma, but what is taught as an 
expedient does not constitute true reality. 
53 
are no objective causes. 
54 
As to the 'predominant cause'; 
Since dharmas do not have self nature 
The characteristic of existence does not occur 
To assert 'because this things exists 
That thing exists' is not correct. -, 
Therefore there 
1/12 In relation to the sutras' teaching of the twelve causal links, 
14 
to say that 'because this thing exists, therefore that thing 
exists', is wrong, and why? Because dhazmas are produced from 
causes and do not have a fixed nature of their own. Since they 
have no fixed nature of their own, they do not have the 
characteristic of 'existence'. Where the characteristic of 
existence does not exist, how can you say 'this thing exists, 
therefore that thing exist. s'? Therefore, there is no 
predominant cause. It was only in accordance with the 
distinction made by ordinary people between existence and 
nonexistence that the Buddha spoke of them. 
56 
Further: 
1v13 In causes and conditions, whether summarized or at 1ength, 
57 
You search in vain for an effect. 
If an effect does not exist within conditions 
How can you say that it issues from them? 
1/13 'Summarized' means; in the causes taken in combination there 
is no effect. 'At length' means; in the causes taken one by 
one there is likewise no effect. If there is no effect within 
the causes, whether taken in summary or at length, how can you 
say that effects issue from causes? 
Further: 
1v14 If you maintain that causes have no effects 
And yet effects arise from within causes, 
Then why should these effects not 
Issue from non-causes? 
114f you seek for effects within causes you cannot find them, 
15 
so why should they not issue from non-causes? As an analoger, 
there is no jug in the clay, so why should one not issue from 
milk? Moreover: 
1v15 If effects arise from causes 
And these causes have no self-nature, 
Then effects arise from things which have no self-nature, 
So how can they arise from causes? 
1v16 Effects do not arise from causes 
And they do not arise from non-causes. 
Since the effects do not exist, 
Causes and non-causes likewise do not exist. 
1/16 Effects arise from causes, but these 'causes' do not have 
self-nature. If they do not have self-nature then they are 
not dharmas. If they are not dharmas, how can they arise? 
Therefore, effects do not arise from causes. As for not 
arising from non-causes; in denying causes we stated that there 
were non-causes, but in reality there are no such dharmas as 
non-causes, and therefore there is no arising from non-causes. 
If there is no arising from either of these two then there are 
no effects. Since there are no effects, there are neither 
causes nor non-causes. 
16 
Chapter 2. Contemplation of Going and Coming58 25 verses 
2/0 Question: We see with our worldly eyes the three periods of 
time59 operating. There is the gone, the not-yet-gone and the 
moment-of-going. Because these operate we know that all dharmas 
exist. 
Reply: 
2v1 In the already-gone there is no going 
And in the not-yet-gone there is no going 
Apart from the already-gone and the not-yet-gone 
The moment of going also has no going. - 
2/1 In the already-gone there is no going, since it is already 
gone. If there existed an 'action of going160 separate from 
'going' this would not be right. The not-yet-gone similarly 
has no going, since there is not yet any dharma of going. 
'The moment of going' means half gone and half not-yet-gone, 
b ecwsc i1 is , ýý- stý art dý+t %''`t" mow! 4.0- 
Question: 
2v2 In the place of movement there is going 
In this is the moment of going 
It is neither already-gone nor not-yet-gone 
Therefore the moment of going goes. 
2/2 Insofar as there is a situation in which there is an action 
done, going ought to exist in this. We see with our eyes that 
in she moment-of-going there is a situation of (karmic) 
activity. In the already-gone, the activity has already 
ceased, and in the not-yet-gone activity does not yet exist. 
17 
Therefore we know that there is going in the moment-of-going. 
Reply: 
2v3 Why do you say that in the moment-of-going 
There must exist a dharma of going? 
When without the dharma of going 
There cannot be a moment-of-going? 
2/3 'In the moment-of-going there is a dharma of going'; This is 
not so, and why? No moment-of-going can be found apart from a 
dharma of going. If there could be a moment-of-going which 
existed without a dharma of going, there would be going 
within such a moment-of-going, just like fruit in a dish. 
Moreover: 
2v4 If someone asserts that. there is going in a moment-of-going, 
This person is in error. 
The moment-of-going exists without any separate 'going' 
Since the moment of going 'goes' in itself. 
2/4 If someone says that in the already-gone and the not-yet-gone 
there is no going, but that a going really exists in the moment- 
of-going, this person is in error. If the moment-of-going 
existed independently of the dharma of going, then they would 
not be interdependent. Why is this? If you assert that there 
is going in the moment-of-going, this implies two operations, 
but this is not so in reality. Therefore you cannot say that 
there is a moment-of-going separate from going. Moreover: 
2v5 If the moment-of-going has going 
Then there are two kinds of going. 
One is called the moment-of-going 
The other is the going-of-the-moment-of-going. 
2/5 If you assert that the moment-of-going has going, then this is 
an error which implies there are two goings. One is the 
lh 
moment-of-going which depends on going; the other is the going 
within the moment-of-going. 
Question: What is wrong in there being two goings? 
_Reply: 
2v6 If there are two dharmas of going 
Then there are two goers 
Because, unless there were a goer 
You could not have a dharma of going. 
2/6 If there are two dharmas of going, then there must be two 
goers, and why? Because the goer exists by virtue of the 
dharma of going. One man, two goings and two goers? This is 
not right. Therefore the moment-of-going does not have going 
as well. 
Question: Although it may be true that a goer does not have 
(a separate) going, yet there definately are goers in the three 
times. 
Reply: 
2v7 If, apart from a goer 
No dharma of going can be found, 
Where there is no dharma of going 
How can there be any goer? 
2/7 If you isolate the goer, no (separate) dharma of going can be 
found. Now how can you assert, when there are no dharmas of 
going, that goers definitely exist in the three periods of 
time? 
Further: 
2v8 A goer does not go 
And a non-goer does not go. 
Apart from goer and non-goer, 
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There is no third goer. 
2/8 There is no goer. Why is this? If there were goers, then there 
would be two categories, either goers or non-goers. Apart from 
these two, there can be no third (category of) goer. 
Question: What is wrong in saying that a goer goes? 
Reply: 
2v9 If you talk about a goer going, 
What does this mean 
Wher3 without a dharma of going, 
There can be no goer? 
2/9 If you say that a goer definitely exists, and he employs a 
dharma of going, this is not correct, and why? Because no 
goer can be found separately from a dharma of going. If a 
dharma of going definitely existed, separate from a goer, then 
the goer could employ the dharma of going, but this is not what 
happens. 
Further: 
2v10 If a goer has going, 
Then there are two sorts of going. 
One is the going of the goer, 
The other is the going of the dharma of going. 
2/10 If you say that a goer employs a dharma of going, then this 
involves two errors, for there is one goer but two goings. 
One; by means of the dharma of going, the goer is established 
(as a goer), the other; by means of the goer the dharma of 
going is established. The goer, already established, employs 
the dharma of going. This is not correct. Therefore, when you 
previously asserted that in the three periods of time there 
definitely exist goers, and they who employ dharmas of going, 
this is not right. Again; 
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2v11 If someone says that a goer goes, 
This person is in error. 
(He makes) the goer separate from going, 
And asserts that the goer has going. 
2/11 If someone teaches that a goer can employ a dharma of going, 
this person makes the error (of saying that) the goer exists 
separately from the dharma of going. Why is this? To teach 
that a goer can employ a dharma of going, implies that the 
goer existed first and the dharma of going later on, but this 
is not correct. Therefore, there are no goers in the three 
periods of time. Further, if (both) going and goer definitely 
existed, they would have to have a beginning, but if -you search 
for such a beginning in the three periods of time you cannot 
find it. Why is this? 
2v12 In the already-gone there is no beginning 
In the not-yet-gone there is no beginning 
And in the moment-of-going there is no beginning. 
So where could this beginning be? 
2/12 Why are there no beginnings in the three times? 
2v! 3 Until it has begun, there is no moment-of-going, 
And likewise, there is no already-gone. 
These two ought to have beginnings 
how can there be a beginning of the not-yet-gone? 
2v14 No (already) gone and no not-yet-gone 
And moreover, no moment of going; 
If all these have no beginnings. 
Why then do we distinguish them? 
21 
2/14 If a person has not yet started out, then there is no moment- 
of-going, and likewise there is no already-gone. If there were 
beginnings then they would have to be located in two places, 
namely, the moment-of-going or the already-gone. These two 
are both wrong since, at the time when a person has not yet 
gone, there has not yet been any beginning. So how can there 
be a beginning in the not-yet-gone? If there is no beginning, 
there is no going. If there is no going, there is no goer; so 
how can there be an already-gone, a not-yet-gone and a moment- 
of-going? 
Question: Even if there is no going and no goer, surely 
there is (the antithesis) resting, and those who are at rest? 
Reply: 
2v15 A goer is not at rest61 
A non-goer is not at rest 
Apart from the goer and non-goer 
What third one is there to be at rest? 
2/15 If there is resting, and those who rest, these ought to be 
either goers who are resting, or non-goers who are resting, 
or, apart from these two, some third who is resting, but 
these are not correct. A goer is not at rest, since a goer 
has not yet stopped. Going means the opposite of resting. A 
non-goer likewise is not at rest, and why? It is because of 
the cessation of the dharma of going that resting exists, so 
where there is no going, there is no resting. Apart from the 
goer and non-goer there is no further third one who is at rest. 
If there were a third type who was at rest, he would have to be 
found amongst either the goers or the non-goers. Therefore, 
you cannot say that a goer is at rest. 
Further: 
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2v16 If a goer is at rest, 
What meaning does this have 
When, as you say, without going 
You cannot have a goer? 
0 
2/16 You say that a goer is at rest but this is not correct, and 
why? No goer can be had apart from a dharma of going. If the 
goer resides in the characteristic of going, then why do you 
suppose that he is at rest, since going and resting are 
opposed to each other? 
Further: 
2v17 lathe gone, and not-yet-gone there is no resting 
And in the moment-of-going there is no resting 
All the dharmas of moving and ceasing which exist, 
Are included in the idea of going. 
2/17 If you say that one who goes is at rest, then this person 
should be at rest either in the moment-of-going, or in the 
already-gone, or in the not-yet-gone. In none of these 
situations is he at rest. Therefore, when you say'a goer is 
at rest' this is not correct. It amounts to a denial both of 
the dharma of going and the dharma of being at rest. It is 
the same with moving and stopping. 'Moving' is like the grain 
of corn developing by a continuous process into sprout, stalk 
and leaf, and so on. 'Stopping' is when, because the grain of 
corn dies, the sprout, the stalk and the leaf die. There is 
continuity of characteristics so we call it movement; there 
is cessation so we call it stopping, It is like the process 
of ignorance, causing predispositions and so on up to old age 
and death, being called 'movement', and when the predispositions 
and so forth cease because of the cessation of ignorance this 
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being called Istopping'. 
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Question: Although you have refuted going and goers and 
resting and those at rest in various ways, nevertheless we 
can see with our eyes that there is going, and being at rest. 
Reply: What you see with the physical eyes cannot be trusted. 
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If there really are going and goers, are these established in 
terms of one dharma, or in terms of two dharmas? 
would be wrong. Why is this? 
2v18 'The dharma of going is the same as the goer'; 
This assertion is wrong. 
'The dharma of going is different from the goer'; 
This assertion, too, is wrong. 
Two at once 
2/18 If the dharma of going and the goer are said to be one, then 
this is not correct. If different, this too is incorrect. 
Question: What error is there in their being either 
identical or different? 
Reply: 
2v19 If you hold that the dharma of going 
Is the same thing as the goer, 
Then a doer, and his deed 
Would also be one thing. 
2v20 If you hold that the dharma of going 
Is different from the goer, 
Then there is going separate from a goer 
And a goer separate from his going. 
2/20 These two are both wrong, and why? If the. dharma of going 
were the same as the goer, then this would confuse and negate 
the principle of causality. The goer exists by virtue of his 
T 
going. Going exists on account of the goer. Moreover 'going' 
means a dharma, whereas 'goer' means a person. A person abides 
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whilst a dharma is fleeting. If these were identical, then 
they would have to be either both permanent or both impermanent. 
These are the kinds of errors we find in (the concept of) 
oneness. If they were different, they would contrast with each 
other. The goer would have to exist even when the dharma of 
going was not yet in existence, and the dharma of going would 
have to exist while the goer was not yet in existence. Since 
they would not be mutually dependent one dharma could cease and 
the other dharma be present. These are the kinds of errors that 
we find in the (concept of) difference. 
Further: 
2v21 These two, going and goer 
Whether established as identical or different dharmas, 
Cannot be established in either of these two ways 
So how can you say that they are established? 
2/21 If you have a goer and a dharma of going, you must establish 
them either in terms of one dharn , or in terms of different 
dharmas. Both of these are untenable, and we have already 
stated that there is no third dharma. If you maintain that 
they are established (as entities) then you will have to 
assert that in terms of causality there is no going, and there 
are no goers. Now we will discuss this: 
2v22 We snow a goer by virtue of his going, 
But he cannot employ this going, 
Because no dharma of going previously existed. 
Therefore, it is not a case of a goer going. 
25 
2/22 Whatever may be the dharma of going by which we recognise a goer, 
that goer cannot employ such a dharma of going. Why is this? 
At the time when the dharma of going is as yet inexistent, 
there is no goer; neither is there a moment-of-going, an 
already-gone or a not-yet-gone, as if there were first person, anoi 
a city or town which he is to reach, and there is the place 
from which he is to start. A dharma of going and a goer is not 
correct. The goer is established by virtue of the dharma of 
going, and the dharma of going by virtue of the goer. 
Moreover: 
2v23 It is because of (his) going that we recognise a goer 
He" cannot employ a separate going 
Since, within one goer 
There cannot be two goings. 
2/23 By whatever dharma of going we recognise a goer, the goer 
cannot employ any separate dharma of going, and why? Because 
there cannot-be two dharmas of going within one goer. 
Again : 
2v24 A goer who has a definitely fixed existence 
Cannot employ the three goings. 
And a goer who does not have a definitely fixed existence 
Likewise cannot employ the three goings. 
2v25 Whether the dharma of going is fixed or not fixed 
The goer cannot employ the three (goings). 
For this reason, neither going, nor the goer, 
Nor the place of going exist. 
2/25 'Definitely fixed 
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means having real existence from the 
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beginning and not arising on account of a dharma of going. 
'Dharma of going' means the movement of the body. 'These 
three' 
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means not-yet-gone, already-gone and moment-of-going. 
If the goer has a definite, fixed existence, then such a goer 
ought to exist separately from the dharma of going, though he 
should not be at rest. This is why it is said that a 
definitely fixed existent goer cannot employ the three goings. 
As for 'if the goer is not definitely fixed'; 'Not definitely 
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fixed' means really nonexistent from the beginning. Since it 
is by virtue of the dharma of going, that we identify someone 
as a goer, where there is no dharmä of going, he cannot employ 
three goings. It is by virtue of a dharma of going that a goer 
exists. If there is no dharma of going, then there is no goer, 
so how can you maintain that a goer not definitely fixed can 
employ the three goings? What applies to the goer also applies 
to the dharma of going. If there were a definitely fixed 
dharma of going existing before there was a goer, then the 
dharma of going would not be existing because of the goer, 
and for this reason, the goer could not employ the three 
dharmas of going. If the dharma of going were definitely 
non-existent, what would the goer employ? 
(5c10) If we thoroughly investigate and contemplate in this way upon, 
the dharmas of going, the goer and the place of going, we are 
able to regard these goings as all mutually dependent; the 
goer existing by virtue of the dharma of going, and the dharma 
of going existing by virtue of the goer. Because of these two 
dharmas, there exists the situation in which going can take 
place. It cannot be said to be definitely existent, and it 
cannot be said to be definitely non-existent. In this way 
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we may have definite knowledge that these three goings are 
false and insubstantial. They are empty and have no 
existence, being merely unreal designations, like illusions 
67 
or apparitions. 
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Chapter 3. Contemplation of the six sense-faculties 8 verses 
3/0 Question: In the sutras it says that there are six sense- 
faculties, namely; 
3v1 The faculties of eye, ear, nose, tongue, 
Body and mind. 
These six faculties, the eye and so forth, 
Go with the six objects, of form and so on. 
69 
3/1 In this case, the eye constitutes the inner faculty and form 
the outer object, and the eye can see forms, and so on up to 
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mind is the inner faculty, dharmas the outer object and the 
mind cognizes dharmas. 
Reply: Not so, and why? 
3v2 The eye is unable 
By itself to see itself. 
If it is unable to see itself 
How can it possibly see anything else? 
3/2 The eye cannot see its own self. Why not? Just as a lamp, 
shining by itself is able to illuminate something else, so 
the eye, if it had this characteristic of seeing, should see 
both itself and other things. But in fact this is not the 
case. So, in the verse he says: when the eye does not see 
itself, how can it see other things? 
Question: Even, though the eye cannot see itself, yet it can 
see other things. Fire, for instance can bum other things 
without burning itself. 
Reply: 
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3v3 The example of fire cannot establish anything 
About eyes and seeing 
In the contemplation of present, past and future going71 
We have already dealt with this topic. 
3/3 Although you offer the example of fire, this cannot illustrate 
anything about eyes and seeing. This topic has already been 
dealt with in the chapter on going and coming. Just as in 
what has already gone there is no going, and in what has not- 
yet-gone there is no going and in the moment of going there is 
no going, so in the already-burnt, not-yet-burnt and moment of 
burning there is no burning at all. Likewise in the already- 
seen, the not-yet-seen and the moment of seeing, no 
characteristic of 'seeing' can be found at all. 
Again: 
3v4 Seeing, before the moment of seeing, 
is not called seeing. 
But you say that 'seeing' can see. - 
This is not so 
3/4 When the eye is not yet confronted with the visible form, then 
it cannot see it. At this juncture we do not call it 'seeing'. 
It is because of the confrontation with form that we call it 
'seeing'. This is why it says in the verse: before there is 
seeing, there is no seeing. So how can we see by means of 
seeing? Moreover, within these two events there is no dharma 
of seeing, and why? 
3v5 Seeing cannot see 
And non-seeing cannot see 
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Since we have already refuted seeing 
This amounts to a refutation of a seer also. 
3/5 Seeing cannot see, for reasons explained in our refutation of 
errors. Non-seeing cannot see because it possesses no 
characteristic of seeing, and when there is no characteristic 
of seeing how can there be seeing? Where no dharma of seeing 
exists, no seer exists either, and why? if there were seers 
who existed apart from seeing, then those without eyes should 
also be able to see, using their other faculties. If we saw 
by means of seeing, then the characteristic of seeing would 
exist within the act of seeing. But the one who sees is not 
the characteristic of seeing. This is why it says in the 
verse: when we refute seeing, this implies a refutation of 
the seer. 
Again : 
3v6 Whether separate from seeing, or not separate from seeing, 
No seer can be found. 
Since there is no-one who sees, 
How can there be seeing, or anything seen? 
3/6 When there is seeing, then no seer can be established, and 
also when there is no seeing no seer can be established. Since 
there is no seer, how can there be seeing, or anything seen? 
And if there is no seer, who is there to employ a dharma of 
seeing to distinguish external forms? For these reasons it 
says in the verse: Since there is no-one who sees, how can 
there be seeing, or filing seen? 
Again : 
3v7 Since seeing and what can be seen do not exist, 
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The four dharmas of consciousness etc., 
72 
do not exist. 
Nor the four types of attachment, 
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nor causal links. 
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How could these things exist? 
3/7 Since the dharmas of seeing and what is seen do not exist, 
none of the four dharmas of consciousness, contact, reception 
and craving75 exists, and since there is no craving etc., the 
four graspings76 etc., and each one of the twelve causal links 
similarly does not exist. 
Again : 
3v8 Ear, nose, tongue, body and mind77 
Soun d78 and hearer79 and so forth 
Must be understood in the same way 
Together with what has been discussed above. 
3/8 Just as the dharmas of seeing and what is seen are empty 
because they are wholly dependent upon conditions and not 
fixed, so the five remaining faculties of ears etc. and five 
objects such as sound etc. must be understood in the same way 
as seeing, what is seen, and so on. Because these may be 
interpreted according to the same principle they are not 
discussed separately. 
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4/0 
4v1 
4/1 
4v2 
Chapter 4 
Question: 
Contemplation of the Five Skandhas80 9 verses 
The sutras state that there are five skandhas. 
What do you say about this? 
Form that is separate from the cause of form8l 
Is inconceivable 
A cause of form separate from form 
Is inconceivable 
As for 'cause of form'. It is like threads being the cause 
of the cloth. If you takeaway the threads, there is no cloth, 
and if you cast away the cloth, there is no thread. The cloth 
is like form, the threads are like its cause 
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Question: What is the error in saying that form exists 
separately from its cause? 
Reply: 
Form which existed separately from the cause of form 
Would be form without a cause. 
A dharma which exists without a cause? 
This is not correct. 
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4/2 It is like a cloth existing separately from its threads, which 
would be a cloth without a cause. Things which are uncaused 
and yet exist are not found anywhere in the world. 
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Question: In the Buddha-dharma, in the doctrines of outsiders 
(non-Buddhists) and in worldly teachings there are dharmas 
which are uncaused. Buddhism has the three inactive (dharmas)85 
which, being inactive are permanent and therefore without 
causes. In the non-Buddhist teachings they have space, time, 
33 
direction, soul, atoms, nirvana and so forth. In the teachings 
of the ordinary world there are emptiness, time, direction and 
so on. These three äharmas, being nowhere non-existent are 
consequently called 'permanent'. Being permanent, they are 
uncaused, so how can you say that uncaused d. harmas do not 
exist in the world? 
(6c3) Reply: 
These 'uncaused dharmas' only exist as figures of speech. If 
we ponder and analyse them we find they are non-existent. If 
dharmas have their being through causes and conditions, we 
ought iiot to say that they are uncaused. If they have no 
causes and conditions then it is as we have said. 
Question: Causes are of two kinds: 
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One is the actual 
cause, the other is the 'figurative cause'. These 'uncaused 
dharmas' have no actual cause, they merely have a figurative 
cause, to make people know of them. 
Reply: Although they have figurative causes, you are not 
correct. Just as 'Space' is refuted, in the (next chapter on 
the) six elements, so the remaining items will be refuted 
later. Moreover, since even visible things can be refuted, 
how much more so atoms and other invisible things? This is 
why we state that there are no uncaused dharmas in the world. 
Question: If (we said that) the cause of form existed 
separately from form, what would be wrong with that? 
Reply: 
4v3 If its cause existed, separate from form, 
Then this 'cause' would be without an effect. 
If you are saying that there are causes without effects 
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- This circumstance does not exist. 
4/3 If we eliminate the effect, i. e. form, and merely have the 
cause of form, this would be a cause without an effect. 
Question: What is wrong with there being a cause with no 
effect? 
Reply: Nowhere in the world do you find a cause without an 
effect, and why? It is by virtue of its effect that we call 
something a cause. If there is no effect, how can you call 
it a cause? 
Moreover, if there is no effect within the cause, why should 
things not arise from no-cause? This topic is similar to* that 
dealt with in chapter one, on the refutation of causality. 
Therefore, no cause exists without an effect. 
Moreover: 
4v4 If form were already existent, 
Then it would have no use for a 'cause of form'. 
If form did not exist 
Then, too, it would have no use for form. 
4/4 In neither case is there a cause for form. If form pre- 
existed in the cause, the cause would not be called the cause 
of form. If no form pre-existed in the cause, in that case 
too the cause would be termed the cause of form. 
Question: If both these cases are wrong, then what is wrong 
with there being simply uncaused form? 
Reply: 
4v5 For form to exist and yet be uncaused - 
This is altogether wrong 
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For this reason, one who has insight 
Should not analyse forms. 
4/5 Whether the effect inheres in the cause, or whether no 
effect inheres in the cause: such matters remain inconceivable. 
How much more so the existence of form without cause? This is 
why it is said 'for form to exist and yet be uncaused - this is 
altogether wrong', and therefore one who has insight should not 
analyse form. 
'Analyser' is a name for the common man87 who, bound by 
ignorance, desire and attachment to form, consequently 
develops from his perverted views distinctions and vain 
arguments, speculating that the effect inheres or does not 
inhere in the cause, and so forth. If you search for form in 
this way, it is never attainable, and therefore a man of 
insight 
88 
should not analyse. 
Further: 
4v6 If (you say that) the effect resembles the cause, 
This is not correct. 
If (you say that) the effect does not resemble the cause 
This too is incorrect. 
416 If (you say that the effect and the cause resemble each other, 
this is not correct, because the cause is subtle, the effect 
gross. Cause and effect, form and function89 etc. are 
different from each other. Just as cloth is similar to thread, 
but we do not call thread 'cloth', for threads are many but 
cloth is one, so we cannot say that cause and effect resemble 
each other. To say that cause and effect do not resemble each 
other is also wrong, for just as hempen thread does not make 
thin silk, and coarse thread will not produce fine cloth, so 
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we cannot say that cause and effect are dissimilar. 
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Both 
ideas are wrong, so there is neither form, nor cause-of-form. 
4v7 The skandha of reception, the skandha of conception 
the skandhas of predisposition and consciousness 
And all remaining dharmas, 
May be taken together with the skandha of form. 
4/7 The (other) four skandhas and all dharmas should also be 
contemplated and refuted in the same way. And now the author, 
wishing to extol the idea of emptiness, says in a verse; 
4v8 
. 
If a man has a question 
And you try to answer it without emptiness, 
You will be unable to make an answer 
It will be wholly the same as the other's doubts. 
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4v9 If a man makes a criticism 
Explaining the other's errors without recourse to emptiness 
He will not succeed in his criticism 
It will be wholly the same as the other's doubts. 
4/9 If, during a discussion, each party seizes on to a particular 
position and they debate without reference to the idea of 
emptiness they will never conclude the debate, and all will be 
together in doubt. For example, a man says 'a jug is 
impermanent'. His opponent says 'why is it impermanent'? and 
he replies: 'because it arises from an impermanent cause'. 
This is not what one would call an answer. Why not? Because 
there is still the uncertainty of not knowing whether the 
cause is permanent or impermanent. 
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(7a25) If, wishing to explain the other's erroneous views, he simply 
declares, without relying on emptiness, that all dharmas are 
impermanent, this is not what one would call a criticism, and 
why? Because you by your 'impermanence' have refuted my 
'permanence' but I by my 'permanence' can refute your 
'impermanence', saying that if things truly were impermanent 
there would be no karma and consequences, that the dharmas of 
eye and ear, etc., would cease every instant and that there 
would be no distinctions (between sin and merit etc. ). Such 
fallacies as these will never succeed as criticisms, being at 
the same level as the opponent's doubts. 
(7bl) However, if one relies on emptiness to refute permanence, no 
error is involved, and why? Because such a man does not cling 
to the mark of 'emptiness'. Therefore if one even wants to 
debate, he should rely upon the idea of emptiness; how much 
more so if he desires to seek the characteristic of release 
from affliction, and calm extinction. 
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Chapter 5 Contemplation of the six elements92 8 verses 
5/0 Question: The six elements all have their fixed 
characteristics. It is because they have these fixed 
characteristics that they are the six elements. 
Reply: 
5v1 Before there was the characteristic of space 
There was no dharma of space 
If space had been pre-existent 
Then it would have been without characteristics. 
5/1 If the dharma of space had existed before there were the 
characteristics of space, space would have been without 
characteristics, and why? What we mean by the characteristic 
of space is 'a place without form'. Form is something created 
and impermanent. Before forms arise, not yet having arisen 
they do not cease, thus at that time there is no 
characteristic of space. It is only because there is form 
that there are places without form. To be a place without 
form is what is meant by the characteristic of space. 
Question: What is wrong in saying that there is space with- 
out characteristics? 
Reply: 
5v2 Such a dharma without characteristics 
Is nowhere to be found 
In a dharma without characteristics 
Characteristics would have nothing to characterise. 
5/2 If you search for dharmas without characteristics amongst 
either permanent or impermanent dharmas you will not find any. 
It is as the authors93 say; "How do we know that 'This exists' 
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and 'This does not exist'? Because each entity has its own 
characteristics". 
94 
Arising, abiding and ceasing are the 
characteristics of active (things) and non-arising, non- 
abiding and non-ceasing are the characteristics of the inactive. 
95 
If space had no characteristics, it would not be space. Nor is 
it correct to say that it previously had no characteristics, 
but subsequently its characteristics manifested as 
characteristics. If it had no characteristics before, then 
there was no dharma to be characterised, and why? 
5v3 Whether 'having characteristics' or 'not having 
characteristics' 
No characteristic has any place in which to reside. 
Nor does it reside in any other place 
Apart from 'having characteristics' or 'not having 
characteristics'. 
5/3 For example, having a hump, horns, hair at the end of the tail 
and a dewlap hanging below the neck, are called the 
characteristics of a cow, and apart from these charact- 
eristics there is no cow. If there were no cow, there would 
be nowhere for these various attributes to reside. This is 
why we say that characteristics have nowhere to manifest in an 
entity with no characteristics. In things which have 
characteristics, too, there is nowhere for (further) 
characteristics to reside, because the characteristics are 
already existent. As an example, the characteristics of fire 
do not reside in the characteristics of water, 
96 because water 
already has its own characteristics. 
Moreover, if characteristics were to abide in (a thing) with- 
out characteristics, then it would be uncaused, 
97 
and something 
which is uncaused is not regarded as a dharma. That which has 
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characteristics, 
98 the characteristics, 
99 
and characterisation, 
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are always mutually interdependent, and there is no further 
third state of characterisation apart from a dharma either 
having characteristics or not having characteristics. This is 
why it says in the verse (v3) "nor does it reside in any other 
place apart from having characteristics or not having 
characteristics". 
Further: 
5v4 Because the dharma of 'characteristic' does not exist 
There is likewise no dharma of 'characterisation'. 
And because no dharma of characterisation exists, 
No dharma of 'characteristic' exists either. 
5/4 Since there is nowhere for a characteristic to reside, there is 
no dharma of 'characterisation'. Since there is no dharma of 
characterisation, there is no dharma of characteristic. Why 
is this? Because characterisation exists by virtue of 
characteristics, and characteristics exist by virtue of 
characterisation: the two are causally interdependent. 
5v5 Therefore, there are no characteristics, 
Neither is there any characterisation. 
And apart from characteristics and characterisation, 
No other entity exists. 
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5/5 If you make a thorough investigation of causality from 
beginning to end, you will not be able to find a fixed nature 
for characteristics and characterisation. Since neither of 
these two can be discovered, all dharmas are completely 
inexistent. 
102 
All dharmas are completely comprised in these 
two dharmas of characteristic and characterisation, with either 
the characteristic bringing about the characterisation, or the 
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characterisation bringing about the characteristic. For 
example, smoke is regarded as a characteristic of fire, but on 
the other hand fire may be considered a characteristic of 
smoke. 
Question: If there is no existence, then there must surely 
be non-existence? 
Reply: 
5v6 If we allow that there is no existence 
Then how could there be non-existence? 
And since there would be neither existence nor non-existence, 
Who would be the knower of existence or non-existence? 
5/6 When ordinary things either decay of themselves or are 
destroyed by others, they are termed non-existent. Non- 
existence does not exist in itself but derives its being from 
existence. This is why it is said, 'if we allow that there is 
no existence, then how could there be non-existence? ' If even 
eyes' seeing and the ears' hearing cannot be found, how much 
more so 'inexistent entities'? 
Question: (Granted that because existence does not exist, 
non-existence does not exist either, yet surely there must be 
a knower of existence and non existence? 
Reply: If there were such a knower, either he would have to 
reside in existence, or he would have to reside in non- 
existence. Since existence and non-existence have already 
been refuted, such a knower is equally refuted. 
5v7 Know therefore that space 
Is neither existent nor non-existent 
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Neither a characteristic nor characterisable103 
And that the other five are the same as space. 
5/7 Just as one may search for the characteristic of space in 
various ways but cannot find it, so the other five elements104 
are also the same. 
Question: Space is neither the first nor the last (of the six 
elements), so why do you refute it first? 
105 
Reply: Earth, water, fire and wind are causally combined, and 
therefore easily refuted, and because consciousness is the 
cause of pain and pleasure it is recognised to be impermanent 
and changeable and thus is easily refuted. Space does nct 
possess such characteristics, but the ordinary man imagines it 
to be existent, so this is why we refute it first. Moreover, 
space has the function of supporting the four great (elements, 
fire, etc. ), and consciousness exists by virtue of the four 
great elements. 
1o6 
Therefore we first refute the basic thing, 
and the others are automatically refuted. 
Question: Ordinary people all see things as existent or non- 
existent. Why do you alone, in contradiction to the world, say 
that what is seen does not exist? 
Reply: 
5v8 The superficial see dharmas 
As having the characteristics of existence or non-existence. 
And thus are unable to perceive 
The calm serenity of the cessation of views. 
107. 
5/8 When a person has not yet attained the Way, 
108 
he is unable to 
perceive the true character of dharmas, 
l09 
and because of his 
desires and false perceptions he generates all kinds of vain 
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arguments. Seeing a dharma as it comes into being he asserts 
that it is 'existent'. Clinging to its characteristics he 
says it exists. Seeing a dharma ceasing to exist he asserts 
that it is cut off, and clinging to this characteristic he says 
that it is inexistent. The man of insight, 
110 
seeing that 
dharmas arise, extinguishes the view that they are non- 
existent, and seeing that they cease extinguishes the view that 
they exist. 
ill 
Consequently, although there is something in 
. regard 
to dharmas which he sees, it is like an illusion or a 
dream, so that he ceases even to hold a view of 'a Way free of 
112 
outflows'. How much more so other views? 
Therefore, someone who does not perceive the calm tranquility 
of the cessation of views, will only see things as existing 
or see them as not existing. 
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Chapter 6 Contemplation of passion and the impassioned one113 
10 verses 
4 8 /0 Question: The sutras say that desire, hatred and delusion11 
are the foundation of the world. Desire has various names. It 
is called love, or attachment, or passion, or lust, or desire, 
and there are other such names as these. Such obsessions 
depend upon living beings, and these living beings are 
'impassioned'. Desire means the dharma of passion. Because 
of the dharma of passion and the impassioned one, there is- 
desire. It is the same with the other two passions; where 
there is anger, there is an angry being, and where there is 
delusion, there is a deluded being. It is because of these 
three poisons115 that the three forms of karmic activity ariseý16 
and it is because of the three karmic activities that the three 
realms117 arise, and all dharmas consequently have their 
existence. 
Reply: 
(8a22) Even although the sutras mention the names of the 'three 
poisons', if you seek for their reality you will not find them, 
and why? 
6v1 If, separate from the (dharma of) passion 
The impassioned being pre-existed independently, 
Then surely the passion should arise 
On account of this impassioned one. 
6v2 If there were no impassioned one, 
How could there be passion? 
When passion exists or does not exist 
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It will be the same for the impassioned. 
6 /2 If there really is an established impassioned one beforehand, 
then there is no need for any further passion, because the 
impassioned one already has passion. If no impassioned one 
exists beforehand, in this case too no passion should arise, 
for there must first be an impassioned one for passion to 
arise subsequently. If there were no impassioned one 
beforehand, there would be no one to receive the passion. It 
is the same with passion itself. If passion really pre-existed 
apart from the individual it would be without a cause, so how 
could it arise? It would be like a fire without fuel. If no 
fixed passion existed beforehand, there would be no impassioned 
one. For this reason it says in the verse, 'when passion 
exists or does not exist, it will be the same for the 
impassioned'. 
Question: If it is impossible for passion and the impassioned 
one to arise one after the other in reciprocal dependence, 
what is wrong with them arising simultaneously? 
Reply: 
6v3 For the impassioned one and the passions 
To be established both together is not correct, 
For if the impassioned and the passions could combine 
They would not be mutually dependent. 
613 If passion and the impassioned were established simultaneously, 
they would not be reciprocally dependent. There would be 
passion independent of the impassioned and there would be the 
impassioned independent of passion, and these two would be 
permanencies, being already established and without any causes. 
Once permanence is admitted many errors follow, but no 
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liberation. Furthermore, we will now refute passion and the 
impassioned in terms of unity118 and difference. ; '. 
6v4 If the impassioned and passion are one, 
How can one dharma combine? 
If the impassioned and passion are different, 
How can different dharmas combine? 
6 /4 Either passion and the impassioned combine as one dharma, or 
they combine as different dharmas. If they are one then they 
do not combine, and why? How can one dharma combine with 
itself? It is like a fingertip which cannot touch itself. As 
for them combining as different dharmas, this too is 
impossible, and why? Because they are different. If each 
dharma is already complete then there is absolutely no need for 
further combination, for even though combined, they will still 
remain different. 
Moreover, unity and difference are both impossible, and why? 
6v5 If there is combination of one thing. 
It should be combination without any associatingý19 
If there is combination of different things 
This too should be combination without any associating. 
6 /5 If passions and the impassioned were one, this would perforce 
be called a combination, and the passions and the impassioned 
ought to be separate from any other causes. Moreover, if they 
were one, there ought not to be the two names, 'the passions' 
and he impassioned'. Passion is a dharma, the impassioned 
one is an individual. For an individual and a dharma to be 
regarded as a unity, is a great confusion. If passion and the 
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impassioned one are different from each other, and yet you 
claim they are a combination, then they should not need any 
further causes and conditions to be a combination. And if 
they are different and yet combined, then they ought to combine 
even though remote from each other. 
Question: That one thing does not combine may be granted, but 
we see with our eyes that different dharmas unite. 
Reply: 
6v6 If being different they nevertheless combine 
What kind of things are passions and the impassioned? 
For these two, having different characteristics before, 
Are subsequently said to have the characteristic of combining. 
6 /6 If passion and the impassioned one initially have different, 
fixed characteristics, and then afterwards unite, this is no 
unity, and why? Because their two characteristics, being 
previously different, are then later arbitrarily spoken of as 
a unity. 
Moreover: 
5v7 If passion and the impassioned one 
Pre-existed, each with different characteristics, 
Since they already had different characteristics, 
How can you say that they area unity? 
6/7 If passion and the impassioned one each previously had its own 
distinct characteristics, how can you now arbitrarily speak of 
them as a unity? 
Again : 
6v8 Having different characteristics does not work 
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So you want unity. 
Unity of characteristics does not work at all, 
So you again assert that there are differences. 
6/8 Having failed to establish the relationship between passion 
and the impassioned one in terms of different characteristics, 
you then say that they have a unity of characteristics. But 
there is a flaw in this unity of characteristics and it does 
not establish (the relationship between) passion and the 
impassioned one. So then, in order to establish their unity 
of characteristics you again assert their difference in 
characteristics. You yourself have fixed (concepts) but what 
you assert, is unfixed, and why? 
6v9 Since you have not established differences in characteristics 
Their unity of characteristics remains unestablished. 
Within what kind of difference, then 
Do you wish to speak of a unity? 
6/9 Since a difference in characteristics between the passions and 
the impassioned one has not been established, their unity of 
characteristics is not established either. In terms of what 
kind of difference do you want to speak of a unity of 
characteristics? 
Further: 
6v10 Just as in the passions and the impassioned one 
Neither combination nor non-combination is found, 
So all dharmas are the same; 
Neither combination nor non-combination is found. 
6/10 As with passion, so it is with hatred and delusion. As with 
the three poisons, so it is with all the afflictions and all 
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dharmas, which neither precede nor succeed each other and are 
neither combined nor separate, but are wholly established 
through causality. 
50 
Chapter 7 Contemplation of the three marks 
120 
35 verses 
7 /0 Question: The sutras say that dharmas have the three marks of 
arising, abiding and ceasing. Things arise through the dharma 
of arising, they abide through the dharma of abiding, and they 
cease through the dharma of ceasing, and this is how the various 
dharmas exist. 
Reply: Not so, and why? Because the three marks have no 
21 fixed (nature). Are these three marks to be regarded as active, 
able to operate as122 the marks of the active, or as inactive, 
yet able to operate as the marks of the active? Neither is 
correct, and why? 
7v1 If 'arising' is active 
Then it should have the three marks 
If arising is not active 
How can you call it a mark of the active? 
7/1 If arising is active, it ought to have the three marks of 
arising, abiding and ceasing, but this is not correct and why? 
Because these (three) are mutually opposed. 'Mutually opposed' 
means that the mark of arising should cause dharmas to arise, 
the mark of abiding should cause dharmas to abide, and the 
mark of cessation should cause them to cease. When a dharma 
is at the point of arising, there should not be present the 
opposing dharmas, the marks of abiding and cessation. 
Simultaneity (of these marks) is thus incorrect, in the same 
way that light and darkness do not coexist. Therefore 'arising' 
cannot be an active dharma, and the same applies to the marks 
of abiding and ceasing. 
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(9a19) Question: If arising is not active, what is wrong with saying 
that it is inactive? 
Reply: If arising were inactive, how could it possibly 
operate as marks of active dharmas? Why is this? It is 
because inactive dharmas have no nature. It is because of the 
cessation of activity that they are called inactive, and indeed 
this is why we speak of non-arising and non-ceasing as the marks 
of the unconditions. Moreover, they have no own-mark, and 
therefore they are non-dharmas and cannot operate as the marks 
of dharmas, just as a rabbit's horns - or a tortoise's hair etc. 
cannot operate as the marks of dharm. as. Therefore arising is 
not inactive, and the same goes for abiding and ceasing. 
Further: 
7v2 The three marks, whether combined or separate, 
Cannot be marked. 
For how in one place, at one time 
Could there be three marks? 
7/2 Whether (you say that) these marks of arising, abiding and 
ceasing can operate as the marks of active dharmas individually, 
or they operate as the marks of active dhazmas by acting in 
combination; neither is correct, and why? You may say that 
they operate individually; but in any one place either there 
exists a mark or there does not exist a mark. When something 
is arising, there (should be) no abiding or ceasing. When it 
is abiding there should be no arising or ceasing. When it is 
ceasing there should be no arising or abiding. 
You may say that they operate in combination; but they are 
mutually exclusive. How can you say that they exist 
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simultaneously? If you say that the three makrs themselves 
have three marks, this is incorrect too, and why? 
7v3 If you say that arising, abiding and ceasing 
Themselves possess the marks of the active 
This, if so, would make for an endless (regression). 
If not, they would not be active. 
7/3 If you say that arising, abiding and ceasing themselves have 
the marks of active (dharm, as), then arising itself would have 
an arising, 
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an abiding and a ceasing, and these three marks 
would again each have their own marks, and if this were so it 
would be endless. If, on the other hand, you say that they 
have no marks themselves, then these three marks ought not 
to be called active dharmas, and they will be unable to 
operate as the marks of active dharmas. 
Question: You state that the three marks would lead to an 
endless regression, but this is not correct. Although arising, 
abiding and ceasing are active, there is no endless regression. 
Why is this? 
7v4 That which arises in the arising-of-arising 
Produces another 'original arising'. 
What arises in that original arising 
Produces the arising of arising in return. 
7/4 When a dharma arises, seven dharmas, including the dharma 
itself, arise together: (1) the dharma, (2) arising, 
(3) abiding, (4) ceasing, (5) arising-of-arising, 
(6) abiding-of-abiding, (7) ceasing-of-ceasing. In these 
seven dharmas original arising can produce the six dharmas 
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excepting itself. Arising-of-arising produces original 
arising, and original arising produces arising-of-arising. 
Thus the three marks, though active, are not an endless series. 
Reply: 
7v5 If, as you say, the arising-of-arising 
Can produce original arising 
Since arising-of-arising comes from original arising 
How can it produce original arising? 
7 /5 If the arising of arising can produce original arising, then 
such an arising-of-arising cannot be said to have arisen from 
original arising, and why? If arising-of-arising arises from 
original arising, how can it produce original arising? 
Furthermore : 
7v6 If, as you say, original arising 
Can produce arising-of-arising 
Then, original arising arising from it, 
How could it produce arising-of-arising? 
7 /6 If you assert that original arising is able to produce the 
arising of-arising, then this original arising cannot be said 
to arise from the arising-of-arising, and why? Because 
original arising arises from the arising of-arising. How can 
it produce arising-of-arising? The dharma of the arising-of- 
arising is supposed to produce original arising, yet the 
arising-of-arising cannot now produce original arising. When 
arising-of-arising has not yet acquired its own self-substance 
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how can it produce original arising? Hence original arising 
cannot produce arising-of-arising. 
Question: It is at the moment of arising of arising-of-arising, 
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neither before nor after, that it can produce original arising. 
Just at the moment of arising of arising-of-arising it can 
produce original arising ... 
Reply: Not so, and why? 
7v7 If at the moment when arising-of-arising arises, 
It can produce original arising. 
Arising-of-arising not yet existing, 
How can it produce original arising? 
7/7 It could perhaps be, as you say, that-at the moment when 
arising-of-arising arises it can produce original arising - 
but in fact it would not yet exist. Therefore, at the instant 
when arising-of-arising arises, it is impossible for it to 
produce original arising. 
IvxvVw, 
7v8 - If original arising, at the moment of its arising, 
Could produce the arising-of-arising. 
Original arising not yet existing, 
How could it produce arising-of-arising? 
7 /8 It could perhaps be, as you say, that at the moment of original 
arising's arising it could produce the arising-of-arising, but 
in fact it would not yet exist, hence original arising, at its 
moment of arising could not give rise to the arising-of-arising. 
Question: 
7v9 Just as a lamp can illumine itself 
And also illumine others, 
So, in the same way, the dharma of arising 
Produces itself and produces other things. 
7/9 Just as a light brought in to a dark room complebrillumines 
55 
every object, and also illumines itself, so also arising is 
similar; it can produce other things and it can produce itself. 
Reply: Not so, and why? 
7v10 In a light there is naturally no darkness 
And in the place where it abides there is no darkness. 
'Destruction of darkness' is what is meant by light. 
Where there is no darkness there is no light. 
7/10 The substance of light is itself without darkness, and places 
reached by the light are also without darkness. Since light 
and dark are opposites, light means the destruction of darkness. 
Where there is no darkness there is no light. How can you say 
that the lamp illuminates both itself and other things? 
Question: The lamp does not have light before it is produced, 
and it does not have light after it is produced, it is simply 
that at the moment of production of the light it is able to 
illumine itself and illumine others. 
Reply: 
7v11 How could a lamp at the moment of arising 
Be able to destroy darkness? 
Such a lamp at the first instant of arising 
Cannot penetrate the darkness. 
7/11 At the instant of its arising the light is said to be half 
arisen and half not-yet-arisen. If the substance of the light 
is not yet complete, how can it destroy the darkness? More- 
over, the light cannot reach 
126 
the darkness, just as a man, 
catching a thief, considers him nullified. 
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If you claim 
that light, even though it does not reach the darkness never- 
theless destroys the darkness, this too is wrong, and why? 
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7v12 - If -a light, before it reached darkness, 
Could nevertheless destroy the darkness, 
A light in here 
Would destroy all darkness. 
7/12 If a light had the power to destroy darkness without reaching 
it, then a lamp lit here would be able to destroy darkness 
everywhere, because the two would have no contact. Moreover, 
a light should not (be said to) illumine itself and illumine 
others, and why? 
7v13 If a light' could illumine itself 
And could illumine other things 
Darkness, too could darken itself 
And also darken other things. 
7/13 If light, being the opposite of darkness, can illumine itself 
and also illumine. other things, then darkness, being the 
opposite of light, should also darken itself and other things. 
If darkness, being the opposite of light cannot darken both 
itself and other things, then light, being the opposite of 
darkness, should likewise be unable to illumine itself and 
other things. Therefore light is no illustration. Because we 
have not yet exhaustively refuted the causes and conditions of 
'arising', we must now further expound them. 
7v14 When arising has not yet arisen 
How can it produce itself? 
If, already arisen, it produces itself, 
Being already arisen, why would it need to arise? 
7/14 On an occasion when arising produces itself, either it will arise 
when it has already arisen, or it will arise when it has not 
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yet arisen. If it arises without being arisen then it is not a 
dharma, and if it is not a dharma, how can it produce itself? 
If you say that it arises when already arisen, then it may be 
considered as already complete, and there is no need for any 
further arising, just as something that has already been made 
should not be made again. So, whether already arisen or not 
yet arisen, neither of these two arises, and consequently there 
is no arising. You earlier said that arising was like a lamp 
in that it could both produce itself and produce others. This 
is not correct, and the same goes for abiding and ceasing. 
Again : 
7v15 Arising is not produced after it has arisen, 
For is it produced before it has arisen. 
Nor is it produced at the same time as it arises 
This has already been dealt with in (the chapter or) 'going and 
coming' . 
7/15 'Arising' means that by a combination of causes there is arising. 
In something already produced there is no. activity, and hence 
no arising, and in something not yet produced there is no 
activity and hence no arising. In the instant of arising 
there is also none. You cannot have an instant of arising 
separated from a dharma of 'arising', and you cannot have a 
dharma of arising separate from the instant of arising. How 
can there be arising in the moment of arising? This point has 
already been dealt with in (the chapter on) going and coming. 
(10a25) A dharma which has already arisen cannot arise. Why is this? 
For something already arisen to arise again and continue thus 
repeatedly would be endless, like something already made being 
made again. 
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Moreover if, after having arisen, it were again to arise, by 
what dharma of arising would it arise? Its mark of arising 
would not yet have arisen, yet you say that it arises after 
already having arisen. This contradicts your own statement, 
and why? Although the mark of arising has not yet arisen you 
say there is arising. If you say that there is arising even 
though something has not yet arisen, the dharrna can either be 
already arisen, and yet still arise, or it can be not-yet- 
arisen, and yet still arise. You earlier said that it arose 
after having already arisen, but this is not settled. 
Again, just as something already burnt cannot-burn again, and 
something already gone cannot go again, for the same reasons as 
apply in these cases, something already arisen cannot arise 
again. 
(10b4) A dhama not yet arisen does not arise either, and why? If a 
dharma has not yet arisen, it cannot combine with its 
productive causes, and if it does not combine with its 
productive causes, then there is no arising of the dharmas. If 
dharmas arose without having combined with their productive 
causes, then there would be action without dharmas of action, 
going without dharmas of going, passion without dharmas of 
passion, anger without dharmas of anger and delusion without 
dharmas of delusion, and such being the case all dharmas in the 
world would be negated. Therefore, a not-yet-arisen 
ä. harma 
does not arise. 
(10b9) Moreover, if a dharma not yet arisen could arise, all dharmas in 
the world not yet arisen should arise. All the ordinary people 
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in whom enlightenment has not yet arisen could now produce the 
dharma of imperishable bodhi128 (enlightenment). An arhat129 
freed from the afflictions would now develop the-afflictions, 
and hares without horns would now produce them, but this is not 
right. Therefore dharmas do not arise when they are not yet 
arisen. 
(10bl4) Question: If dharmas do not arise when they are not yet 
arisen, it is because they do not yet have causes; they lack 
doing, doer, time and space, etc,, and this is why they do not 
arise. If conditions such as doing, doer, time and space were 
combined then the not-yet-arisen dharma would arise. Thus for 
you to say that no dharmas at all arise that are not-yet 
arisen is not correct. 
(10b18) Reply: If a dharma is produced by the combination of con- 
ditions such as time, space, etc., then it is not a pre- 
existent thing that arises, nor a non-pre-existent thing that 
arises, nor a both pre-existent and non-pre-existent thing 
that arises, for these three (possibilities) have already been 
refuted. Consequently something already arisen does not arise, 
and something not yet arisen does not arise. 
(10b20) In the moment of arising there is no arising either, and why? 
(Because) the already-risen part does not arise, and the not- 
yet-arisen part does not arise, as has already been shown. 
Furthermore, if there were a moment of arising separate from 
arising, this moment of arising would itself have to arise, but 
there is no moment of arising separate from arising, and there- 
fore in the moment of arising there is no arising either. 
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(10b24) Moreover, if you say that the moment of arising itself arises, 
there would be the fallacy of two arisings; the first known as 
the moment of arising and the second being the arising within 
the moment of arising, and to have these two is incorrect. 
There are not two. dharmas involved, for how can there be two 
arisings? Therefore, 'in the moment of arising too, there is 
no arising'. 
(10b27) Moreover, before the dharma of arising is manifested, there is 
no moment of arising, and since there is no moment of arising, 
what could arising depend on? Therefore you cannot say that 
the moment of arising arises. According to our investigation 
then, there is no arising, in what has already arisen, there 
is no arising in what has not yet arisen, and there is no 
arising in the moment of arising. Because there is no arising, 
arising is not established, and arising not being established, 
abiding and ceasing also cannot be established. Since arising, 
abiding and ceasing cannot be established, active dharmas 
cannot be established. This is why it says in the verse that 
this has already been dealt with in relation to the gone, the 
not-yet-gone and the moment of going. 
Question: 
(10c3) We do not exactly130 say that there is arising in the already- 
arisen, arising in the not-yet-arisen and arising in the moment 
of arising, but merely that through the combination of causal 
conditions there is arising. 
Reply: Even though you state it like this, it is still 
incorrect, and why? 
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7v16 If you say that there is arising in the moment of arising 
This fact has not been established. 
In the moment when conditions are combining, 
How can there be arising? 
7/16 Arising in the moment of arising has been refuted already- for 
various reasons. How can you again say that there is arising. 
as a result of the combination of causal conditions? Whether 
causal conditions are complete or incomplete, they are refuted 
together with arising. 
Again : 
7v17 If a dharma arises from conditions 
Its nature will be calm extinction. 
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Therefore arising and the moment of arising 
132 Would both be nirvanic. 
7/17 Dharmas produced by conditions have no self-nature and are 
consequently nirvanic. Nirvana is considered to be non- 
existent, but this non-existence and the marks of this non- 
existence cut off the flow of words and put an end to all 
sophistries. 
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The meaning of 'conditions' may be likened to 
cloth mich exists because of its threads, or a rush mat which 
exists because of the rushes. If the threads themselves had 
fixed characteristics, they would not come from hemp. If the 
cloth itself had fixed characteristics, it would not come 
from the threads, but in fact we do get cloth from threads, and 
threads from hemp, so threads have no fixed nature, and cloth 
has no fixed nature. It is like fire and fuel, which are 
established by the combination of causal conditions and have no 
self-nature. Without fuel there is no fire, and without fire 
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there is no fuel. 
(10c20) All dhaxmas are like this; therefore dharmas arising from 
causal conditions have no self-nature, and having no self-nature 
are empty and unreal like a mirage. This is why the verse says 
that arising and the moment of arising are both nirvanic. 
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We should not say that there is arising of the moment of 
arising. Although you wish to establish by various reasonings134 
a characteristic of 'arising', these are all sophistries and do 
not have the characteristic of nirvana. 
Question: There is definitely a differentiation between the 
three periods of time. 
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A dharma which belongs to the future 
may arise. If there are causes and conditions it will arise. 
How can you say that it will not arise? 
Reply: 
7v18 If there is a dharma which has not yet arisen, 
And you say that it will arise, 
If this dharma already exists 
What need will it have for any further arising? 
7/18 If, in the future period of time, there is a not-yet-arisen 
dharma which arises, since this dharma will already have 
arisen, why will it need to arise again? An existent dharma 
should not have to arise again. 
Question: Although it will exist in the future, this is not 
like the characteristic of (being in) the present. We call it 
arisen when it takes on the characteristic of being in the 
present. 
Answer: The characteristic of present existence is not in the 
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future. Since it is not in the future, how can you say that a 
future dharma arises? 
(11a3) If something exists it is not regarded as future, but as 
present. What is present has no need to arise again, and 
since neither of these arise, there is no arising. Further- 
more; you say that arising at the moment-of arising can also 
give rise to something else. We must now give a further 
explanation: 
7v19 You say that there is an arising at the moment of arising 
Then there must be something which is produced; 
How can there be any further arising - 
Which can produce this arising? 
7/19 If an arising in the moment of arising can produce something 
else, what is it that this arising in turn produces? 
7v20 If you say that there are repeated arisings, 
Then the arising of arising will continue endlessly. 
If there is arising apart from the arising of arising, 
Then dharmas can produce themselves. 
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7/20 If there is repeated arising within arising, then arising will 
be endless. If there were no such repeated arising and yet 
there were arising, then all dharmas could produce themselves, 
but in fact this is not the case. 
F1urthe r: 
7v21 Existing dharmas should not arise 
Non-existent dharmas likewise should not arise. 
Existent and non-existent together do not arise. 
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This idea has been discussed previously. 
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7/21 Ordinarily, whatever has arisen is regarded either as an 
existent dharma which has been produced, or as an inexistent 
dharma which has been produced, or as a both existent-and- 
inexistent dharma which has been produced. None of these is 
correct, and this has already been explained. Beyond these 
three possibilities there is no other (form of) arising, and 
consequently there is no arising. 
Further: 
7v22 At the moment of cessation of dharmas - 
At this point there should be no arising. 
And if dharmas have no cessation 
Then there is no question of arising at all. 
7/22 If a dharma has the mark of cessation, then this dharma should 
not arise, and why? Because the two characteristics are 
mutually opposed. One is the mark of cessation by which we 
know that a dharma is ceasing, the other is the mark of arising, 
by which we know that a dharma is arising. The two marks are 
the opposite of each other, and they cannot co-exist 
simultaneously, so a dha=a with the mark of cessation cannot 
arise. 
(11a23) Question: Even though dharmas with the mark of cessation 
should not arise, surely dharmas without the mark of cessation 
may arise? 
Reply: Since all active dharmas are ceasing every instant, 
there are no non-ceasing dharmas. 
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Apart from active dharmas, 
there are no fixed, inactive dharmas. 'Inactive dharma' is merely 
a designation, and this is why we say that if dharmas do not 
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cease this problem (of arising) does not occur. 
Question: Eiren if dharmas have no arising, surely they have 
abiding? 
Reply: 
7v23 Non-abiding dharmas do not abide 
Abiding dharmas do not abide either. 
Nor does the moment of abiding abide. 
Since they do not arise, how can they abide? 
7/23 Non-abiding dharmas do not abide because they have no mark of 
abiding. Abiding dharmas similarly do not I abide, and why? 
Because they already have abiding. Abiding exists by virtue 
of movement. 
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If a dharma of abiding already e: iists it will 
not need to abide again. There is no abiding, in the moment 
of abiding either, and since there is no moment of abiding 
apart from abiding and not abiding, there is no abiding. Even 
though you search everywhere in this way for abiding you will 
not be able to find it. 
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It is the same as no arising, and 
if there is no arising, how can there be abiding? 
Further: 
7v24 When dharmas are ceasing 
They cannot be abiding 
And if dharm. as do not cease, 
The problem (of abiding) will not occur at all. 
7/24 If a dharma has the mark of cessation, then this dharma will 
not have the mark of abiding, and why? Because in the one 
dharma there would be two contradictory marks, the first being 
the mark of ceasing, the second being the mark of abiding. It 
is not possible for abiding and ceasing to exist in the same 
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time and place. Therefore you cannot say that a dharma with 
the mark of ceasing is abiding. 
Question: Surely if dharmas are not ceasing they can abide? 
Reply: There are no dharmas which are not ceasing, and why? 
7v25 Every dharma which exists 
Has the marks of old age and death. 
You will never see any dharma 
Abiding without old age and death. 
7/25 All dharmas at the moment of their arising are impermanent. 
Always accompanying impermanence are two things, namely old 
age and death. All dharmas are the same in this respect, and 
because old age and death are always present there is no 
moment of abiding. 
Further: 
7v26 Abiding is not abiding of its own marks, 
Nor is it abiding of the marks of something else 
Just as arising does not produce itself 
Nor does it produce the marks of anything else. 
7/26 If there were a dharma of abiding, then it could either be 
regarded as the abiding of its own marks or as the abiding of 
another thing's marks, but neither of these is correct. If it 
is its own marks which abide then it would be considered 
permanent. All active dharmas arise from causal conditions, and 
if a dhai a of abiding were self-abidi ng, it would not be 
considered active. If abiding were the abiding of own marks, 
dharmas too ought to abide in their own marks. Just as the 
eye cannot see itself, so it is with abiding. 
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(11b24) If it is abiding of another thing's marks, that abiding would 
again have to abide, and abiding would be an endless regression. 
Moreover, we see different dharmas producing different marks, 
bu* we cannot find uncaused, different dharmas which neverthe- 
less have different marks, because their different marks are not 
fixed. To say that there is abiding on the basis of different 
marks is not correct. 
Question: If there is no abiding, surely there must be ceasing? 
Reply: No, and why? 
7v27 A dhama already ceased does not cease 
And when not yet ceased also does not cease. 
At the moment of ceasing, too, there is no ceasing. 
With no arising, how can there be ceasing? 
7/27 If a dharma has already ceased, it does not cease, because it 
has previously ceased. Similarly, if it has not yet ceased it 
does not cease, because it is without the mark of cessation. 
It does not cease at the moment of ceasing either, for apart 
from these (first) two there is no further 'moment of ceasing'. 
Thus, according to our investigation the dharma of cessation is 
nothing but non-arising, for where there is no arising how can 
there be ceasing? 
Further: 
7v28 If dh. armas did abide 
They could not cease. 
If dharrnas did not abide, 
Then, too, they could not cease. 
7/28 If dharmas really did abide there would be no cessation, and 
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why? Because they would have the mark of abiding. If a dharma 
of abiding ceased there would be two marks, the mark of abiding 
and the mark of ceasing. Therefore, you cannot say that 
abiding contains ceasing, just as, in the same way being born 
and dying cannot exist simultaneously. But if dbarmas do not 
abide, there is no cessation either, and why? Because they are 
without the mark of abiding. If they are without the mark of 
abiding then they are not dharmas, and not being dharmas, how 
can they cease? 
Further: 
7v29 A certain dharma, at a certain moment 
Does not cease in that same. moment 
A certain dharma, at another moment 
Does not cease in that other moment. 
7/29 If a dharma has the mark of ceasing, then either this dharma's 
ceasing is a mark belonging to itself, or its ceasing is a 
mark of something else, but neither is correct, and why? As an 
example, milk does not cease at the moment when it is milk, for 
while it is milk the mark of milk definitely abides. At the 
time when it is not milk, it does not cease either, since if it 
is not milk you cannot say that it is ceasing to be milk. 
Further: 
7v30 It is the same with all dharmas; 
No mark of arising can be found 
Because of the mark of non-arising, 
There is also the mark of no-ceasing. 
7/30 As found in the foregoing investigation, no mark of arising can 
be discovered in any dharma, and at the same time there is no 
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mark of cessation. We have refuted arising, and therefore 
there is no arising. Since there is no arising, how can there 
be ceasing? If your mind is still undecided, I will now 
expound further reasons for cessation to be denied. 
7v31 If a dhazma is existent. 
Then there is no cessation. 
There could not be in one dhaxma 
The marks of both being and non-being. 
7/31 When a dharma is existent you may seek for a mark of cessation 
but you will not be able to find it, and why? How could there 
be, within one dharma, the marks of both being and non-being? 
They are like light and shadow which cannot occupy the same 
place. 
Further: 
7v32 If a dhazma is non-existent 
Then there is no cessation 
Just as, not having a second head 
You cannot out it off. 
7/32 If a dharma is non-existent, there is no characteristic of 
cessation. It is like a second head or a third hand - not 
having them, you cannot cut them off. 
Further: 
7v33 A dharma does not cease by virtue of its own marks, 
Nor by the marks of something else. 
Just as there is no arising from own marks 
Nor arising from the marks of another. 
7/33 As previously explained in relation to the mark of arising; 
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arising does not produce itself, nor does it arise from something 
else. To say that it arises out of its own substance would be 
incorrect, for everything is produced by causal conditions, and 
just as a finger tip is unable to touch itself, so arising 
cannot produce itself. Arising from some other source is also 
wrong, and why? When arising has not yet occurred, there should 
be no arising from anything else. Since there is no such arising, 
there is no self-substance, and since there is no self-substance 
there is likewise no other, thus arising from another is incorrect. 
The dharma of cessation is also like this: there is no 
cessation by own marks or by marks of others. 
Further: 
7v34 Arising, abiding and ceasing not being established, 
There is consequently no activity 
Since there are no active dharmas 
How can there be inactive ones? 
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7/34 You earlier stated that activity existed because of the marks 
of arising, abiding and ceasing. It is because of activity that 
there is inactivity. We have now shown by reasoned investigation 
that these three marks are untenable, so how can you say that 
there is activity? As we said before, there exist no dharmas 
without marks. Since there are no active dharmas, how can there 
be inactive dharmas? The characteristics of the inactive are 
non-arising, non-abiding and non-ceasing. 
Stopping of the marks of activity is what is meant by 'the 
characteristics of inactivity'. The inactive has no special 
marks of its own; the marks of the inactive are contingent upon 
these three marks. For example, heat is the mark of fire, 
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hardness is the mark of earth, and coldness is the mark of 
water, but the inactive is not like this. 
Question: If these (marks of) arising, abiding and ceasing 
are absolutely non-existent, how can you speak their names in 
this treatise? 
Reply: 
7v35 Like an illusion, like a dream 
Like a Gandharva-city; 
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The arising, abiding and ceasing of which we speak 
Have marks such as these. 
7/35 The characteristics of arising, abiding and ceasing are not 
fixed and real. Unenlightened people with their voracious 
attachments assert that they are fixed and real, so saints and 
sages, out of pity and compassion and a desire to bring to an 
end their perverted views, revert to using those terms to which 
people are attached. Though the expressions are the same, 
their minds are different. To speak thus of arising, abiding 
and ceasing should not deserve criticism, just as the acts of 
an illusionist should not be censured, because of his motive. 
There should be no feelings of grief or joy in this regard; 
one should simply see with one's eyes and that is all, just as 
one should not seek in the real world for something seen only 
in a dream, and just as, for example, a Gandharva-city, 
manifesting with the sunrise is not real, but merely a 
conventional designation which soon ceases to be. 'Arising', 
'abiding' and 'ceasing' are also like this. The unenlightened 
man differentiates them as existents; the sage investigates and 
finds them untenable. 
r-- 
(8/0) 
8v1 
8/1 
Chapter 8 
Question: 
Contemplation of Deed and Doer 12 verses 
Doing, the doer, and the deed which he performs, 
manifestly exist. Karmic recompense exists by virtue of the 
combination of these three elements, so there must be a doer 
and a deed. 
Reply: In chapter after chapter above, we have negated all 
dharmas, with nothing remaining. The three marks, for example, 
have been negated, and since the three marks do not exist, 
there are no active dharmas. Since active (dharmas) do not 
exist there are no non-active ones, and since there are neither 
active nor non-active dharmas, there is no doing, and no doer 
of any dharma whatsoever. If these are active, then they have 
been negated already, being included in the active. If 
inactive, they have been negated already being included among 
the inactive. You should not question this again, yet being 
deeply immersed in mental attachments, you have raised more 
questions, to which we must now give more replies: 
If there is a fixed, existent doer 
He does not do a fixed deed. 
If there is no fixed, existent doer 
non- 
He does not do a, &fixed deed. 
If there is a fixed, pre-existent doer, and a fixed, existent 
deed, then there should be no doing. If there is no fixed pre- 
existent doer and no fixed deed, then also there should be no 
doing, and why? 
8v2 A fixed deed has no doing, 
And such a deed has no doer 
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A fixed doer has no doing 
And a doer also has no deed. 
8 /2 If there is a fixed, pre-existent deed, then there should not be 
any additional doer. Even so (you might argue) there should be 
a deed apart from the doer - but this is not so. If there is a 
fixed, pre-existent doer, then there should not be any 
additional deed. (Perhaps) even so there should be a doer 
apart from the deed? - but this is not so. Therefore, if you 
have a fixed doer or a fixed. deed there cannot be doing, and if 
you have a non-fixed doer and a non-fixed deed then there cannot 
be doing either, and why? Because from the beginning they 
never existed. Even an existent doer and existent deed cannot 
do. How much less a non-existent doer and non-existent deed! 
Further: 
8v3 If there were a fixed doer 
And a fixed deed 
Both the doer and the deed 
Would fall into causelessness 
8/3 If there were a fixed, pre-existent doer and fixed existent 
deed, and you say that there is a doer who does, then this 
constitutes causelessness. If there is a doer apart from the 
deed done, or a deed apart from its doer, then they exist 
without arising from causal conditions. 
Question: What is wrong in saying that both doer and deed 
exist, without arising from causal conditions? 
Reply: 
8v4 If you fall into causelessness 
Then there is no cause and no effect. 
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8v5 
8v6 
8 /6 
No doing and no doer 
And no dharma of deed involved. 
If there are no dharmas of doing, 
Then there is no sin or merit 
Where there is no sin or merit 
No recompense for sin or merit exists either. 
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Where there is no recompense for sin or merit, 
There is also no nirvana. 
And whatever one may do 
Is completely vacuous and without effect. 
If you fall into causelessness, all dharmas become causeless 
and effect-less. A dharma which is able to produce is called 
a 'cause', and the dharma which is produced is called an effect. 
If these two are non-existent, then because these two do not 
exist there will be no doing and no doer, and no dharma of deed 
involved. Also there will be no sin or merit, and because 
there is no'sin or merit there will be no recompense or 
retribution for sin and merit and thus no path to nirvana. 
Therefore, there cannot be causeless production. 
(12c14) Question: What is wrong in saying that the doer is not fixed, 
and that he does a non-fixed deed? 
Reply: Eiren if one element is missing, it is impossible to 
begin a deed. How much more so when both are lacking! It is 
like an apparition which has its abode in apparent space, 
existing merely as a designation without any doer or deed. 
Question: If there is no doer and no deed, there cannot be 
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anything done, but if there is a doer and there is a deed, 
there should be doing. 
Reply: 
8v7 A doer, whether fixed or not fixed, 
Cannot do two kinds of deeds. 
For, since existence and non-existence are mutually opposed, 
The two cannot exist together. 
8/7 A doer, whether fixed or unfixed, cannot perform either fixed 
or unfixed deeds, and why? Because existence and non- 
existence are mutually opposed, and the two cannot exist in one 
place. Existence is fixed, non-existence is non-fixed, but one 
person is one entity, so how can he be both existent and non- 
existent? 
Further: 
8v8 An existent cannot do the non-existent. 
A non-existent cannot do the existent. 
As to there being both a doing and a doer 
That error is as previously explained. 
8/8 If the doer exists but the deed does not, how can there be 
anything which is done? If the doer is non-existent and the 
deed is existent, how again, can there be anything done? Why 
is this? As previously explained in regard to existence, if 
the deed pre-existed, what more would there be for the doer to 
do? If the deed was not pre-existent, how could he accomplish 
the deed? In this way one would negate sin and merit, 
causality, recompense and retribution. Therefore he says in the 
verse; 'An existent cannot do the non-existent, A non-existent 
cannot do the existent. As to there existing both a doing and 
a doer, That error is as previously explained. ' 
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Further: 
8v9 A doer does not do a fixed deed 
Neither does he do a non-fixed deed, 
Nor a fixed-and-non-fixed deed. 
Those errors have already been explained. 
8 /9 A 'fixed deed' has already been refuted, as has a'non-fixed 
deed', and a deed which is both fixed and non-fixed. Now, 
wishing to refute all these at once, he utters this verse. 
Therefore, a doer cannot do these three kinds of deed. Now, 
the three kinds of doer also cannot do a deed, and why? 
8vlO A doer, whether fixed, or non-fixed, 
Or both-fixed-and-non-fixed. 
Cannot do a deed. 
Those errors have already been explained. 
8/10 A doer, whether fixed, not fixed, or both fixed-and-not-fixed, 
cannot do a deed, and why? It is for the same reasons as the 
earlier kinds of error, which we should explain at length here. 
Thus, wherever you search for a doer and a deed, you will be 
utterly unable to find them. 
Question: If you say that there is no deed and no doer, then 
you in turn fall into causelessness. 
Reply: Deeds arise from causality. They are conventionally 
termed 'existent', but they have no fixed (nature), and are not 
as you describe them. Why is this? 
8vll The doer exists by virtue of the deed, 
The deed exists by virtue of the doer, 
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This is how we establish the meaning of 'deed' 
There is nothing to add beyong this. 
8/11 A deed is non-fixed from the beginning. A deed originates 
because of a person, and by virtue of the deed, he is a 'doer'. 
The doer is not fixed, it is because there is a deed that he 
is designated a 'doer'. It is through the combination of these 
two elements that deed and doer are established. If something 
arises from a combination then it has no self-nature, and 
having no self-nature it is empty. Because it is empty there 
is nothing which is produced, but in accordance with the 
thinking of ordinary unenlightened people we make distinctions, 
saying 'there is a deed' or 'there is a doer'. But in the 
highest sense there is no deed and no doer. 
Moreover: 
8v12 In the same way that we negate deed and doer, 
So (we refute) reception and the recipient. 
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All other dharmas too 
Should be negated thus. 
8/12 Just as deed and doer cannot be separated from each other 
and, not being separable, are therefore non-fixed, and having 
no fixed (nature) therefore have no self-nature, so it is with 
reception and the receiver. Reception stands for the body of 
the five skandhas; the recipient is the person. There are no 
five skandhas apart from the person, and no person apart from 
the five skandhas, which merely arise from causality. Just as 
with receiving and the recipient, so it is with all other 
dharmas, which should be negated in the same way. 
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9v1 
9v2 
9/2 
Chapter 9 Contemplation of a substrate145 
Question: Some people say; 
The faculties of eye, ear etc., 
146 
The dharmas of pain and pleasure etc., 
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Who has such things as these? 
Such a one is called the 'substrate'. 
If there were no substrate 
Who would have the dharmas of eye etc.? 
We should realise from this 
That there is a pre-existent substrate. 
12 verses 
'The functions of eye, ear etc. ' means the functions of eye, 
ear, nose, tongue, body, and life. 'The dharmas of pain and 
pleasure etc. ' means dharmas of the mind and mental 
configurations 
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such as reception of pain, reception of 
pleasure, reception of neither pain nor pleasure, conception, 
volition, remembrance etc. 
Some authors say, 'before the dharmas of eye, etc. come into 
existence, there must surely be some substrate, and it is 
dependent on this substrate that the functions of the eye, etc. 
develop. If there were no substrate, on what would the 
functions of body and eye, etc. depend for their development? 
Reply: 
9v3 If, separate from the functions of eye etc., 
And the dharmas of pain and pleasure, 
There were a pre-existent substrate, 
How could we know it? 
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9/3 If, separate from the functions of eye, ear etc. and the 
dharmas of pain, pleasure etc., there were a pre-existent 
substrate, how could it be described, and how could we know 
about it? External dharmas such as pots, clothes etc., can be 
known by the function of the eye, etc. Winner dhax as can be 
known by the functions of pain and pleasure etc. As it says 
in the sutras, 'perishability is the characteristic of 
material form; the ability to receive is the characteristic 
of reception; to be able to know is the characteristic of 
consciousness'. You say that there is a pre-existent 
substrate separate from eye and ear, pain and pleasure, etc.. 
but how can we know about it or say that it exists? 
Question: 
(13b22) Some writers 
149 
say that breathing in and out, looking and 
winking, lifespan, thinking, pain and pleasure, hate, love, 
excitation and so on are characteristics of a soul. Without a 
soul, how could there be characteristics such as breathing in 
and out, etc? Therefore we should accept that there is a pre- 
existent substrate apart from the functions of eye, ear, 
etc., and the dhai as of pain and pleasure. 
Reply: 
(13b25) If such a soul does exist, then it must be either inside the 
body, like a pillar within a wall, or outside the body, like 
armour worn by a man. If it were inside the body, then the 
body could not be perishable, since the soul would always be 
dwelling inside it. Therefore to say that a soul dwells in the 
body is mere words, absurd and unfounded. If it dwells outside 
the body, covering the body like armour, then the body ought to 
be invisible, because the soul would closely cover it. Moreover, 
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it should not be perishable, yet we can see now that in reality 
the body does decay. Therefore we must know that there is no 
other pre-existing dharma, separate from pain and pleasure, etc. 
(13c2) If you say that when an arm is cut off the soul shrinks back 
inside and cannot be cut off, then when the head is cut off 
(the soul) should also shrink back in and one should not die, 
but in fact one does die. Therefore we must know that (to 
speak of) a soul which is pre-existent and separate from pain 
and pleasure etc., is mere words, absurd and unfounded. 
(1 3c5) Moreover, if you say that where the body is big, the soul is 
big, and where the body is small the soul is small, just as when 
a lamp is big its light is big, and where a lamp is small its 
light is small, then if the soul follows the body in this way 
it should not be permanent. If it accords with the body, then 
when there is no 75ody there will be no soul, just as when a 
lamp is extinguished the light is extinguished. If the soul is 
impermanent, then it is the same as the eye, the ear, pain and 
pleasure etc. Therefore we should know that there is no 
distinct soul pre-existing and separate from eye and ear, etc. 
(13c10) Moreover, suppose that a man who is crazy, who is not 
responsible for himself, does something which he should not 
do. 
If there is a soul which is master of all one's actions, how 
can we say that the man is not responsible 
for himself? If 
madness does not afflict the soul, then it must 
be something 
which acts separately from the soul. Seeking 
thus in various 
ways for something which is separate from 
the functions of eye 
and ear, and the dharmas of pain and pleasure etc, we 
find no 
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such pre-existent substrate. Even though you insist that 
there is a pre-existent substrate apart from the function of 
eye and ear and the dharmas of pain and pleasure, no such 
entity exists, and why? 
9v4 If, apart from eye and ear etc., 
There were a substrate 
Then also, without a substrate 
Eyes and ears, etc., should exist. 
9/4 If there were a pre-existent substrate, separate from the 
functions of eye and ear etc., and the dharmas of pain and 
pleasure etc., then the functions of eye and ear etc., and 
the dharmas of pain and pleasure etc. should likewise exist 
apart from this substrate. 
Question: It could be that the two things are separate from 
each other, perhaps only the substrate existing. 
Reply: 
9v5 Because of dharmas we know that there is a person. 
Because of the person, we know that there are dharmas. 
Apart from dharmas, how can there be a person? 
Apart from a person, how can there be dharmas? 
9/5 'Dharmas' means eye, ear, pain, pleasure etc. 
'Person' means this substrate. You say that we know there is a 
person by virtue of there being dharmas, and we know that there 
are dharmas because there is a person. Now, how can there be a 
person apart from the dharmas of eye and ear etc., and how can 
there be dharmas of eye and ear etc., apart from the person? 
Further: 
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9v6 In all the functions of eye, ear etc., 
There is truly no substrate. 
All the functions of eye and ear etc., 
With different characteristics, discriminate. 
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9/6 In all the functions of eye and ear etc. and all the dharmas of 
pain and pleasure etc., there is truly no substrate. With, the 
eye as its cause, and form as its condition, seeing- 
consciousness is produced. We know of the existence of all the 
functions of eye, ear etc. by means of this combination of 
causes and conditions, and not through some substrate. This 
is why it says in the verse, "In all the functions of eye, ear 
etc., there is truly no substrate. " Each of the functions of 
eye, ear etc., can discriminate individually. 
Question: 
9v7 If in all the functions such as eye etc., 
There is no substrate. 
How can eye etc., functioning separately, 
Know objects? 
151 
9 /7 If there is no substrate in all the functions of eye and ear 
etc., and all the dharrnas of pain and pleasure etc., 
then how 
can these individual functions know objects? There is no 
thinking in the functions of seeing and hearing etc., so they 
should not have knowledge, yet-in fact they 
do know objects. 
We must realise (from this) that in addition 
to the functions 
of eye and ear etc., there is something which 
has the capacity 
to know objects. 
Reply: If this were so, then either this knowing agent will 
inhere in each individual function, or there will be one 
knower 
in all the functions, but both ideas are erroneous, and why? 
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9v8 "The one who sees is the one who hears. 
The one who hears is the one who receives. 
All the functions are like this, 
Consequently there must be a substrate". 
9/8 "If the one who sees is also the one who hears, and the one who 
hears is also the one who receives, then there is one soul. 
Since all the functions of eye and ear etc., are like this, 
there must be a pre-existent substrate". Form, sound, 
fragrance, etc., not having a fixed, knower, perhaps (the 
substrate) could use his eye to hear sounds, like a man seeing 
sounds in six ways152 according to his will? If the hearer and 
seer were one, he could see sounds at will with the eye- 
function etc., but this is not the case. 
9v9 If the seer and the hearer are each separate, 
And the one who receives is also separate, 
Then when seeing, there should also be hearing, 
And thus the soul would be multiple. 
9/9 If the seer, the hearer and the receiver are different from 
each other, then at the time of seeing there should also be 
hearing, and why? Because the hearer would exist separately 
from the seer, and in the same way souls ought to be operating 
simultaneously in the nose, the tongue and the body. If this 
were so, though the individual were one, his souls would be 
many, and he would be knowing the world via all his functions 
simultaneously, but in reality this is not the case. Therefore 
a seer, a hearer and a recipient are not employed together. 
Further: 
9v10 All the functions of eye and ear etc., 
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And all the dharmas of pain, pleasure etc., 
- The elements from which they are produced 
Those elements have no souls. 
9/10 If someone says that there is a separate substrate apart from 
the functions of eye, ear, etc., and the dharmas of pain, 
pleasure etc., this has already been refuted. Now, as for the 
four elements which give rise to eye and ear etc., there is no 
substrate contained in these four elements. 
Question: Even if it is true that there is no substrate in all 
the f -Linctions of eye and ear, etc.. and all the dharmas of pain 
and pleasure, surely the functions of eyes ear etc., and the 
dharmas of pain and pleasure exist? 
9v11 If the functions of eye and ear, etc., 
And the dharmas of pain and pleasure 
Have no substrate. 
Then the eye, etc. should not exist either. 
9/11 If the dharmas of eye and ear, pain and pleasure etc., have no 
substrate, who has this eye and ear etc., and by what means do 
they exist? Therefore eye and ear etc., are also non-existent. 
Moreover: 
9v12 In eyes, etc. there is no substrate, 
Now and in the future there will be none. 
Since there is none in the three periods of time, 
There is no distinction between existence and non-existence. 
9/12 (Though we) contemplate and search for a substrate, it never 
existed in the eye etc., and does not exist now, or in the 
future. Not existing in any of the three periods of time, it, 
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is the nirvana of non-arising, in which there should be no 
obstacles. 
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If there is no substrate, then how can there be 
the eye, etc? Debates and vain arguments such as these 
consequently cease, and when vain arguments have ceased, all 
dharmas are empty. 
36 J 
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Chapter 10 
Question: 
Examination of fire and fuel154 16 verses 
Surely receiving and a recipient exist, like fire 
and fuel, the recipient being the fire, and what is received 
being the fuel, which is to say the five skandhas. 
Reply: This is not so, and why? Because neither fire nor fuel 
can be established. Fire and fuel may either be established as 
one dharma or established as two dharmas, but neither can 
(in fact) be established. 
(14b18) Question: Let us leave aside for now the unity or difference 
of (these) dharmas, for if you say that fire and fuel are non- 
existent, how can you refute them by means of the 
characteristics of unity or difference? It is like a hare's 
horns or a tortoise's hair; being non-existent they cannot be 
refuted. We can see with our worldly eyes that things do exist, 
and we can subsequently examine them, just as there is metal, 
which can then be heated and forged. If there were no fire or 
fuel, we would not be able to examine them in terms of identity 
and difference. If you allow that there is unity and difference 
of dharmas, then you must recognise that fire and fuel exist, 
and if you allow that they exist, then this is to consider them 
as already existent. 
Reply: 
(14b24) In terms of conventional worldly expression, there would be no 
error, but whether one speaks of fire and fuel as one, or as 
different, they are not to be considered as (one) receiving 
(the other). Apart from conventional worldly expressions, there 
is nothing with which to argue. If we did not speak of fire 
and fuel, how could anything be refuted? If nothing is spoken 
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about, then meanings cannot be clarified. Thus, if a 
commentator wishes to refute existence and non-existence, 
inevitably he has to speak of existence and non-existence. 
He takes up (the terms) existence and non-existence but does 
not thereby accept existence and non-existence. He is 
following conventional worldly usage so there is no error 
involved. If putting words in one's mouth was at once to accept 
them, then for you to say 'destroy' would constitute self- 
destruction. It is the same with 'fire' and 'fuel'. Although 
the expressions exist, these are not accepted either. There- 
fore we may consider whether fire and fuel are one dharma or 
different dýý. armas, (and say) that neither can be established, 
and why? 
10v1 If fire is the same as fuel, 
Then the deed and the doer are one 
If fire is different from fuel 
Then fire would exist without fuel. 
10/1 'Fire' is the flames, 'fuel' is the firewood. 
'The doer' is the person, 'the deed' is the act. If fire and 
fuel are one, then doer and deed also should 
and deed are one, then the potter and his pot 
being the potter and the deed being the pot. 
is not the pot and the pot is not the potter, 
regarded as one? Therefore, because the doer 
not one, fuel and fire are also not one. 
be one. If doer 
are one, the doer 
(but) the potter 
so how can they be 
and the deed are 
(14c10) If you say that, oneness being impossible, they must 
be 
different, this too is incorrect, and why? If fire and fuel 
are different, then there should be fires which exist quite 
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separately from fuel. If we distinguish this thing as a fire 
and that thing as fuel, then everywhere there would be fires 
without fuel, but in reality this does not happen, and 
consequently, they cannot be different. 
Further: 
10v2 In that case fire would exist eternally 
Arising without fuel as its cause 
Then burning would have no result 
And we would call it ineffectual fire. 
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10/2 If fire and fuel were different, then fires would burn 
permanently without depending on fuel. If they burned 
permanently they would be self-subsistent and not dependent on 
causes and conditions, and human effort would be in vain, 
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(but in fact) human effort may, by feeding a fire cause it to 
burn; this effect157 manifestly exists, and therefore we know 
that the fire is not different from the fuel. Moreover, if fire 
were different from fuel then fire would be ineffectual, for 
what is burnt by a fire apart from its fuel? If this were so, 
fire would be ineffectual, but no such thing as ineffectual 
fire exists. 
(14c22) Question: Why is it that, if fire arose independent of causes 
and conditions, human effort would also be in vain? 
Reply: 
10v3 If fire does not depend on fuel 
Then it does not arise from causes and conditions. 
If flames were permanently burning, 
Human effort would be in vain. 
103 If fire and fuel were different, then there would be fire 
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independent of any fuel. If there were fire independent of fuel, 
then fire would not be a dharma dependent on a cause, and 
consequently it would not have arisen from causes and 
conditions. Moreover, if fire and fuel were different then 
there ought to be permanent fire, but if there were permanent 
fire we should see this fire, separate and apart from fuel, and 
without any need at all of human effort, and why? 
1 0v4 If you say that when something is burning 
It constitutes fuel, 
At the time when it is only firewood; 
What thing is it that burns the fuel? 
10/4 If you say that what was previously firewood is (only) called 
when it is burning, this is not correct. But if fuel fuel; 
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exists separately apart from fire, how can you say that when it 
is afire159 it is (still) to be regarded as fuel? 
Further: 
10v5 If different, there would be no contact 
And without contact there would be no burning. 
Without burning there would be no extinguishing. 
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And with no extinguishing there would be permanence. 
10/5 If fire were different from fuel then fire would never come into 
contact with fuel, and why? Because they would not be 
established interdependently. But fire, if not established by 
interdependence, would be self-subsistent, and then what use 
would it have for fuel? Therefore, there would be no contact, 
but without contact there would be no fire and fuel. Why is 
this? Because there is nothing which can burn without contact. 
If there is no burning, there will be no extinguishing, which 
would mean permanence and own-mark, 
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and this is not correct. 
9o 
Question: 
1Ov6 Fire may be different from fuel 
Yet it can come together with fuel 
Just as this person comes together with that person, 
And that other comes together with this person. 
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10/6 Fire might be different from fuel, yet it could come in contact 
with fuel, just as a man comes together with a woman, and a 
woman comes together with a man. 
Reply: 
10v7 If you say that fire and fuel 
Are separate from each other 
This being so, a fire could 
Come in contact with some other fuel. 
10/7 If there were fuel separate from fire, and fire separate from 
fuel, and each was established individually, there could be 
fire coming in contact with fuel; but in reality this is not 
so, and why? Because there is no fuel apart from fire, and no 
fire apart from fuel. But there are women apart from men, 
and men apart from women, and for this reason your illustration 
is not right. Since your example does not succeed, fire does 
not contact fuel. 
Question: Fire and fuel are interdependent yet existent. 
Fire exists on account of fuel, and fuel exists on account of 
fire. The two dharmas are established interdependently. 
Reply: 
10v8 If fire exists because of fuel 
" And fuel exists because of fire, 
Then what fixed dharma pre-existed 
That there should be fire and fuel? 
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10/8 
1 0v9 
10/9 
If fire is established because of fuel, then fuel too should 
be established on account of fire. In this case, if a fixed 
(entity) of fuel existed first, then fire would be 
established on account of the fuel. If a fixed (entity) 
'fire' existed first then fuel would be established on account 
of the fire. Now, if fire is established on account of fuel, 
this means that first there is fuel, and subsequently there is 
fire, but then the fuel must have existed independently of the 
fire a Why? Because the fuel came first, and the fire after- 
wards. If the fire was not burning the fuel, then the fuel 
would not be established (as fuel). The same goes for fuel, 
since it is not found anywhere apart from with fire. If fuel 
is not established then neither is fire. If (you say that) fire 
comes first and the fuel exists afterwards, then there is the 
same error as with fire. 
established. 
Further: 
Therefore, neither fire nor fuel is 
If fire exists on account of fuel, 
Then fire already established is established again. 
If it were in the fuel 
It would be non-existent fire. 
If you want to say that fire is established on account of fuel, 
then an already-established fire is being established again, 
and why? Fire abides as itself in fire. If you say 
that fire 
is not self-subsistent, but is established from fuel, no such 
thing exists. Therefore, if fire is established from fuel, 
then the fire, having been established, would be again 
established, and there errors like this. Moreover, 
there is 
the error of fuel which exists while fire does not exist. 
Why 
is this? Because fuel would be self-subsistent and separate 
92 
from fire. Therefore, it is not-the case that fuel and fire 
are mutually interdependent. 
Further: 
10v10 When a dharma is established by dependence, 
This dhanna in return establishes dependence 
Now, where there is no dependence, 
There will be no dharmas established either. 
10/10 When a dharma is established through dependence, this dharma in 
return establishes the original (dharma) on which it depends. 
Thus, these are not two fixed entities. It is like fire being 
established on account-of fuel, while in return the fuel is 
established on account of the fire. Thus these two entities 
are not fixed, and because they are not fixed they are unten- 
able, and why? 
10v11 If dharmas are dependently established, 
When non-yet established, how can they depend? 
If established, they are already dependent; 
Being already established, what use have they for dependence? 
10/11 If dharmas are established by means of dependence, such dharmas 
are initially not yet established, and being not yet established 
do not exist. When they are non-existent, how can there be 
dependence? If such dharmas have already been established 
previously, then being already established, what need do they 
have for dependence? Neither is (in need) of mutual dependence. 
Therefore it is not the case that, as you said earlier, fuel 
and fire are established through mutual interdependence. 
Therefore 
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10v12 Fire does not exist through dependence on fuel, 
Nor does fire exist independently of fuel 
Fuel does not exist through dependence on fire 
Nor does fuel exist independently of fire. 
10/12 Now, fire is not established by dependence on fuel, nor is it 
established by non-dependence on fuel. It is the same with 
fuel, whether (one says it is) dependent on fire or 
independent of fire, in neither way can it be established. 
This error has already been discussed. 
Further: 
10v13 Fire does not come from some other place, 
. 
And there is no fire in the place occupied by fire. 
The same applies to fuel, 
And the rest is as explained in 'going and coming'. 
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10 113 Fire does not come from some other quarter and enter the fuel, 
but there is no fire in the fuel either, for if you cut up the 
firewood and look for fire you will not be able to find it. It 
is the same with fuel. It does not come from some other place 
and enter into fire, but there is no fuel in fire either. The 
already-burnt does not burn, the not-yet burnt does not burn 
and in the moment of burning, there is no burning. Such ideas 
have been discussed in the chapter on going and coming. 
Therefore: 
10v14 Fuel is not the same as fire, 
But apart from fuel there is no fire 
Fire is not the same as fuel, 
Within fire there is no fuel, 
And within fuel there is no fire. 
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10/14 Fuel is not the same as fire, and why? Because of the error 
previously discussed (of saying) that doer and deed are one. 
There is no fire apart from fuel, because of the error of 
JO e5 carat 
'permanently existing fire' and so forth. Fire not 
fuel, there is no fuel in fire, and there is no fire in fuel. 
Since these would involve the error of (fuel and fire being 
different entities, none of the three can be established. 
Question: 
. 
Why are you discussing fuel and fire? 
Reply: In the same way that fire depends for its existence on 
fuel, so the recipient depends for his existence on receiving. 
'Receiving' stands for the five skandhas, 'the recipient' means 
the person. Since fuel and fire are not established, receiving 
and recipient also are not established (as existent) and why? 
10v15 By means of the dharmas of fire and fuel, 
We may explain the dharmas of receiving and recipient. 
And we explain pots and cloth, 
And all the various dharmas. 
10/15 Just as fuel is not fire, so receiving is not the recipient, 
because of the error of deed and doer being one. But also, 
there is no recipient without receiving, because no difference 
can be found, (between them). Because of the error of 
'difference', none of the three is established. 
Just as with receiving and the recipient, so it is with all the 
external dharmas such as cloth, pots, and all the various 
dharmas, which are to be explained in the same way as above, as 
non-arising and utterly empty. 
Therefore : 
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10v16 If a person says that he has a self 
And that all the dharmas each have different characteristics, 
You will know that such a man 
Has not acquired the flavour of the Buddha-dharma. 
10/16 All dharma s from the beginning have been non-arising, having 
the characteristic of utter nirvana. This is why he utters 
this verse at the end of the chapter. If a person asserts that 
there is a characteristic of 'self' as the Vatsi. putriyaý65 
school teaches, he cannot say that form is the self, and he 
cannot say that there is a self apart from form, but only that 
self resides in the 'fifth indescribable storehouse'. This is 
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like the Sarvastivadins who teach that each of the dharmas 
has its own characteristics, distinguishing this one as skilful, 
this one as unskilful, this as neutral, this as outflowing or 
not outflowing, active or inactive, and so on. Such people as 
these do not attain the nirvana-quality of dharmas, but 
fabricate various kinds of sophistries, using the Buddha's 
words. 
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Chapter 11 Contemplation of Original Limits 
167 
8 verses 
110 Question: The 'Sutra on Limitless Origins' 
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says that beings 
come and go in birth and death (samsara) and that its original 
limits are inconceivable. In that Sutra it states that there 
are beings and that there is birth-and-death. Why does it make 
this statement? 
Reply: 
livl The Great Sage has said 
That no original limit is conceivable. 
Birth and death had no beginning 
And likewise will have no end. 
111 Sages are of three kinds. Firstly there are the non-Buddhist 
sages with their five supernatural powers, secondly the Arhats 
and Pratyekabuddhas, and thirdly the great bodhisattvas who 
have attained supernatural powers. 
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Because the Buddha is 
supreme amongst these three kinds we call him 'The Great Sage'. 
In whatever the Buddha has said there is nothing which is not 
the truth. Birth and death has no beginning, and why? A 
beginning or end of birth and death is inconceivable. This is 
why we say that it has no beginning. 
If you say that, even though it has no beginning and end, it 
must have a middle, this too is wrong, and why? 
11v2 If there is no beginning or end 
How can there be a middle? 
Therefore within this (process) 
There is no before, no after, and no simultaneity. 
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11/2 Beginning exists because of middle and end, and end exists 
because of beginning and middle. Where there is no beginning 
and no end, how can there be a middle? Within samsara there 
is no beginning and no end, hence we say that before, after and 
simultaneity cannot be. Why is this? 
11v3 If we suppose that first there is birth, 
And afterwards there is old age and death; 
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Then there will be birth with no old age and death, 
And old age and death with no birth. 
11 v4 If old age and death come first, 
And afterwards there is birth. 
Then this constitutes causelessness: 
For without birth, there is old age and death. 
11/4 If all the beings in samsara were first born, then gradually 
became old and afterwards died, then in their being born there 
would be no old age or death. As a dharma, birth should involve 
old age and death and old age and death should involve birth. 
Moreover, if there were birth without old age and death this 
too would be wrong, and so too if there were old age and death 
not caused by birth. If old age and death came first, and 
birth afterwards, then old age and death would be uncaused, 
because birth would only come afterwards. Also, without birth 
how can there be old age and death? If you say that birth, old 
age and death coming either before or after each other is 
untenable, and assert that they are established simultaneously, 
this is also erroneous, and why? 
11v5 Birth and old age and death 
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Cannot occur simultaneously 
For in the moment of birth there would be death, 
And both of these would be uncaused. 
11/5 To say that birth, old age and death are simultaneous is 
incorrect, and why? Because there would be death in the 
moment of birth, and dhaxmas ought to exist at the moment of 
birth and not exist at the moment of death. For there to be 
death in the moment of birth, is not correct. If they arose 
simultaneously they would be independent of each other, just 
as an ox's horns growing simultaneously are independent of each 
other. 
Therefore: 
11v6 If you admit that beginning, end and simultaneity 
Are all incorrect 
Why do you (pursue) sophistries 
And say that there is birth, old age and death? 
11/6 On investigation of birth, old age and death, all three 
(interpretations) are found to be erroneous; they are simply 
non-arising and utterly empty.. Why do you tenaciously cling 
to vain arguments about birth, old age and death, claiming that 
they have fixed, definite characteristics? 
Further: 
11v7 Every cause and effect which exists, 
Marks and marked dharmas 
Receiving and recipient etc.. 
All existing dharmas ... 
11v8 Not only does birth and death. 
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Have no conceivable original limits - 
All dharmas are like this. 
No original limits exist at all. 
11/8 'All dharmas' refers to cause and effect, marks and what is 
marked, receiving, recipient and so on. All are without 
original limits. It is not only birth and death that has no 
ultimate limits, but in order to summarize all the details he 
talks only about birth and death having no original limits. 
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Chapter 12 Contemplation of Suffering172 
12/0 Some people say: 
12v1 'Self-created, created by another 
Jointly created, or created by no cause'. 
In these ways they describe suffering 
But in fact these are wrong. 
10 verses 
12/1 Some people say that suffering is self-created, or that it is 
created by something else, or that it is. created by both self 
and other, or that it is created by no cause, but in fact none 
of these is the case. None of these being the case (means that 
sentient beings bring about suffering through causality, and 
disliking pain, desire to extinguish it. Being ignorant of the 
true causes and conditions of suffering, they have these four 
kinds of mistaken ideas. Thus he says that in fact they are 
all wrong, and why? 
12v2 If suffering were self-created 
Then it would not arise from conditions. 
(But) it is on account of 'these skandhas'173 
That 'those skandhas' arise. 
12/2 If suffering is self-created, then it does not arise from 
conditions. 'Self (-created)' means to arise from its own 
nature, but this is not correct. Why is this? It is because 
of the previous five skandhas that the subsequent five skandhas 
arise, and therefore suffering cannot be self-created. 
Question: If you say 'these skandhas create those skandhas', 
this is creation by another. 
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Reply: This is not the case, and why? 
12v3 If you say that these five skandhas 
Differ from those five skandhas 
Then surely you are saying that 
Suffering is created by another? 
12/3 If these five skandhas are different from those five skandhas, 
and those five skandhas are different from these five skandhas, 
then (you say that) this must be 'creation by another'. But 
by way of example, if thread were different from cloth, then 
there ought to be cloth apart from thread, but as there is no 
cloth apart from thread, then cloth is not different from thread. 
In the same way if those five skandhas differ from these five 
skandhas, then those five skandhas ought to exist apart from 
these five skandhas, and if those five skandhas do not exist 
apart from these five skandhas, then these five skandhas are not 
different from those five skandhasa Consequently, you should 
not say that suffering is 'creation by another'. 
Question: 'Self creation' means that everybody creats of him- 
self his own suffering and of himself receives his suffering. 
Reply: 
12v4 If the person himself creates suffering - 
What person is there apart from suffering? 
That you could say of that person, 
'He is able to create his own suffering'? 
12/4 You may say that the person himself creates his own suffering, 
but in what other situation, apart from in the suffering of the 
five skandhas, do you find a person who could create his own 
suffering? You should give an account of such a person, but 
you cannot give an account of him. Therefore, suffering is 
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not self-created by the person. 
If you say that, although a person does not self-create his 
own suffering, another person creates the suffering and 
transfers it to this person, this also is incorrect, and why? 
12v5 If suffering is created by another person 
And yet is transferred to'this person, 
Then, if he is separate from the suffering 
How can this person receive it? 
12/5 If another person creates the suffering and transfers it to 
this person, there can be no reception by this person apart 
from the five skandhas. 
Further: 
12v6 If that person creates suffering, 
And bestows it on this person, 
What person could exist, apart from suffering 
Who could give it to this person? 
12/6 Suppose you say that that person creates suffering and gives it 
to this person; what person is there apart from the suffering 
of the five skandhas, to create suffering and give it to this 
person? If such a one exists you should describe his 
characteristics. 
Further: 
12v7 If self-creation is not established 
How can there be creation of suffering by another? 
If another person creates suffering 
Then this is also termed 'self-creation'. 
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12/7 Neither other nor self-creation of suffering can be established 
for various reasons, yet you say that suffering is created by 
another. This too is incorrect, and why? Because 'this' and 
'that' are mutually dependent. If that (person) creates 
suffering then for that (person) it will constitute self-creation 
of suffering. Self-creation of suffering has already been 
refuted, and since you have accepted that self-creation of 
suffering cannot be established, other-creation cannot be 
established either. 
Moreover: 
12v8 Suffering is not termed self-created 
Dharmas do not themselves create dharmas 
The 'other' has no self-substance. 
How can there be an 'other' who creates suffering? 
12/8 There is no self-creation of suffering, and why? 
krni ýP. 
Just as a cannot cut itself, so a d. harma cannot create, 
of itself, a d. harma. Therefore, there cannot be self-creation. 
There is no other-creation of suffering either, and why? 
There is no own-nature of an 'other' apart from suffering. If 
there were another own-nature, we would have to say that this 
other created suffering, but this other is itself also 
suffering, and how can suffering itself create suffering? 
Question: Even if there is neither self-creation nor other- 
creation, surely there is 'joint creation'? 
Reply: 
12v9 'if the suffering of this 
(person) and that (person) is 
established, 
Then surely there is joint creation of suffering'? 
But this and that person do not create, 
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How much less is there creation without a cause. 
12/9 Even self-creation and creation by another are erroneous. How 
much more so creation with no cause? Causelessness involves 
numerous errors, as has already been explained in the chapter 
refuting the deed and the doer (chapter 8). 
Furthermore : 
12v10 It is not only in the explanation of suffering 
That these four ways of thinking cannot be established, 
But also in regard to all external things 
These four ideas cannot be established. 
12/10 Although it is stated in the Buddha's teaching that the five 
receptive174 skandb s constitute suffering, there are non- 
Buddhists who say that suffering is the reception of suffering. 
For this reason he says that it is not only in the explanation 
of suffering that the four kinds of ideas cannot be established, 
but they cannot be established for any external objects 
including earth, water, mountains, trees and so on or any of the 
6 
dharmas. 
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Chapter 13 'Contemplation of predispositions175 
Question: 
13v1 As is taught in the Buddhist sutras, 
False deceptions have the mark of misapprehension. 
All predispositions and misapprehensions 
9 verses 
And therefore they are called deceptions. 
1311 In the Buddhist sutras it says that false deceptions 
176 
are 
characterised by missapprehension, 
177 
but the supreme reality 
which is called nirvana is not characterised by missapprehension. 
Because of what these sutras say, we should know that all pre- 
dispositions are false deceptions and characterised by mis- 
apprehension. 
Reply: 
13v2 False deception and misapprehension; 
What is apprehended in these? 
The Buddha has spoken thus 
In order to point to the meaning of emptiness. 
13/2 If dharmas characterised by misapprehension are false deceptions, 
what is considered to be apprehended in the predispositions? 
When the Buddha speaks thus we shouldlmo; 1 that he is explaining 
the meaning of emptiness. 
(17b6) Question: How do you know that the predispositions are empty? 
Reply: Because all predispositions have the characteristic of 
falsity. The predispositions arise and cease without abiding; 
they have no seif-nature and are therefore empty. 'Pre- 
dispositions' means the five skandhas. Since they arise from 
predispositions, the five skandhas are called predispositions. 
These five skandhas are all false and unreal and have no fixed 
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(17b10) 
(17b15) 
nature, and why? 
For example; the form178 one has when an infant is not the fo m 
one has when crawling. The form one has when crawling is not 
the form one has when a toddler. One's form as a toddler is 
not the form one has as a boy. The form one has as a boy is not 
the form one has in manhood, and the form one has in manhood is 
not the form one has in old age. Thus form does not abide even 
momentarily, so that to distinguish any fixed nature in it is 
impossible. Either the infant's form is the same as the 
crawler's form and so on up to the form in old age, or they are 
different, but both (these ideas) are wrong, and why? 
Suppose that the infant's form were the same as the crawler's 
form, and so on up to the form in old age. If this were so, 
there would be only one form, that of the infant, and there would 
be no crawler and so on up to old age. Or again, it is like a 
lump of clay which is always a lump of clay and never becomes a 
pot. Why is this? Because a form is always fixed. If the form 
of an infant differs from that of a crawler, then an infant will 
not become a crawler, and a crawler will not become an infant, 
and why? Because the two forms are different. If things were 
thus, the forms of boyhood, youth, manhood and old age would not 
succeed each other, and there would be loss of any family structure, 
with no fathers and no sons. If things were thus, there would 
only be an infant, who would have to become a father - the other 
stages from crawling to old age would play no part. Therefore, 
both are erroneous. 
(17b23) Question: Even though form is not fixed, when the infant's 
form has ceased, it arises in a succession 
(of forms) up to the 
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form of old age. This does not involve the kind of errors 
discussed above. 
(17b25) Reply: If the infant's form is successively reproduced, then 
either it is successively reproduced after having ceased (at 
each juncture) or it is successively reproduced without having 
ceased. If the infant's form has ceased, how can there be any 
successive reproduction, since there would be no cause? Even 
though, for example, there is firewood which could burn, there 
is no successive production (of fire) after the fire has gone 
out. If we suppose that there is successive reproduction of 
the childhood form without it having ceased, then the childhood 
form, since it never ceases, will surely continue with its 
original characteristics and there will be no successive repro- 
duction here either. 
(17c1) Question: We are not saying that there is successive 
reproduction because (the form) has ceased or not ceased. We 
are merely saying that because non-abiding characteristics seem 
to arise, we can speak of successive reproduction. 
Reply: If this were so, it would be a fixed form arising again, 
and in that case there ought to be a thousand myriad kinds of 
form, but this is not so. In that case too, there should be no 
succession. Thus, though we may search everywhere for form, it 
has no fixed characteristics. It exists only through 
conventional expressions. It is like the banana tree - you can 
search for its core 
179 
but you will not be able to find it, for 
it is merely bark and leaves. In such a way does the man of 
insight seek the characteristics of form. Ceasing moment by 
moment and utterly without reality, form is unattainable. The 
shape and characteristics of non-abiding form, seeming to arise 
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consecutively are hard to distinguish, just as it is 
impossible to distinguish fixed forms in the flames of a lamp. 
It is impossible for there to be forms arising from such fixed 
forms (as you describe), therefore form has no nature and is 
empty, existing only through conventional expressions. 
(17c11) Receiving180 is also like this. The wise man investigates it 
in various ways but since (receptions) are sequential and 
similar, it is difficult to distinguish their arising and 
ceasing; they are like the succession of flowing water. 
p rce 
i vtoý 
It is only because we have r it that we say there are 
three receivings182 within the body. Therefore, you should 
know that receiving may be explained in the same way as form. 
(17c13) (The skandha of) conceptionl83 arises on account of names and 
marks, and without such names and marks it would not arise. 
Therefore the Buddha says that discriminative knowledge of names 
and terms is called conception. It is not fixed and pre-existent, 
but arises from conditions and has no fixed nature. Having no 
fixed nature, it resembles 'the shadow following the substance'184 
The shadow is there because of the substance. Without the 
substance there is no shadow, and the shadow has no fixed nature. 
If it did have a fixed existence, then the shadow would exist 
without the substance, but in reality this does not happen. 
Therefore it arises from conditions, has no own-nature and is 
unattainable. Conception too, is like this. It only exists 
because of external designations and through conventional worldly 
expressions. 
1o9 
(17c20) (The skandha, of) consciousness185 arises because of form, 
sound, smell, taste, touch, etc., and eyes, ears, nose, mouth 
and body etc. 
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Because the functions of eye, etc., are 
differentiated, consciousness is differentiated. This 
consciousness must be either in the form, or in the eye, or 
between them. It has no fixed nature, and only after it has 
arisen is there consciousness of the material world, conscious- 
ness of this person and consciousness of that person. The 
consciousness which cognizes a particular person is either the 
same as the consciousness which cognizes another person, or it 
is different. These two may be hard to distinguish, just as 
eye-consciousness may be difficult to distinguish from ear- 
consciousness. Since they are hard to distinguish, we can 
either say that they are one, or that they are different. They 
are not fixed and differentiated, because they merely arise from 
conditions. Such distinctions as eye (consciousness), etc., are 
therefore empty and have no own-nature. 
(17c27) It is like an entertainer who puts a pearl in his mouth, then 
having taken it out, shows it to the people who begin to doubt 
whether it is the original pearl, or some other different one. 
Consciousness is also like this, for having arisen, it arises 
again. Is it the original consciousness, or is it a different 
consciousness? Therefore you should know that consciousness, 
being non-abiding, has no own-nature and is false and deceptive, 
like an illusion. 
(18a2) Predispositions187 are also like this. Predispositions are those 
of body, speech and mind, and are of two kinds, pure and impure. 
Which are impure? The grasping attachment which afflicts beings 
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is called impure. True speech, non-attachment etc. which do not 
afflict beings are called pure. These (two) either increase, or 
diminish. 
(18a5) Those with pure predispositions, since they have already received 
their rewards either as humans, or in the heavens of desire, or in 
the heavens of form or the formless heaven, 
188 
are 'diminishing', 
but now in resuming their activities they are called 'increasing'. 
Those with impure predispositions are also like this. Having 
already received their deserts in the hells, in animal births, and 
amongst the hungry ghosts and asuras189 they are 'diminishing', 
but in resuming their activities they are called 'increasing'. 
Therefore, since all predispositions are increasing and decreasing 
they never abide. It is like a man who is ill. If he is given 
suitable treatment his illness will subside, but if it is un- 
suitable his illness will get worse. Predispositions are like 
this. Because they increase and diminish they are not fixed, but 
exist only through conventional worldly expressions. It is by 
means of the worldly truth that we manage to perceive the supreme 
truth. 
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(18a12) It is said that ignorance causes predispositions, because of pre- 
dispositions there is consciousness and attachment, because of 
consciousness and attachment, there is name and form, from name 
and form derive the six avenues, from the six avenues there is 
contact, from contact there is reception, from reception there is 
desire, from desire there is grasping, from grasping there is 
existence, from existence there is birth and from birth there is 
old age and death, sorrow, grief, suffering affliction, the pain 
of separation from those you love, and the pain of association 
with those you hate, and so on. In 
111 
this way all sufferings have their origin in predispositions. 
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The Buddha's teachings rely on conventional worldly truth, (but) 
if you attain to the truth of the supreme meaning and develop 
true insight (prajna) then ignorance will cease. When ignorance 
ceases the predispositions do not accumulate, and because the 
predispositions do not originate, that which the perception of 
truth 192 cuts off, the view of the body (as the self) and doubts, 
rituals and attachments and so on are all cut off. 
(18a19) In addition, that which meditation193 cuts off, namely attach- 
ment and craving, anger, contamination by forms, contamination 
by non-form, lust and ignorance are also cut off. Because these 
are cut off, each link (of causation) ceases, which is to say 
that ignorance, pre-dispositions, consciousness, name and form, 
the six avenues, contact, reception, desire, grasping, existence, 
birth, old age, death, sorrow, grief, suffering, affliction, 
the pain of separation from those you love, and pain of 
associating with those you hate, and so forth, all cease. 
Because of this cessation the five skandhas completely cease, 
with nothing'at all remaining, only emptiness. 
(18a24) This is why the Buddha, wishing to point to the meaning of 
emptiness, taught that all predispositions are false deceptions. 
Furthermore, all dharmas, since they are without (own) nature, 
are false deceptions. Being false and deceptive, they are 
empty. As the verse says: 
1 3v3 Since all dharmas vary' 
94 
We know that they have no nature. 
Dharmas without a nature do not exist 
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13/3 
18b4) 
13v4 
Because all dharmas are empty. 
Dharmas have no nature, and why? Though dharmas arise, they do 
not abide in an own-nature, and hence they have no nature. It 
is as if an infant had a fixed, abiding own-nature. He could 
never become a crawler, and so on up to old age. Yet an 
infant, through consecutive phases, does have different 
characteristics manifesting as crawling and so on up to old age. 
This is why we say that, since we see dharmas having varying 
characteristics we know that they have no nature. 
Question: Even if dharmas have varying characteristics and no 
nature, what is wrong in saying that dharmas with no nature 
exist? 
Reply: If they have no nature, how-can they be dharmas, how can 
they have characteristics? Why is this? Because they have no 
basis. It is solely in order to refute their (presumed) nature 
that we say they have no nature. If dharmas which had no 
nature existed, we would not describe all dharmas as empty. If 
all dharmas are empty, how can dharmas with no nature exist? 
Question: 
If dharmas have no nature 
How can you say that from infancy 
To old age and so on 
Various differences-exist? 
134 If dharmas had no nature, then they would not have varying 
characteristics, yet you say that they do have varying 
characteristics. Therefore dharmas do have a nature. If there 
were no dharma-natures, how could there be varying character- 
istics? 
Reply: 
l3v5 If dharmas had a nature 
How could they vary? 
If dharmas had no nature 
How could they vary? 
13/5 If dharmas had a fixed and definite nature, how could they 
possibly vary? 'Nature means a fixed, settled existence which 
cannot be transformed, just as true gold cannot be transformed, 
or the nature of darkness cannot be changed into light, and the 
nature of light cannot be changed into darkness. 
Moreover: 
13v6 A particular dharma does not vary, 
A different dharma does not vary. 
Just as youth does not become old age 
And old age does not become youth. 
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13/6 If a dharma did vary it ought to have varying characteristics. 
Either it is the same dharma which varies, or it is a different 
dharma which varies, but neither of these is correct. If it 
was the same dharrna which varied, then old age ought to become 
old age, but in reality old age does not become old age. If it 
is a different dharma that is the variant, then, old age being 
different from youth, youth should become old age, but in reality 
youth does not become old age. Both are wrong. 
Question: What is wrong in saying that the same dharma varies? 
We see with our own eyes that youth, with the passing of the 
seasons and the years, becomes old age. 
Reply: 
13v7 If a dharma is the same as its variant, 
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I 
Then milk should itself be cream. 
114 
What dharma is there apart from milk 
That can produce the cream? 
13/7 If a dharma were the same as its varient, then milk itself ought 
to be cream, and would need no causes or conditions at all, but 
this is not correct, and why? Because milk differs from cream 
in various ways. Milk itself is not cream, and therefore dharmas 
are not their on variants. If you say that it is a different 
dharma which varies, this too is incorrect, for what other 
thing could be considered as cream? Looked at in this way, a 
dharma does not vary itself, but it is not a different dharma 
that varies either. Therefore you should not cling to a one- 
sided position. 
Question: Destroying both 'itself' and 'different' dharmas, 
you seem to be abiding in emptiness. Emptiness is itself a 
doctrine. 196 
Reply: 
13v8 If dharmas which are not empty exist 
Then empty dharmas should exist 
But in reality non-empty dharnmas do not exist 
How can there be empty dharmas? 
13/8 If non-empty dharmas existed, then empty dharmas should exist 
interdependently with them. But in what has gone before we have 
refuted non-empty dharmas with various types of reasonings. 
Since no dharmas exist which are non-empty, there is no 
reciprocal dependence, and since there is no reciprocal 
dependence, how can empty dharmas exist? 
(18c11) Question: You say that because no non-empty dharmas exist, 
empty dharmas do not exist either. If so, this is a doctrine 
115 
of emptiness. 
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But since there is no reciprocal dependence 
there should not be any clinging (to a position). If there are 
opposites, there must be interdependence. If there are no 
opposites, then there will be no interdependence. If there is 
no interdependence there will be no characteristics, and if 
there are no characteristics there will be no clinging (to a 
position). It is in this way that we regard your doctrine of 
emptiness. 
Reply: 
13v9 The Great Sage speaks of the emptiness of dharmas 
In order to wean us from all views. 
If you then reinstate a view of 'emptiness', 
You cannot be taught by all the Buddhas. 
13/9 It was in order to destroy the sixty-two views, 
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as well as 
ignorance, craving etc., and all the afflictions, that the 
Buddha spoke of emptiness. If a person produces further views 
about emptiness, such a person is incorrigible. As an example, 
a sick man has to take medicine to be healed. If the medicine 
makes him ill again he cannot get better. Or it is like a flame 
coming out of firewood which can be extinguished by water. If 
it had been produced by water, what could one use to extinguish 
it? In the same way emptiness is the water which can extinguish 
the fires of affliction. There are some people who, because 
they carry a heavy load of karma, have a mind steeped in craving 
and attachment and are dull in insight, produce views of 
emptiness. They either say that there is emptiness, or that 
there is not emptiness, and through (these ideas) they again 
generate afflictions. If one (tries to) instruct this kind of 
person in emptiness, he will say 'I have known this emptiness 
for a long time'. But without this emptiness there is no way 
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to nirvana, for as the sutra says, 'Unless you pass through 
the gate of emptiness, marklessness and non-doing, your 
liberation will be nothing but words'. 
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Chapter 14 Contemplation of Combination199 8 verses 
14/0 The proponent says: In the earlier chapter (Ch 3) refuting the 
sense-functions, we explained that seeing, what is seen, and 
the seer cannot be established. Since these three things are 
not different dharmas, they do not combine, and the meaning of 
no-combining will now be explained. 
Question: Why is there no comination of the three elements of 
eye etc? 
Reply: 
14v1 Seeing, what is seen and the seer; 
Each of these three has a different realm, 
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The three dharmas being thus different 
They will never for a moment combine. 
14/1 'Seeing' is the function of the eye, 'what is seen' is the 
material form, and 'the seer' is the self. Each of these three 
things occupies a different place and there will never be a 
time when they combine. 'Different place' means that the eye 
is inside the body, and forms are outside the body, while the 
self may be said to be either inside the body or to be every- 
where and in all places. This is why there is no combination. 
(19a8) Furthermore, if you say that a dharma of seeing exists, it must 
be either seeing involving combination, or seeing not invol- 
ving combination, but both of these are wrong, and why? If it 
is seeing with combination, then according to where the object 
is, the sense-function and self should be there as well, but 
this is not the case, and consequently there is no combination. 
If it is seeing with no combination, then there would have to 
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be seeing with sense-function, the self and the object each 
occupying different places, but then there would be no seeing, 
and why? Because if, for example, the eye-function is here, 
it cannot see a jug in a distant place. Consequently in 
neither case is there seeing. 
(19a13) Question: Through the combination of four things; self, mind, 
sense-function and object, knowing is produced. We do have the 
ability to Imow the myriad objects such as pots, clothes etc., 
and therefore there must be seeing, what is seen and the seer. 
(19a15) Reply: These matters have already been refuted in the chapter 
on the sense-functions, but we will now explain them once again. 
You say that four things combine to produce knowing. This 
knowing is either produced after seeing objects such as pots, 
clothes, etc., or it arises before seeing them. If it arises 
after having seen them, such knowing is useless. If it arises 
before seeing them, it would be before any combination, so how 
would knowing have been produced? If you say that the four 
things combine simultaneously to produce knowing this also is 
incorrect. If they arose simultaneously there would be no 
interdependence and why? First the pot exists, then you see it, 
and then afterwards knowledge arises. In simultaneity there is 
no before or after. 
Since knowing does not exist, seeing, what is seen and the seer 
likewise do not exist. In the same way all dharmas are like an 
illusion, like a dream, without fixed characteristics. How 
could they combine? And since they do not combine, they are 
empty. 
4 
Further: 
l4v2 Passion, and the object of passion 
And the impassioned one are also thus. 
The other avenues, the other afflictions 
Are also all like this. 
14/2 In the same way that seeing, what is seen and the seer are not 
combined, so passion, the object of passion and the impassioned 
one also should not combine. And what is said of the three 
dharmas of seeing, what is seen, and the seer, may also be said 
of hearing, what is heard and the hearer, and the remaining 
avenues. What is said of passion, the object of passion and 
the impassioned one, may also be said of hate, the object of 
hate, and the hater, and the remaining afflictions, etc. 
Further: 
14v3 Different dharmas should combine 
But seeing, etc., are not different 
Since their characteristics have not been established as 
different, 
How can seeing, (and seer) etc., combine? 
14/3 Ordinary things combine by virtue of being different, but no 
difference in characteristics can be found in seeing, (seer) 
etc., and consequently there is no combination. 
Further: 
14v4 Not only in the dharmas of seeing, etc. 
Can no difference in characteristics be found 
But all dharmas which exist 
Are also without different- characteristics. 
14/4 Not only can we find no difference in characteristics among the 
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three elements of seeing, what is seen, and the seer, but all 
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dharmas are without such different characteristics. 
Question: Why do they not have different characteristics? 
Reply: 
14v5 Difference is difference because of differenceg 
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Difference without difference is not difference. 
If a dharma issues from a cause 
That dharma does not differ from its cause. 
14/5 The difference of which you speak is a difference which is 
called difference on account of it being a different dharma. 
Unless there are different dharmas we cannot regard things as 
different, and why? If a- dharma is produced from conditions, 
that dharma is not different from its cause. When the cause 
is destroyed, the effect is also destroyed. For example, a 
house exists because of its beams and rafters. The house is 
not different from the beams and rafters, so that for the beams 
and rafters to decay is for the house, too to decay. 
Question: What is wrong in saying that there are fixed, 
different dhai as? 
Reply: 
14v6 If a' difference' means a separate thing arising from something 
different, 
Then it should be different from that other different thing. 
There are no 'different' things which arise separated from 
different things. 
Therefore there is no 'difference'. 
14 16 If there were (genuinely) different dhannas, separate and 
arising from other different (dharmas), then these different 
dharmas would be separate from those other different (dharmas). 
But in reality there are no (genuinely) different dharmas, 
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separate and arising from different dharmas, consequently those 
other different dharmas do not exist. it is as if the fist 
were different and separate from a different (entity) of five 
fingers. If the fist were different, it should be (equally) 
different to different things such as pots, etc. Now, one 
cannot find a different fist, quite separate from a different 
(entity of) five fingers. Therefore there is no different 
dharma of a fist which is different to pots, etc. 
(19b22) Question: Our sutras say that different characteristics do 
not arise from conditions. Different characteristics result 
from our making distinctions within the universal character- 
istic, a-ad it is because of these different characteristics 
that there are different dharmas. 
Reply: 
14v7 Within difference there are no different characteristics. 
Nor are there any within non-difference. 
Since there are no different characteristics 
There is no difference between this and that. 
14/7 You say that different characteristics are a result of making 
distinctions within a universal characteristic, and that 
because of these different characteristics there are different 
dharmas. If this were so, these different characteristics 
would arise from conditions, and this being the case they would 
be described as (causally) conditioned dharmas. Since these 
different characteristics cannot be found apart from different 
dharmas, the different characteristics merely exist because of 
different dharmas, for they cannot be established in isolation. 
But, there are no different characteristics within different 
dharmas, and why? If the different dharmas are already in 
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existence, what use have they for different characteristics? 
Neither are these different characteristics in dharmas which 
are non-different, and why? Because if the different 
characteristics were in dharmas which were not different, they 
would not be called non-different dharmas. Since they do not 
exist in either situation, there are no different charact- 
eristics, and since there are no different characteristics 
there is no 'this dharma' and 'that dharma'. 
Moreover, since there are no different dharmas, there is also 
no combination. 
14v8 A dharma does not combine with itself. 
Different dharmas do not combine either. 
Combiner, moment of combining 
And dharma of combining; none of these exists. 
14/8 A dharma does not combine with its own substance, because it 
is one, just as one finger does not combine with itself. 
Different dharmas also do not combine because they are 
different, and different things already established do not' need 
to combine. Contemplated thus, a dharma of combination is 
untenable, and this is why we say that a combiner, a moment of 
combining and a dharma of combining are all untenable. 
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Chapter 15 Contemplation of Existence and Nonexistence 
11 verses 
15/0 
15v1 
15/1 
15v2 
Question: Every dharma has a , nature, 
because it has a 
function. 203 For example, a pot has the nature of a pot, and 
cloth has the nature of cloth. This nature emerges when there 
is a combination of conditions. 
Reply: 
That a nature exists within conditions 
Is not correct. 
And a nature issuing from conditions 
Would be termed a 'created dharm. a'. 
204 
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If dharmas have natures, they should not issue from conditions, 
and why? Because if they issue from conditions they are 
'created' dharmas and have no fixed nature. 
Question: What is wrong in saying that a dharma's nature is 
created from conditions? 
Reply: 
Suppose its nature were created; 
But what would be the meaning of this? 
'Nature' means something uncreated 
Established without reliance on other dharmas, 
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15/2 Just as gold mixed with copper is not true gold, so if a nature 
exists then it has no need of conditions. If it issues from 
conditions we will know that it is not a true nature. Also, if 
a nature is fixed, then it should not emerge in reliance upon 
anything else. It is not like length and shortness, or this 
and that, which, having no fixed natures, rely upon other things 
for their existence. 
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Question: If dharmas have no self-nature, they must have 
other-nature. 
Reply: 
15v3 If a dharma has no self-nature 
How can it have other-nature? 
Self-nature, in relation to other-nature 
Is also called other-nature. 
15/3 Since a dbarma's nature is created by conditions and 
established by causal dependence, it is not self-nature. This 
being the case, other-nature, since it is self-nature in 
relation to an other-nature and is also produced interdepend- 
ently from conditions, does not exist either. Since it does 
not exist, how can you say that dharmas are produced from an 
other-nature, since that other-nature is also a self-nature? 
Question: What is wrong in saying that dharmas exist without 
either a self-nature or an other-nature? 
Reply: 
15v4 Without self-nature or other-nature 
How could there be any dharmas at all? 
If there is self or other-nature 
Dharmas can be established. 
15/4 'Lou speak of dharmas existing without either self-nature or 
other-nature, but this is not correct. Without self-nature and 
other-nature there will be no dharmas, and why? It is through 
the existence of self-nature and other-nature that dharmas are 
established. For instance, where the substance of a pot is a 
9 
self-nature, cloth is an other-nature. 
Question: If you refute existence in terms of self-nature and 
A -elu-rtrvv 
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other-nature, then there must be nonexistence. 
Reply: 
15v5 If existence is not established, 
How can nonexistence be established? 
It is because there are existent dharmas 
That when existents are destroyed, they are called 'nonexistent'. 
15/5 If you have already accepted that existence is not established, 
then you should accept that nonexistence does not exist either, 
and why? When existent dharmas are destroyed they are called 
nonexistent. This nonexistence exists because of the dest- 
ruction of existence. 
Further: 
15v6 If a person sees existence and nonexistence, 
And sees self-nature and other-nature, 
(seeing) thus he does not see 
The true meaning of the Buddha-dharma. 
15/6 If a person is deeply attached to dharmas, then he will 
inevitably pursue a view of existence. If you refute self- 
nature then he will see other-nature. If you refute other- 
nature he will see existence. If you refute existence, he will 
see nonexistence. If you refute nonexistence, he will become 
confused. But if he is clear-witted and his mental attachments 
are slight, and he knows the calm serenity of the cessation of 
all views, 
206 he will nevermore generate these four kinds of 
sophistries. Such a person sees the Buddha-dharmat gnnot ' 
(&(S is 
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15v7 The Buddha is able to extinguish both existence and nonexistence 
As it says in the sutra, 
In the 'Instruction to Katyayana' 
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"Separate from existence and separate from nonexistence". 
15/7 In the Samdaf-Kätyayana sutra, 
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the Buddha expounds the 
meaning of 'right view' as 'separate from existence and 
separate from nonexistence'. If there were the least fixed 
'existence' in dharmas, the Buddha would not have refuted both 
existence and nonexistence. When existence is refuted, people 
- say that this constitutes nonexistence, but because the Buddha 
is thoroughly versed in the characteristics of dharmas, he 
explains that neither is the case. You should therefore 
relinquish views of existence and of nonexistence. 
Further: 
15v8 If dharmas really have a nature 
They cannot subsequently change. 
For a nature to have varying characteristics 
Would never be the case. 
15/8 If dharmas have a fixed existent nature this should under no 
circumstances change, and why? If it is a fixed, existent self- 
nature, then it should not have varying characteristics, just 
as in the 'true gold' example above 
(15/2). Now, since dharmas 
are manifestly seen to have varying characteristics, we must 
know that they do not have fixed characteristics. 
Further: 
15v9 If dharmas really had a nature 
How could they vary? 
If dharmas really had no nature 
How could they vary? 
15/9 If dharmas had a fixed nature, how could they change? If they 
have no nature then they have no self-substance, so how could 
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they change? 
Further: 
15v10 Fixed existence is attachment to permanence. 
Fixed nonexistence is attachment to severance. 
Therefore the wise man 
Should not be attached to either existence or nonexistence. 
15/10 If dharmas were fixed and existent, having the mark of existence, 
08 
then they would never become nonexistent, with the mark of 
nonexistence, and this would be permanence. Why is this?. It 
is like saying, of the three periods of time, that the 
characteristics of a dharma exist in the future period, and 
that this dharma comes into present existence, and then in turn 
passes into the past, without abandoning its original 
characteristics. This would constitute permanence. It is also 
saying that an effect exists beforehand in the cause, which is 
also permanence. 
(20b22) If you say that a fixed (entity) is nonexistent, then this 
nonexistent thing must have existed previously but does not 
exist now, and this constitutes severance. Severance means no 
continuity of characteristics. Through these two views, one 
strays very far from the Buddha's Dharma. 
Question: Why does (a view of) existence produce the view 
that things are permanent, and a (view of) nonexistence 
produce the view that things are cut off? 
Reply: 
15v11 If dharnas had fixed natures 
They would not be nonexistent, and this would be permanence. 
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If they previously existed and now do not, 
This would constitute severance. 
15/11 If dharmas' nature were fixed and existent, they would have the 
characteristic of existence and not the characteristic of non- 
existence, so they would in no way be nonexistent. If they were 
nonexistent, they would not exist, and consequently they would 
not be dharmas. Because of the errors previously discussed, 
one thus falls into a view of permanence. 
(20c1) If a dharma which formerly existed is destroyed and becomes 
nonexistent, then this constitutes severance, and why? Because 
existence cannot be nonexistence, and because, as you say, 
existence and nonexistence each have fixed characteristics. If 
you have views of severance or permanence, sin and merit, etc. 
will not exist and you will negate all worldly processes. For 
this reason, you should relinquish them. 
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Chapter 16 Contemplation of Bondage and Liberation 
209 
10 verses 
16/0 Birth and death (samsara) is not entirely without foundation. 
Within it there are surely living beings transmigrating (Lit: 
going and coming) , 
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or predispositions transmigrating. What 
are your reasons for saying that living being and predis- 
positions are absolutely empty, and that there is no trans- 
migration? 
Reply: 
16v1 As for the predispositions transmigrating, 
If they are permanent they should not transmigrate. 
Nor should they if impermanent. 
It is the same too, with living beings. 
16 11 If predispositions transmigrate within the six paths of 
samsara, do they transmigrate with permanent characteristics, 
or do they transmigrate with impermanent characteristics? 
Both are wrong. If they transmigrate with permanent 
characteristics, then there will be no continuity of 
characteristics through births and deaths, because they will 
be fixed, and because their self-nature will persist. If they 
transmigrate with impermanent characteristics, then, too, there 
will be no continuity of characteristics through transmigration 
and birth and death, since they will not be fixed, and will have 
no self-nature. In the case of living beings transmigrating, 
the same errors will apply. 
Further: 
16v2 If living beings transmigrate 
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Within the skandhas, the realms and the avenues, 
211 
Seek them five ways; 
212 
they are utterly nonexistent. 
Who is it that transmigrates? 
16/2 Birth and death, the skandhas, realms and entrances all mean the 
same thing. If it is living beings who transmigrate within 
these skandhas, realms and avenues, we have searched in the 
chapter on fire and fuel213 for such living beings in five ways 
and they are unattainable. Who is it that transmigrates in the 
skandhas, the realms and the avenues? 
Further: 
16v3 If something transmigrates from a body to a body, 
It will be bodiless. 
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If it has no body, 
Then there will be no transmigration. 
16/3 If living beings transmigrate, do they transmigrate with a 
body, or do they transmigrate without a body? Neither is 
correct, and why? If there is transmigration with a body, then 
(the living being) will go from one body to another body, and if 
so, the transmigrator will not have a body. Moreover, if the 
body already existed, (the living being) would not have any 
further need to pass from body to body, but if no body existed 
beforehand, he would not exist, and being non-existent, how 
could he transmigrate, be born, or die? 
Question: The sutras say that there is nirvana, and the 
extinction of all suffering. Surely this extinction must be 
the extinction of the predispositions, or215 the extinction of 
living beings? 
Reply: Both are incorrect, and why? 
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16v4 The predispositions becoming extinct? 
Such would never be the case. 
Living beings becoming extinct? 
This too could not be right. 
16/4 You say that either the predispositions cease or the living 
being ceases, but we have already answered these assertions. 
Predispositions have no nature. 
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Living beings too, you can 
search for in various ways in samsara and transmigration but 
you will not be able to find them. Therefore, predispositions 
do not cease, nor do living beings cease. 
Question: If this is true, then there is no bondage, and no 
liberation, since no foundation can be found for them. 
Reply: 
16v5 Predispositions have the characteristics of arising and ceasing, 
Not bound, and not liberated. 
Living beings too, as formerly explained, 
Are not bound and not liberated. 
16/5 You say that predispositions and living beings have bondage 
and liberation, but this is not the case. Since predisposi- 
tions arise and cease instant by instant, they cannot be bound 
or liberated. It has already been explained that you can search 
for living beings in five ways but you will not find them. How 
can they have bondage or liberation? 
Further: 
16v6 If bondage means the body, 
Then having a body is not bondage. 
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Not having a body also is not bondage, 
How then can there be bondage? 
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16/6 If you say that bondage means (to have) the body of the five 
skandhas, then if a living being already has the five skandhas, 
he cannot be bound, and why? Because this would be one person 
having two bodies. Having no body he cannot be bound either, 
and why? If he has no body, then he has no five skandhas, and 
having no five skandhas is emptiness, so how could there be 
bondage? There is no further third (entity) which could be 
bound. 
Further: 
16v7 If bondage preceded the one who is bound, 
Then it would bind the one who is bound. 
But in reality no pre-existent bondage exists 
The other (aspects) may be answered as in 'going and coming' . 
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16/7 If, as you assert, bondage exists prior to the one who is bound, 
then it ought to bind the one who is bound, but in reality no 
prior bondage exists, separate from the one who is bound. 
Therefore, you cannot say that the living being is in bondage, 
nor can you say that the living being is the one who is bound 
and that the five skandhas are the bondage. Nor can you say 
that, within the five skandhas, the afflictions are the bondage 
and the remainder, the five skandhas, are what is bound. None 
of these is correct, and why? If the living being existed 
separately, prior to the five skandhas, then the living being 
would be bound by the five skandhas, but in reality there is no 
separate being apart from the five skandhas. If the afflictions 
existed separately, apart from the five skandhas, then the five 
skandhas would be bound by the afflictions, but in reality there 
are no separate afflictions apart from the five skandhas. 
133 
(21b2) Moreover, as is explained in the chapter on going and coming, a 
past going does not go, a future going does not go, and a moment 
of going does not go. In the same way a future bondage does not 
bind, a past bondage does not bind, and a moment of bondage does 
not bind. There is, moreover, no liberation either, and why? 
16v8 One who is bound does not have liberation 
One who is unbound also does not have liberation 
If there were liberation in the moment of binding, 
Bondage and release would be simultaneous. 
16/8 One who is bound does not have liberation, and why? Because he 
is already bound. One who is not bound does not have liberation 
either, and why? Because he is not bound. And if you say that 
there is liberation in the moment of. bondage, then bondage and 
liberation would be simultaneous, and this is not right, since 
bondage and liberation are mutually opposed. ' 
Question: There are people who, cultivating the Way, 
manifestly enter nirvana and achieve liberation. How can you 
say that they do not exist? 
Reply: 
16v9 "If we do not receive dharmas 
We will attain nirvana". 
Such persons as these 
Are themselves the ones in bondage to receiving. 
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16 19 If a person produces this thought - "I shall free myself from 
receiving and attain nirvana", this person is the very one who 
is in bondage to receiving. 
Further: 
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16v10 Nirvana is not something special, 
Separate from birth and death. 
The meaning of thusness being thus, 
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How can there be any distinctions? 
16/10 In the highest sense of the real character of all dharmas, we 
do not speak of a special nirvana which exists apart from 
birth and death. As the sutras say; "nirvana is samsara, 
samsara is nirvana". 
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Within this true character of all 
dharmas how can you say 'This is samsara, this is nirvana'? 
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Chapter 17 Contemplation of Karma 
222 
33 verses 
Question: 
17/0 Although you refute dharmas in various ways, karma does have a 
fixed existence, since it is able to cause living beings to 
receive the fruits and rewards (of their actions, As the 
sutra says, 'all living beings take birth according to their 
karma'. An evil person goes into the hells, one who 
cultivates merit is reborn in heaven, and one who traverses the 
path attains nirvana. Therefore, these dharmas are not empty. 
It is said of karma that: 
17v1 A person can subdue his mind 
And benefit living beings. 
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This is called compassion 
The seed and the fruit of the two worlds. 
17/1 The three poisons in a person cause distress to others and give 
rise to actions, so the good person first of all destroys his 
own evil. This is why it is said that subduing his own mind 
benefits others. 'Benefiting others' means almsgiving, holding 
to the precepts, humility, etc. and not harming others. This 
is what is meant by 'benefiting others'. It is also known as 
'compassionate goodness and blessed virtue' and as 'the seeds 
and joyful fruit of this world and the next'. 
Further: 
17Tr2 The great sage expounds two kinds of karma; 
The thought, and that which thought produces. 
224 
Within these different characteristics of karma 
Various distinctions are explained. 
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17/2 The great sage teaches that karmas are of two kinds. One is 
thought, the other is that which thought produces. These two 
kinds of karma are explained in detail in the Abhidharma. 
17v3 The thought of which the Buddha speaks 
May be termed 'mental karma'. 
That which arises from the thought 
Is speech and body karma. 
17/3 Conception225 is one of the dharmas of mental configurations. 
226 
Amongst the mental configurations, it has the capacity to 
initiate that which is done, and this is why it is called karma. 
External actions of body and speech arise on account of 
conception. Although there are things which are done through 
the other configurations of the mind, it is conception which 
is the basis of action, and this is why conception is said to 
be karma. The characteristics of karma will now be explained: 
17v4 The karma of body and the karma of speech, 
Performed and non-performed karma. 
227 
Within these four things 
Is both goodness and non-goodness. 
17v5 From their effect 
228 
arises blessed virtue 
And evil arises in the same way. 
These seven dharmas, 
229 including conception, 
Comprise the characteristics of karma. 
17/5 Speech karma: There are four kinds of speech karma. 
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Bodily karma: There are three kinds of bodily karma. These 
seven kinds of karma are subdivided into two types, 'active' and 
'non-active'. When you act, this is called 'active' karma, but 
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once you have acted the successive subsequent products are 
termed 'non-active' karmas. 
both 'good' and 'not good'. 
These two types of karma may be 
'Not good' means that they do not 
stop evil. Good means that they stop evil. 
(21c20) Furthermore, blessed virtue arises from their enjoyment, as 
when a benefactor gives something to a recipient. If the 
recipient receives and enjoys it, the benefactor acquires two 
kinds of merit, one arising from the giving and the other 
arising from the enjoyment. 
(21c22) It is like a man shooting at another man with an arrow. If the 
arrow kills the man, there are two kinds of sin involved. One 
is the sin of shooting at him, the other is the sin arising 
from the murder. If the shot had not killed him, the one who 
shot would only have the sin of shooting, and there would be no 
sin of murder. This is why it says in the verse that sin and 
merit are produced from the effect. 
(22a2) These are what is meant by the six kinds of karma, and the 
seventh is called conception. These seven kinds of karma are 
subdivisions of the characteristics of karma, and karma has 
effects and rewards in this world and subsequent worlds. 
Therefore there are fixed, real (karmic) actions and their 
results. Hence, dharmas cannot be empty. 
Reply: 
17v6 If the action continues up to its reception of reward, 
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Then such an action is permanent. 
If it ceases, how can a nonexistent action 
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Give rise to a reward? 
17/6 If an action continued right up to the reception of its reward, 
then it would be permanent, but this is not correct, and why? 
Actions have the characteristics of arising and ceasing. They 
do not abide even for an instant, so how much less can they 
persist right up to their reward? But it you say that an 
action ceases, then, being ceased, it does not exist, so how 
can it produce its reward? 
" 
Question: 
17v7 It is like the sprout, etc., 
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where a succession of 
characteristics 
Arises from the seed, 
And from that is produced the fruit. 
Without the seed, there would be no succession. 
17v8 There is a succession from the seed, 
And from this succession comes the fruit. 
The seed comes first, and afterwards the fruit. 
With no severance, and no permanence. 
17v9 And in the same way, from the initial mindX33 
The dharmas of mind have arisen in succession. 
And from this mind there are effects 
Without that mind, there would be no succession. 
17v10 From mind, there is a succession 
From this succession comes the effect. 
The act comes first, and afterwards the result. 
With no severance, and no permanence. 
17/ 1 It is like the sprout coming from the corn-seed and 
from the 
139 
sprout a succession of stalk, leaf, etc., from which succession 
the fruit is produced, 
V '' 
neither severance nor permanence. 
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and its effect. The initial thought234 which gives rise to sin 
or merit is like the seed of corn. As a result of this thought, 
the other dharmas of thoughts and mental configurations are 
produced in succession, up to the reward. Because the action 
comes first and the effect afterwards, there is no severance 
and no permanence involved. If there were rewards separate 
from actions, this would involve severance or permanence. As 
for the rewards and causes of good actions, it is said: 
17v11 
17/11 
Able to establish blessed virtue, 
Are the ten Paths of 'white' actions. 
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The five desires and pleasures of the two worlds 
Are the reward of these 'white' actions. 
e 
'White' means good and pure. As for establishing the causes 
of blessed virtue; following the ten paths of pure actions 
results in no-killing, no-stealing, no-lewdness, no lying, 
no deception, no evil speech, no useless gossip, no, jealousy, 
no anger and no perverted views. These are termed good. One 
who produces such results in body, speech and mind attains 
name and wealth in this world, and in the next world is 
born 
into a place of honour amongst gods and men. 
236 Although there 
are other various types of blessed virtues such as almsgiving 
and reverence, we are summarising, and these are 
therefore to 
be included within the ten good paths. 
Reply: 
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17v12 If one made such distinctions as yours, 
The errors would be extremely numerous. 
Therefore, what you have said, 
Is not correct in its meaning. 
17/12 If, in connection with the succession from action to reward, 
you take as an example the corn-seed, the errors will be 
extremely numerous, but we shall not discuss them at length 
here. As for your example of corn-seed, this example will not 
do, and why? Corn seed is tangible, it has form, can be seen, 
and has a succession of characteristics, but even so 
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we may 
contemplate this matter and still not accept your words. How 
much less with thoughts and actions, which are intangible, 
formless and invisible? Though they arise and cease without 
abiding, you desire (to establish) some continuity of 
characteristics. This is not correct. 
(22b13) Further, as for the succession from seed to sprout, etc., is 
this succession after (the seed) has ceased (at each juncture), 
or is it a succession in which the seed has not ceased? If it 
is a succession with the seed having ceased, then this would be 
causelessness, but if it is succession without the seed having 
ceased, then corn would be constantly arising from this seed, 
and if this were so, then one seed of corn would produce all 
the corn in the world. But this is not the case, and therefore 
the succession from action to reward is not like this. 
Question: 
17v13 We will now further expound, 
In relation to actions and their rewards, 
(Truths) which all Buddhas, Pratyekabuddhas 
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And sages admire and praise. 
17/13 Namely: 
17TT14 The non-disappearing dharma238 is like a bond, 
Actions are like the goods owing. 
Its nature is neutral239 
Its classification is fourfold. 
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17v15 It is not severed by perception of truths. 
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It is only severed by meditation. 
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By virtue of this non-disappearing dharma 
All actions have their rewards. 
17v16 If it were severed by perception of truths, 
Yet actions still reached similar (rewards) 
243 
This would mean a denial of karma 
And errors such as this. 
17v17 When all predispositions and actions 
Whether similar or dissimilar 
First receive a body in a realm 
At that time only one reward arises. 
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17v18 These two kinds of action245 
Receive their reward in the present world, 
Some say that, having received their reward, 
The actions still remain. 
17v19 Either they cease at fruition 
Or they cease at death 
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Herein is the distinction 
Between those with outflows and those without outflows. 
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17/19 The non-disappearing dharma, we should understand to be like a 
bond, and 'actions' to be like the goods received. This non- 
disappearing dharma may be bound to the realm of desire, bound 
to the realm of form, bound to the formless realm, and also 
unbound. As far as distinctions of good, bad and neutral are 
concerned, it is merely neutral, and the meaning of its being 
neutral is fully explained in the Abhidharma. It is not cut 
off by perceiving truths, but is cut off by meditation in the 
midst of its passing from one effect to another effect. 
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In 
this way, by virtue of the non-disappearing dharma (karmic) 
actions produce effects. 
(22c10) If it were cut off by perceiving truths, and yet actions still 
reached similar (rewards) this would mean the error of denying 
karma, a topic which is fully explained in the Abhidharma. 
Further, with regard to the never-disappearing dharma; at the 
time when actions, similar or dissimilar are first receiving 
a body in a particular realm, only one reward arises. 
(22c12) Further actions arise from actions of the body in the present 
world, and these actions are of two kinds, receiving reward 
according to their weight. Some say that these actions still 
remain in existence after having received their rewards, since 
they do not cease moment by moment. 
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(22c15) 'Either they cease when at fruition, or they cease at death. ' 
means that for the srotapannas etc. (read: Arhats? 
) they cease 
at fruition, but for ordinary people and arhats they cease at 
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death. 'Herein is a distinction between those with outflows 
and those without outflows' means that all the stages of 
sainthood should be distinguished from the srotäpanna (read: 
Arhat? ) in respect of having outflows and not having outflows. 
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Reply: These ideas are not at all free of the errors of 
severance and permanence, and for this reason we cannot accept 
them either. 
Question: If that is the. case, there will be no karma and 
retribution. 
Reply: 
17v20 Although empty, it is not severed 
Though it exists it is not permanent. 
Karma and reward never disappear 
This we call the teaching of the Buddha. 
17/20 The ideas which the author of this treatise sets forth are 
separate from severance and permanence. Why is this? Because 
karma is utterly empty and has the characteristic of nirvana. 
Its self-nature being separate from existence, what dharmna is 
there to be cut off, and what dharma is there to disappear? 
Perverted views are the cause of our transmigrating in samsara, 
and these too are impermanent, and why? Because dharmas arising 
from perverted views are empty, deceptive and unreal, and being 
unreal they are impermanent. Moreover, it is because of your 
attachments to perverted views and ignorance of the true 
character that you say that karma does not disappear, and that 
this is the teaching of the Buddha. 
Further: 
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17v21 All dharmas are fundamentally non-arising 
Since they have no fixed nature. 
All dharmas are also non-ceasing 
Because they do not arise. 
17v22 If actions had a nature 
They would be called permanent 
Inactivity would be called action 
For what is permanent cannot act. 
17v23 If there were inactive actions, 
Then without acting, there could still be sins. 
Without lapsing from puze conduct250 
There could be impurity and transgression. 
17v24 This would negate all 
Dharmas of worldly expression 
Doing evil and doing good 
Would not be distinguished. 
17v25 If, as you say, actions are fixed 
With self-existent natures, 
Then, already having received rewards, 
One would again receive them. 
17v26 If all actions within the world 
Arise from the afflictions, 
And these afflictions are not real, 
How can (actions) then be real? 
17/26 In the highest sense actions do not arise, and why? Because 
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they have no nature. It is on account of their non-arising 
that they do not cease, it is not because they are permanent 
that they do not cease. If this were not so, the nature of 
actions would be fixed and existent, and if actions had a fixed, 
existent nature, this would constitute permanence. If they 
were permanent, they would be non-acting actions, and why? 
Because permanent dharmas cannot do anything. 
(23a16; Moreover, if there were non-acting actions, then that man could 
commit a sin and this man would receive the retribution, or 
that man could lapse from his pure conduct, yet this man would 
have the sin, and this would negate conventional worldly dharm. a. 
(23a18) If things were pre-existent, then in winter there would be no 
need to think about the affairs of spring, and in spring no 
need to think about the affairs of summer, and there would be 
errors such as this. 
(23a19) Moreover, there would be no differentiation between doing good 
and doing evil. To perform deeds such as almsgiving and holding 
to the precepts, etc. is what is meant by 'doing good', and to 
perform actions of murdering, stealing, etc. is termed 'doing 
evil'. If there were actions, yet no doing, there would be no 
(such) distinction. 
(23a22) Again, if actions had a fixed, existent nature, then, having 
already on one occasion received their rewards, one would have 
to receive them again. Thus, your doctrine that action and 
reward exist because of a 'non-disappearing dharma' has these 
kinds of errors. 
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(23a24) 
(23a27) 
17v27 
17/27 
Moreover, if you say that actions arise from the afflictions, 
these afflictions do not have any fixed (nature) but merely 
exist by virtue of conceptualised distin ctions* 
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Since the 
afflictions have no reality, how can karma have any reality? 
Why is this? Because they (the afflictions) have no nature, 
actions have no nature either. 
Question: Even if both afflictions and karma have no nature 
and are unreal, the resultant body manifestly exists; surely 
it is real? 
Reply: 
The afflictions and karma 
Are said to be the causes of bodies. 
Afflictions and actions being empty, 
How much more so the bodies? 
All the saints and sages tell us that the afflictions and 
karma are the causes and conditions of bodies. Within these 
conditions desire has the power to fertilise birth, and karma 
produces the (appropriate) reward of a high, middle, low, 
attractive, ugly, noble or base, etc., birth. Though you 
investigate the afflictions and karma in various ways, they 
have no fixed (nature. How much less do bodies have a fixed 
(nature), since they are effects of causes and conditions? 
(23b5) Question: Although you have refuted karma and retribution on 
various grounds, nevertheless the sutras say that there is an 
originator of karma, and since the one who originates karma 
exists, actions exist, and their rewards exist. 
As it is said, 
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17v28 The one who is obscured in ignorance, 
The one who is bound by the bond of desire, 
Is not the same, and is not different, 
From the original Doer. 
17/28 In the Sutra on Beginninglessness252 it says that all living 
beings, obscured in ignorance and bound by bonds-of desire, 
transmigrate in beginningless samsara experiencing various 
sufferings and pleasures. The one who is now experiencing 
is neither the same as, nor different from, -the one who 
previously acted. If he were the same, then when a man who did 
evil received the form of an ox, the man would not become an ox, 
and nor would the ox become a man. 
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If they are different, 
then all action and reward is lost and we fall into causelessness, 
and causelessness is annihilation. 
(23b14) Therefore, the present recipient is neither the same as, nor 
different from, the former- doer. 
Reply: 
17v29 Karma does not arise from conditions, 
Nor does it arise from non-conditions. 
For this reason, there is no 
Originator of karma. 
17v30 No karma, and no doer, 
How can there be action producing a reward? 
And if there is no reward 
How can there be a recipient of that reward? 
17/30 If there is no action and no-one who performs the action, how 
can there be a reward arising from that action? And if there 
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is no reward, how can there be a recipient of the reward? 
Karma has three aspects; 
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within the five skandhas what we 
conventionally designate as a person is the 'doer', and the 
good or evil situation produced by his actions is called the 
'reward'. If an originator of karma does not even exist, how 
much less can there be actions, their rewards, or a recipient 
of these rewards? 
(23b24) Question: Although you have refuted karma and its reward and 
any originator of karma in various ways, nevertheless we can 
see that all living beings manifestly perform actions and 
receive their rewards. What about this? 
Reply: 
17v31 It is like an illusionary man, made 
By the world-honoured one's spiritual power, 
And this illusionary man 
Transforming into yet another man. 
17v32 Just as the first illusionary man 
May be called a 'doer', 
What the illusionary man performs 
May be called an action. 
17v33 All afflictions and actions 
Doers and rewards, 
Are like illusions or dreams, 
Like flames or like an echo. 
17/33 It is like an illusionary man created by the Buddha's spiritual 
power, who in turn transforms himself into another illusionary 
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man. Such an illusionary man has no actual existence and is 
merely a vision, but the illusionary man's actions of speech in 
preaching the dharma, and actions of the body in giving alms and 
so forth, though they are unreal, can be seen by the eye. 
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Likewise, the body of birth and death, the doer and the action, 
should be understood in the same say. 
(23c7) 'All the afflictions' means the three poisons 
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whose sub- 
divisions constitute such unlimited afflictions as the ninety- 
eight temptations, the nine bonds, the ten ties, the six 
defilements and so forth. 
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'Actions' means the actions of 
body, speech and mind. In respect of the present and future 
worlds they are divided into good, bad and neutral, rewards of 
pain, rewards of pleasure, rewards of neither pain nor pleasure, 
actions with rewards in the present, actions producing rewards, 
and actions with rewards in the future, and so on ad infinitum. 
'Doer' means one who can originate the afflictions and karma 
and can receive the rewards and retribution. 'Rewards' means 
the neutral five skandhas produced from good and bad actions. 
All karmas such as these are empty and without nature, like an 
illusion, like a dream, like a flame or like an echo. 
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18/0 
Chapter 18 
Question: 
Contemplation of Dharmas 12 -rerses 
If dharmas are wholly and utterly empty, with no 
arising and no ceasing, and this is what is meant by 'the true 
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character of dharmas', how can one penetrate it? 
Reply: Through the extinction of attachment to 'I' and 'mine', 
the emptiness of all dharmas is attained. The insight of non- 
self259 constitutes penetration. 
Question: How do you know that all dharmas are without self? 
Reply: 
18v1 If self is the five skandhas, 
That self will arise and cease. 
If self is different from the five skandhas, 
Then it will not have the characteristics of the five skandhas. 
18v2 If no 'I' exists, 
How can there be 'mine'? 
It is the extinction of I and mine, 
That is called 'attaining the insight of non-self'. 
18v3 Attaining the insight of non-self 
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Is termed 'viewing reality' 
One who attains the insight of non-self; 
Such a person is rarely found. 
18v4 When inner and outer, I and mine, 
Entirely cease, with nothing existing, 
All receiving is then extinct. 
Reception ceasing, the body also ceases. 
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18v5 When karma and afflictions are extinct, 
We call it liberation. 
Karma and afflictions are unreal 
Penetrating emptiness, all sophistries cease. 
18v6 The Buddhas may teach that there is a self, 
Or teach that there is no self. 
Within the true character of dharlnas, 
There is neither self, nor non-self. 
18v7 The true character of dharmas, 
Is severance of mind, actions and speech. 
With no production and no cessation 
Calm extinction, like nirvana. 
18v8 All (things) are real, unreal, 
Both real and unreal, and 
Neither unreal nor not unreal, 
This is called the Buddha's Dharma. 
18v9 To know for oneself, not following others, 
Calm extinction, without sophistries, 
No differences and no distinctions; 
This is termed the 'true character'. 
18v10 If dharmas arise from conditions, 
They neither are, nor differ from, their conditions. 
This is why we call the real character 
fj 6 ý- C Mfr oýý Ate -n oý p erNýdýe rý. 
f' .ý 
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18v11 Not one and not different, 
Not permanent and not cut off; 
This is the flavour 
Of the sweet nectar of the Buddha's teachings. 
18v12 If the Buddha had not emerged in the world, 
And the Buddha-dharma had utterly ceased. 
The insight of the Pratyekabuddhas 
Would have arisen quite separately. 
18/12 Some people teach that there is a soul, in which case it must 
be of two kinds. Either the five skandhas are themselves the 
soul, or the soul exists apart from the five skandhas. 
If the five skandhas are the soul, then the soul will have the 
characteristics of arising and ceasing. Thus it says in the 
verse 'if the soul is the five skandhas it will have the 
characteristics of arising and ceasing', and why? Becuase once 
arisen, it will perish. Because they have the characteristics 
of arising and ceasing, the five skandhas have no permanence, 
and just as the five skandhas have no permanence, the two 
dharmas of arising and ceasing likewise have no permanence. 
Why is this? Because arising and ceasing also perish after 
they have arisen and hence are impermanent. If the soul were 
the five skandhas, then, since the five skandhas are impermanent, 
the soul would also be impermanent and would have the 
characteristics of arising and ceasing, but this is not correct. 
(24a21) If the soul existed apart from the five skandhas, the soul 
would not have the characteristics of the five skandhas. As it 
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says in the verse: 'if the soul is different from the five 
skandhas, then it will not have the characteristics of the five 
skandhas'. Yet no other dharma exists apart from the five 
skandhas. If there were any such dharma apart from the five 
skandhas, by virtue of what characteristics, or what dharmas, 
would it exist? 
(24a25) If you say that the soul is like empty space, separate from the 
five skandhas yet existent, this is also wrong, and why? We 
have already refuted empty space in the chapter on refuting the 
six elements. No dhama called 'empty space' exists. 
(24a27) If you assert that a soul exists because belief 
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in it exists, 
this is not correct, and why? Belief is of four kinds; the 
first is belief in a manifest thing, the second is belief in 
something known through this (manifest thing) (= inferential 
belief) as when seeing smoke, we know that there is a fire. 
The third is belief by analogy as when, in a country with no 
copper, one uses the example of it being like gold. The 
fourth is belief in what is taught by saints and sages, as when 
they say that there are hells, heavens and (the continent of) 
uttara-kuru. 
262 Without seeing anything, we believe the words 
of the holy men and thus know about them. 
(24b3) Such a 'soul' cannot be found amongst these beliefs. It is 
not found in belief in manifest things, nor in inferential 
belief, and why? Inferential knowledge means that having 
previously seen something, you thenceforth know 
(about) this 
kind of thing, as for example a man who has previously seen 
that where there is fire there is smoke, subsequently, seeing 
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(24b7) 
(24b15) 
only smoke, knows that there is fire. The concept of 'soul' is 
not like this, for who could first have seen the soul in the 
combination of the five skandhas, such that afterwards, seeing 
the five skandhas, he knows that there is a soul? 
Suppose you say that there are three kinds of inferential 
knowledge, the first being 'like the original', the second being 
'like the remainder', the third 'seeing together'. 'Like the 
original' means previously having seen that fire has smoke, seeing 
smoke now, you know that it is like the original which had fire. 
'Like the remainder' means, for example, that when one grain of 
rice is cooked, you know that the remaining ones are all cooked. 
'Seeing together' means, for example, that when you see with 
your eyes a person going from hereto another place, you also 
see his going. The sun is like this. It emerges from the 
east and goes to the west. Although you do not see it going, 
because a man has the characteristic of going, you know that 
the sun also has going. 
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In the same way suffering, pleasure, 
rerepft . hate, desire, and insight, etc. must also have what- 
ever goes with them. For example, seeing subjects you know that 
they must rely on some king. 
why? 
But these are all incorrect, and 
In belief through the characteristic of together-ness, having 
first seen a person combined with a dharma of 'going' who 
reaches some other place, when you subsequently see the sun 
reach another place you know that there is the dharma of 'going'. 
But there is no prior seeing of the five skandhas combined with 
a soul, such that subsequently seeing the five skandhas you know 
that there is a soul. Therefore, no existence of a soul can be 
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established by inferential knowledge of 'together-ness'. 
(24b18) There is no soul to be found within the teachings of the 
saints either, and why? In the teaching of the saints, what 
they first see with their eyes, they subsequently expound. 
And since the saints teach other things which can be believed, 
we should know that when they speak of the hells, etc., these 
can be believed in, but it is not so with the soul, for there 
is no-one who, having previously seen a soul, subsequently 
speaks of it. 
(24b 22) Therefore, you may seek for a soul within all beliefs such as 
these four types of belief, but you will not be able to find 
it. Since you cannot find a soul even though you seek for it, 
no distinct soul exists separate from the five skandhas. 
(24b24) Further, because of the refutation of seeing, seer and seen 
in the chapter refuting the (six sense-) faculties, 
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the 
soul is to be refuted in the same way. For if even an eye 
seeing coarse dharmas cannot be found, how much less can we 
find a soul by empty delusions, imagination and so forth? For 
these reasons, we know that there is no self. 
(24b26) 'Mine' exists because 'I' exists. If there is no I, then there 
is no mine. Through putting into practice the holy eight-fold 
path265 and extinguishing the causes of I and mine, one attains 
the firm insight266 of no I and no mine. 
(24b29) In the ultimate sense no I and no mine are also untenable. With 
no I and no mine, one can truly see all dharmas. Since the eye 
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of insight in an unenlightened person is veiled by I and mine, 
he cannot see reality. Now, since the saints have no I or 
mine, their afflictions are also extinguished. Because their 
afflictions are extinct, they are able to see the true 
character of all dharmas. When both inner and outer, I and mine 
cease, all reception ceases too, and when all reception ceases, 
the innumerable future bodies also cease, and this is termed 
'nirvana without residue'. 
(24c5) Question: What of nirvana with residue? 
Reply: When all the afflictions and karma have ceased, this is 
called 'the mind attaining liberation'. All these afflictions and 
actions arise wholly from conceptualised discriminations and have 
no reality. Such conceptual discriminations arise wholly from 
vain thoughts. If one attains to utter emptiness, the true 
character of all dharmas, then vain thoughts cease, and this is 
termed 'nirvana with residue'. 
(24c10) The true character of dharmas is like this. Because the Buddhas 
view all living things with omniscience they teach them in 
various ways, teaching both that there is a self, and that 
there is no self. If there is a person whose mind is as yet 
unprepared, who has no inkling of nirvana and knows no fear of 
punishment, to such a one they teach that there is a self. 
Also, if someone has attained the Way, perceived the emptiness 
of all dharmas, and merely uses 'self' as a conventional ' 
designation, there is nothing wrong in speaking of a self to 
such a one as this. 
(24c14) There are those who practice the blessed virtues of almsgiving, 
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holding to the precepts, etc., detest and distance themselves 
from samsara and suffering but fear nirvana as lasting 
extinction. For the sake of these, the Buddhas teach that 
there is no self. All dharmas are merely the combination of 
causes and conditions; when they arise, they arise empty, when 
they cease, they cease empty. Therefore they teach that there 
is no self, 'and that self is said to exist only as a 
conventional designation. Again, someone who has attained the 
, 
Way knows that there is no self, and will not fall into the 
nihilism, so there is no error in his teaching that there is 
no self. This is why it says in the verse (18v6) 'The Buddhas 
teach that there is a self, and they teach that there is no 
self, but in reality they do not teach either self or non-self'. 
(24c20) Question: Even though non-self is the truth, what is wrong 
with teaching, merely as a convention, that there is a self? 
Reply: Non-self exists by virtue of the negation of the dharma 
of self. No fixed self can be found, so how could there be 
non-self? If there were a fixed non-self, then annihilation of 
if would give rise to attachment and craving. As it says in 
the Prajnaparamita, if a bodhisattva has a self, he cannot act, 
and if he has no self, he cannot act. 
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(24c25) Question: If it teaches neither self nor non-self, neither 
emptiness nor non-emptiness, what does the Buddha-dharma teach? 
Reply: The Buddha teaches the true character of all dharmas, 
and within that true character there is no path for verbal 
expressions, for it extinguishes all mental activity. Mind 
arises because of the characteristic of grasping, exists because 
of the rewards and retribution of karma in a previous world, and 
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cannot therefore see the reality of dharmas. 
teaches the cessation of mental activities. 
This is why he 
(24c28) Question: Even though an unenlightened person's mind cannot 
see the reality, surely a saint's mind can see the reality? 
Why does he teach the cessation of all mental activities? 
Reply: The true character of dharmas is nirvana, and 
cessation means nirvana. It is in order to point towards 
nirvana, that cessation is also termed cessation. 
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If one's 
mind. were real, what use would be such ways to liberation as 
emptiness, etc? Why, amongst all the samadhis269 would the 
samadhi of cessation (nirodha-samäpatti) be regarded as the 
highest, and why ultimately reach nirvana without residue? 
Therefore we should know that all mental activities are empty 
deceptions, and as empty deceptions, should cease. The true 
character of all dharmas surpasses all dharmas of mental 
phenomena, has no arising and no ceasing, and has the 
characteristic of calm extinction, like nirvana. 
(25a7) Question: In the sutras it says that all dharmas, having from 
the beginning the characteristic of calm extinction are them- 
selves nirvana. Why do you say that they are like nirvana? 
(25a8) Reply: Those who are attached to dharmas classify dharmas 
into two kinds, some being worldly, some being of nirvana. 
They say that the nirvana (-dharmas) are calm and extinct, but 
do not say that the worldly dharmas are calm and extinct. In 
this treatise it is taught that all dharmas are empty in nature 
and have the characteristic of calm extinction. Since those 
who are attached to dharmas do not understand this, nirvana is 
used as an example. Just as with your assertion that the 
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characteristic of nirvana is emptiness, with no character- 
istics, calm extinction, and no vain thoughts, so it is with 
all worldly dharmas. 
(25a14) Question: If the Buddhas do not teach self, non-self, and the 
cessation of all mental activities and the cutting-off of ways 
of verbal expression, how do they make people understand the 
real character of dharmas? 
(25a15) Reply: All the Buddhas have unlimited powers of skilful means, 
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and dharmas have no fixed characteristics. In order to save all 
living beings, they may teach that everything is real, or they 
may teach that everything is unreal, or that everything is both 
real and unreal, or that everything is neither unreal nor not 
unreal. 
(25a18) 'Everything is real'. If you search for a real nature of 
dharmas, (you will find that) they all enter into the ultimate 
meaning and become equal, with identical characteristics, which 
is to say no characteristics, just like streams of different 
colour and different taste entering into a great ocean of one 
colour and one taste. 
(25a21) 'Everything is unreal'. At the time when one has not yet 
penetrated into the true character of dharmas, each one can be 
contemplated separately. They are all unreal, existing merely 
by the combination of conditions. 
(25a22) 'Everything is both real and unreal'. There are three levels 
of living beings; superior, average and inferior. The superior 
person sees that the characteristic of dharmas is that they are 
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neither real nor unreal. The average person sees the 
characteristics of dharmas as either all real, or all unreal. 
The inferior man, since his powers of perception are limited, 
sees the characteristics of dharmas as a little real, and a 
little unreal, regarding nirvana, because it is an inactive 
dharma and does not perish as real, and regarding samsara, 
because it is an active dharma, empty and false, as unreal. 
(25a27) 'Neither real nor unreal'. Neither unreal nor not unreal is 
taught in order to negate 'both real and unreal'. 
(25a28) Question: The Buddha in other places says 'separate from 
neither existence nor nonexistence'. In view of this, how can 
you say that 'neither existence nor non-existence' is what the 
Buddha teaches? 
(25a29) Reply: In those other contexts he is discoursing in order to 
refute the four kinds of craving attachment, 
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but if there is 
no useless arguing about these four theses, and if you listen 
to what the Buddha teaches you, you will attain the Way. This 
is why we say 'neither real nor unreal'. 
(25b2) Question: We know that the Buddha is discoursing on account of 
these four theses, but as for attaining the true character of 
dharmas, by what characteristic can it be known? And, what is 
the true character? 
Reply: 'If you are able not to follow others'. 
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One who does 
not follow others, means one who, when non-Buddists, even though 
they display supernatural powers and teach that this is the way 
and this is not the way, has faith in himself and in his own 
mind and does not follow them. Even if they transform the-r 
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bodies so that he does not know that they are not the Buddha, 
his mind cannot be diverted because he well understands the 
true character. Since there is within this (true character) no 
dharma to be grasped or relinquished, it is called the 
characteristic of calm extinction. Since it is the 
characteristic of calm extinction it cannot be vainly argued 
with sophistries. Sophistries are of two kinds; one is 
argument from desire, the other is argument from opinion. 
Within (calm extinction), these two types of sophistries do not 
exist, and since these two kinds of sophistry do not exist, 
there is no conceptual discriminating. Lack of any charact- 
eristics of distinction and difference is termed the true 
character. 
(25b11) Question: If all dharmas are utterly empty, does this not 
fall into the error of annihilation? And does no-arising and 
no-ceasing not fall into the error of permanence? 
(25b13) Reply: Not so. Earlier we stated that the true character has 
no sophistries, that the characteristic of mind is calm extinction 
and that it cuts off any ways of verbal expression. You in your 
attachment are now grasping this characteristic, and seeing 
errors of severance and permanence in the doctrine (dharma) of 
the true character. 
Those who attain the true character teach that all dharm. as arise 
from conditions. They are neither the same as their causes, 
nor different from their causes, and consequently there is 
neither severance nor permanence. 
from its cause, this is severance. 
When the effect is different 
If it is not different from 
its cause, this is permanence. 
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(25b17) 
(25b23) 
Question: What advantage is there in explaining things in 
this way? 
Reply: If one who is travelling on the path is able to 
penetrate the meaning of this way, then (for him) all dharmas 
will be neither identical nor different, neither cut off nor 
permanent. If he is able to do this, he will achieve the 
cessation of all afflictions and sophistries, and attain lasting 
bliss and nirvana. This is why it is said that the Buddha's 
teaching has the flavour of sweet nectar, just as in worldly 
terms we say that one who obtains the divine elixir will not 
grow old, fall ill or die, or experience any degeneracy or 
distress. This dharma of the true character is the true taste 
of sweet nectar. 
The true character taught by the Buddha is threefold. To 
attain the true character of all dharmas and end all the 
afflictions is termed the sravaka-dharma. To produce great 
compassion and arouse the unexcelled mind is called the great 
vehicle (Mahayana. If a Buddha does not enter the world and 
there is a time when there is no Buddha-dharma, pratyeka- 
buddhas because of their isolation develop insight indepen- 
dently, for even if a Buddha after, saving living beings enters 
nirvana without residue, and the dharma he '1e 
I bfktiAo 
completely dies out, if there are any who from a previous 
world are supposed to attain the Way, then if they meditate a 
little on the causes for despising and leaving samsara and go 
alone into the mountains and forests remote from any bustle and 
confusion, they will attain the way. These are called 
pratyekabuddhas. 
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Chapter 19 Contemplation of Time 6 verses 
19/0 Question: Surely time exists, established through causal 
dependence? Because past time exists, future and present time 
exist. Because of present time, past and future time exist. 
Because of future time, past and present time exist. The 
dharmas of above, middle and below, same and different, and so 
forth also exist through reciprocal causal dependence. 
Reply: 
19v1 If, on account of past time, 
Future and present exist, 
Future and present 
Should be in the past. 
19/1 If future and present time exist on account of past time, then 
future and present time should exist within past time, and why? 
If dharmas are established according to their place of origin, 
this place should be the dharma. It is like light which is 
established on account of the lamp, the light existing according 
to where the lamp is. The same goes for past time. If it 
establishes future and present time, then future and present 
time must exist within past time, and if future and present time 
do exist within past time, then the three periods should all be 
called 'past time'. Why is this? Because future and present 
time would be in the past. 
(25c15) If all times were entirely in the past, then there would be no 
future and present times, because it would be entirely the past. 
But if there were no future and present times, then there would 
be no past time either, and why? Because past time is only 
called past time because of future and present time. Just as 
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future and present time are established on account of past 
time, so also is past time established on account of future and 
present time. Now without future and present time, there could 
be no past time. This is why your earlier statement (v1) that 
future and present time are established on account of past time 
is not correct. 
(25c21) If you say that future and, present time do not exist within 
past time, but that future and present time are nevertheless 
established on account of past time, this is incorrect,. and 
why? 
19v2 If, within past time 
Future and present do not exist, 
How can future and present time 
Depend 65h-the past? 
19/2 If future and present time are not within past time, how can 
future and present time be established on account of past time? 
Why is this? If each of the three times had different 
characteristics, then they could not be established by mutual 
interdependence. They would be like objects such as pots and 
cloth etc., each of which is separately established in itself, 
not depending upon each other. But in fact future and present 
time are not established independently of past time, past and 
future time are not established independently of present time, 
and past and present time are not established independently of 
future time. 
(26a2) Earlier you said that although future and present time do not 
exist within past time, nevertheless future and present time 
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are established on account of past time. This is not correct. 
Question: What is wrong (in saying that) even though future 
and present time are not established on account of past time, 
they nevertheless exist? 
Reply: 
19v3 Independent of past time 
There is no future time, 
Nor is there present time. 
Therefore the two times do not exist. 
19/3 Future and present time are not established independently of 
past time, and why? If present time did exist independently 
of past time, in what place would present time exist? It is 
the same with future time; in what place would future time 
exist? Therefore, there is no future or present time 
independent of past time. Because of such mutually dependent 
existence, in reality there is no time. 
19v4 Through this interpretation 
We know that the other two times, 
Above, middle, below, same and different 
And other such dharmas, are all nonexistent. 
19/4 Through this interpretation we shouldkiow that the other future 
and past times are also non-existent, and all dharmas such as 
ab ove, middle and below, same and different etc., are all non- 
existent. Since middle and below exist on account of above, if 
there is no above there will be no middle and below. If there 
were middle and below apart from above then they would not be 
interdependent. Difference depends on sameness, and sameness 
depends on difference. If sameness existed as a reality it 
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would exist independently of difference, and if difference 
existed as a reality it would exist independently of sameness. 
All such dharmas as these may be negated in the same way. 
(26a20) Question: Since there are such varied divisions as year, 
month, day, minute etc., we know that time exists. 
Re ply: 
19v5 Time standing still cannot be found 
Moving time cannot be found. 
If time cannot be found, 
How can one speak of characteristics of time? 
19v6 Time exists because of objects. 
Apart from objects, how can there be time? 
If there are not even objects which exist, 
How much less can there be time? 
19/6 If time does not stay still then it cannot be found, yet if it 
were still, it would be non-existent. If time cannot be found, 
how can one expound the characteristics of time? And if there 
are no characteristics of time, then there is no time. It is 
because of the arising of objects that we refer to time, and 
apart from objects there is no time. In what has gone before 
we have refuted all objects on various grounds. Since objects 
do not exist, how can time exist? 
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Chapter 20 Contemplation of Cause and Effect 24 verses 
Question: 
20/0 Since effects produced by a combination of causes and 
conditions manifestly exist, we must know that these effects 
exist through the combination of conditions. 
Reply: 
20v1 If causes and conditions combine 
And an existent effect is produced, 
It already existed within the combination. 
What need-has it to be produced by combination? 
20/1 If you say that an effect is produced by a combination of 
causes and conditions, then this effect already existed within 
the combination, and yet is something which arises from the 
combination. This is not correct, and why? If the effect had 
a pre-existing fixed substance, then it would not have to be 
produced by combination. 
Question: What is wrong with saying that, though no effect 
exists within the combination of conditions, an effect arises 
out of the conditions? 
Reply: 
20v2 If within the combination of conditions 
There is no effect. 
How can an effect arise 
From combination of conditions? 
20/2 'If an effect arises out of a combination of conditions, then 
the effect does not exist within this combination, but is 
produced from the combination. ' This is not correct, and why? 
If an object has no self-nature, then it can never be produced. 
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Further: 
20v3 If within the combination of conditions 
The effect does exist 
It should exist within the combination 
But in reality it cannot be found. 
20/3 If there is an effect which comes from within a combination of 
conditions, then if it has form, it should be visible, and if it 
is formless it should be conceivable. 
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But in reality no 
effect can be found within the combination. Therefore it is 
not correct (to say) that the effect inheres in the combination. 
20v4 If within the combination of conditions 
There is no effect, 
Then these causes and conditions 
Are the same as non-causes and conditions. 
20/4 If there is no effect within the combination of causes, then 
the causes and conditions will be the same as non-causes and 
conditions. If is like milk being the cause and condition of 
cream. If there is no cream within the milk, then, since there 
is no cream within water either, if the milk contains no cream 
it is the same as water, and we should not say that cream comes 
only from milk. Therefore (to say) that there is no effect 
within the combination of causes is not correct. 
Question: A cause, having operated as a cause to bring about 
an effect, ceases, and thus there is cause and effect without 
such errors (as those above). 
Reply: 
20v5 If a cause gives cause to an effect 
And having caused, then ceases, 
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This cause has a dual substance 
One giving, and one ceasing. 
20/5 If a cause, having operated as the cause for an effect then 
ceases, such a cause will have a dual substance, one called 
'giving cause', the other called 'ceasing cause'. This is not 
correct, because it would be one dharma having two substances. 
Therefore it is not the case that a cause, having operated as 
the cause for an effect, then ceases. 
Question: If one says that a cause, without giving rise to an 
effect, operates as a cause and then ceases and an effect arises, 
what is wrong in this? 
Reply: 
20v6 If a cause, without giving rise to an effect, 
Having operated as a cause then ceases. 
The cause having ceased when the effect arises, 
Such an effect will be uncaused. 
20/6 If a certain cause, without giving rise to an effect, operates 
as a cause and then ceases, then, the cause having already 
ceased when the effect arises, the effect will be uncaused. 
But this is not correct, and why? We can manifestly observe 
that there is no effect which is produced without a cause. 
Therefore, your statement that a cause, without giving rise to 
an effect, may operate as a cause and then cease, and 
then an 
effect arises, is not correct. 
Question: What is wrong in saying that the effect is produced 
in the moment of combination of conditions? 
Reply: 
20v7 If in the moment of combining of conditions 
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An effect is produced, 
Then producer and product 
Would occur simultaneously. 
20/7 If an effect is produced in the moment of combination of 
conditions, then producer and product would occur simultaneously, 
but this is not the case, and why? It is like a father and son, 
who cannot be born at the same time. Therefore your assertion 
that an effect arises in the moment of combination of conditions 
is not correct. 
Question: What error is there in (saying that) the arising of 
the effect comes first, and subsequently conditions combine? 
Reply: 
20v8 If first there arises an effect 
And subsequently combination of conditions 
Since it would be separate from causes, 
It would constitute an uncaused effect. 
20/8 If, as you say, there is production of the effect before 
conditions have as yet combined, this is not correct, because 
the effect would be separate from its causes and conditions, 
and hence would be termed a causeless effect. Therefore to say 
as you do that an effect arises before conditions have combined, 
is not correct. 
Question: What is wrong in saying that the cause ceases and 
transforms into the effect? 
Reply: 
20v9 If the cause transforms into the effect 
The cause will reach the effect 
Thus a preceding producing cause 
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Having produced, will produce again. 
20/9 Causes are of two kinds. One is the preceding producing 
(cause), the other is the co-operative producing (cause)ý741f a 
ceased cause changes into an effect, then the preceding 
producing cause would decay and again arise, but this is not 
correct, and why? A thing which has already ceased should not 
arise again. 
(27a2) If you say that a particular cause changes into an effect, this 
is also incorrect, and why? If it is that particular (cause) 
then it cannot be regarded as changed. If it is changed, then. 
it cannot be regarded as that particular (cause). 
Question: The cause does not completely cease, only its 
designation (as a cause) ceases; the substance of the cause 
changes into the effect, just as a lump of clay turns into a 
jug. The designation of 'lump of clay' is lost, and the 
designation of 'jug' is produced. 
Reply: 
(27a6) If the lump of clay ceases before the jug is produced, this 
does not constitute transformation. Also, the substance of 
the lump of clay does not produce only jugs. Urns and so forth 
all come out of clay. If a lump of clay were merely a 
designation it could not change into a jug. 
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as milk changes into cream. Therefore, to say as you do that 
although the designation of the cause ceases it changes into 
the effect is not correct. 
Question: Even though the cause has ceased and disappeared, 
it can still produce an effect. Therefore, there are effects, 
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and no such errors. 
Reply: 
20v10 How can a cause, ceased and disappeared, 
Possibly produce an effect? 
Or, if the cause is in the effect 
How can it produce the effect? 
20/10 If a cause has ceased and is gone, how can it possibly produce 
an effect? And if the cause does not cease but combines with 
the effect, how can it produce the effect? 
Question: Particular causes have effects everywhere, and 
0 
such effects arise. 
Reply: 
20v11 If causes have effects everywhere 
Again, what kinds of effects do they produce? 
The cause may see, or not see, the effect276 
In neither of these two is there producing. 
20/11 Suppose that a certain cause does not 'see'its effect. It 
should not even produce that effect, how much less if it sees 
it? If the cause does not itself see the effect, then it 
should not produce the effect. Why is this? If it does not 
see the effect, the effect will not follow the cause. Moreover. 
if the effect does not yet exist, how can (the cause) produce 
the effect? If the cause has previously seen the effect, it 
does not need to produce it again, since the effect already 
exists. 
Further: 
20v12 If you say that a past cause 
Goes with a past effect, 
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Or future, or present effect; 
These never combine. 
20v13 If you say that a future cause 
Goes with a future effect 
Or with a present or past effect - 
These never combine. 
20v14 If you say that a present cause 
Goes with a present effect 
Or with a future or past effect - 
These never combine. 
20/14 A past effect does not combine with a past, future or present 
cause. A future effect does not combine with a future, 
present or past cause. A present effect does not combine with 
a present, future or past cause. These three kinds of effect 
never combine with past, future or present causes. 
Further: 
20v15 If there is no combining, 
How can a cause produce an effect? 
If there is combination 
How can a cause produce an effect? 
20/15 If cause and effect do not combine then there is no effect. If 
there is no effect, how can the cause produce an effect? If 
you say that the cause can produce the effect in the moment 
when cause and effect combine, this is also incorrect, and why? 
If the effect is within the cause, then, the effect already 
being existent within the cause, how can it arise again? 
Further: 
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20v16 If the cause is empty 
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and there is no effect, 
How can the cause produce an effect? 
If the cause is not empty and there is an effect, 
How can the cause produce an effect? 
20/16 'If a cause has no effect' means that because it has no effect 
a cause is empty, so how can the cause produce an effect? It 
is like someone who is not pregnant; how can they produce a 
child? If the effect pre-exists in the cause, then, since the 
effect already exists, it does not have to be produced again. 
We shall now further discuss the effect: 
20v17 An effect which is not empty 
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is not produced. 
An effect which is not empty does not cease. 
Because where an effect is not empty 
It neither arises nor ceases. 
20v18 Since an effect is empty it is not produced. 
Since an effect is empty it does not cease. 
Where an effect is empty 
It neither arises nor ceases. 
20/18 If an effect is not empty, it should not be produced and should 
not cease. Why is this? If an effect already has a fixed 
existence within a cause, it does not need to be produced 
again, and since there is no production, there is no cessation. 
Therefore, because effects are not empty, they neither arise 
nor cease. 
(27b 21) If you say that effects are empty, and hence do arise and cease 
this is also wrong, and why? If an effect is empty, emptiness 
means that there is nothing which exists, so how can arising 
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and ceasing exist? This is why it is said that where the effect 
is empty, there is neither arising nor ceasing. 
Continuing, we shall now refute cause and effect in terms of 
unity and difference: 
20v19 That cause and effect are one - 
This is never the case. 
That cause and effect are different - 
This, too, is not correct. 
20v20 If cause and effect are one 
Producer and produced are one. 
If cause and effect are different 
Cause is the same as non-cause. 
20v21 If the effect has a fixed, existent nature 
What does the cause cause, which is produced? 
If the effect has a fixed non-existent nature, 
What does the cause cause, which is produced? 
20v22 If a cause does not produce an effect, 
Then it does not have the characteristic of a cause. 
If it does not have the characteristic of a cause, 
From what can there be effects? 
20v23 If, out of causes and conditions, 
Combination is produced. 
Combination itself does not produce 
So how can it produce an effect? 
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20v24 Therefore effects are not produced 
By the combination, or non-combination of conditions. 
If there are no effects 
Where is the dharma of 'combination'? 
20/24 The dharma of 'combination of causal conditions' cannot produce 
a self-substance. Since there is no self-substance how can it 
produce any effect? Therefore, effects are not produced by a 
combination of conditions, nor are they produced by non- 
combination. If no effects exist, where can there be a dharma 
of combination? 
177 
Chapter 21 Contemplation of becoming and dissolution 
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20 verses 
Question: 
21/0 Everything in the world manifestly has the characteristic of 
dissolution. Therefore, dissolution exists. 
Reply: 
21v1 Whether apart from becoming, or together with becoming, 
In neither case is there dissolution. 
Whether apart from dissolution, or together with dissolution, 
In neither case is there becoming, either. 
21/1 Whether there is becoming or there is no becoming, in neither 
case does dissolution exist. Whether there is dissolution, or 
there is no dissolution, in neither case does becoming exist. 
Why is this? 
21v2 If separate from becoming, 
How can dissolution exist? 
It would be like death without birth. 
This is not correct. 
21v3 If becoming and dissolution exist together, 
How can there be becoming and dissolution? 
It would be like. worldly birth and death 
Existing simultaneously - this is not correct. 
21v4 Apart from dissolution, 
How could there be becoming? 
For there is never a time 
When impermanence is not found in all dharmas. 
1? 8 
21/4 Dissolution cannot be found apart from becoming, and why? If 
there were dissolution apart from becoming, then there would 
be dissolution independent of becoming, and dissolution con- 
sequently would be uncaused. Moreover, dharmas which had not 
become could nevertheless be di lved. 'Becoming' means the 
combining of conditions. 'Dissolution' means the dispersion of 
conditions. If there were dissolution apart from becoming, then 
with no becoming, what would dissolve? It is just as when there 
is no jug, we cannot say that the jug has dissolved. Hence, 
there is no dissolution apart from becoming. 
(27c28) If you say that dissolution exists together with becoming, this 
is also incorrect, and why? A dharma first comes into being - 
separately, and (only) afterwards is there combination. The 
combined dharma is not separate from the different (elements). 
If it dissolved separately from its different (elements), the 
dissolution would be causeless. Therefore, dissolution does not 
exist together with becoming. 
(28a2) As to no becoming apart from dissolution or together with 
dissolution; if there were becoming apart from dissolution, 
then becoming would be permanent. Permanence means not having 
the characteristic of dissolution, but in reality we do not see 
any dharma which is permanent and lacks the characteristic of 
dissolution. Therefore, there is no becoming apart from 
dissolution. 
(28a4) If you say that becoming and dissolution exist together, this 
is also wrong. Becoming and dissolution are opposites. How 
can they exist simultaneously? It is like a man having hair and 
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not having any hair - he cannot have both simultaneously. 
Becoming and dissolution are also like this. Therefore, it is 
not the case that becoming exists jointly with dissolution, and 
why? 
(28a7) If you say that dharmas are distinct, asserting that there is 
constant dissolution within becoming, this is not correct, and 
why? If there were constant dissolution within becoming, then 
there would be no dharma of abiding, but in reality there is 
abiding. Therefore, no becoming can exist, either apart from 
dissolution or together with dissolution. 
Further: 
21v5 Becoming and dissolution are not established together 
Nor are they established separately. 
Neither of these is tenable. 
How can becoming exist? 
21/5 As for becoming not being established together with dissolution, 
and the two not being established separately from each other; 
if the two are established together, then, the two dharmas being 
opposites, how can they exist simultaneously? But if they 
exist separately, then they are uncaused. In neither way can 
they be established, so how can becoming exist? If it does 
exist, you should explain how. 
280 
Question: Dharmas which have the characteristic of being 
exhausted and ceased, 
281 
manifestly exist. Such exhausted and 
ceased dharmas are said to be both exhausted and not exhausted. 
Surely becoming and dissolution exist in the same way? 
Reply: 
21v6 Exhausted, there is no becoming, 
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Not exhausted, there is also no becoming. 
Exhausted, there is no dissolution 
Not exhausted, there is also no dissolution. 
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21/6 All dharmas, morning, noon and night, instant by instant, are 
constantly ceasing, becoming exhausted and passing away, like 
flowing water which never stands still. This is termed 
'exhaustion'. This process cannot be grasped, and cannot be 
explained. Like a mirage, which has no fixed nature to get 
hold of, so exhaustion has no conceivable fixed nature. How 
can one subdivide it and assert that becoming exists? This is 
why it is said that exhaustion has no becoming either. Since 
becoming does not exist there can be no dissolution either, and 
this is why it is said that exhaustion has no dissolution 
either. 
(28a25) Where there is, moment by moment, a constant succession of 
arisings and ceasings with no severance this is termed 'non 
exhaustion'. In this case dharmas are fixed, permanent and 
abiding and are not cut off, so how can one differentiate them 
and assert that 'this is a moment'of becoming'? This is why it 
is said that there is no becoming in non-exhaustion either. 
Since there is no becoming, there is no dissolution, and this 
is why it is said that there is no dissolution in non- 
exhaustion either. One may investigate in this way, but since 
no real entity can be found, there is no becoming and no 
dissolution. 
Question: Even if we set aside becoming and dissolution, what 
is wrong with allowing that there are simply dharmas? 
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Reply: 
21v7 Apart from becoming and dissolution, 
There are no dharmas. 
If they should be separated from dharmas 
Becoming and dissolution also would not exist. 
21/7 There are no dharmas apart from becoming and dissolution: If 
there were dharmas with no becoming and no dissolution, such 
dharmas would have to be either nonexistent, or permanent, but 
no permanent dharmas exist in the world. Your statement that 
there are dharmas apart from becoming and dissolution is not 
correct. 
(28b6) Question: What is wrong in saying that only becoming and 
dissolution exist, without dharmas? 
Reply: To say that becoming and dissolution exist without 
dharmas is also wrong, and why? Apart from dharmas, what is 
there to become, and what is there to dissolve? Therefore it 
is not the case that becoming and dissolution exist apart from 
dharmas. 
Further: 
21v8 If dharmas' nature is empty283 
What can become or dissolve? 
If their nature is not empty 
There will also be no becoming or dissolution. 
21/8 If the nature of dharmas were empty, being empty, how 
could they become or dissolve? If the nature of dharmas were 
not empty, then not being empty they would have a fixed 
existence, and again there could be no becoming or dissolution. 
Further: 
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21v9 That becoming and dissolution are one - 
This is not the case. 
That becoming and dissolution are different - 
This also is not the case. 
21/9 If you thoroughly investigate becoming and dissolution, no unity 
can be discovered, and why? Because they have different 
characteristics, and are differentiated in various ways. But 
also no difference can be found in becoming and dissolution, 
and why? Because they are not separated, and because they 
would be uncaused. 
Further: 
21v10 If you say that arising and ceasing 
Are seen by the eyes to exist, 
Seeing arising and ceasing as existent 
Is considered a delusion and deception. 
21/10 If someone says 'arising and ceasing exist since we see them 
with our eyes; how can they be refuted by words and teachings? ' 
This is not correct, and why? Seeing arising and ceasing with 
one's-eyes is due to ignorance and delusion. In seeing the 
nature of dharmas, they are empty and have no fixed (nature); 
they are like an illusion, like a dream. It is only that the 
unenlightened man has attained his eyes on account of his 
delusion in a former world. Because of his false conceptual- 
isation and discrimination in the present world, he says that 
his eyes see arising and ceasing. In the ultimate sense, there 
is, in reality, no arising or ceasing. This topic has already 
been discussed at length, in the chapter refuting the (three) 
marks. (ch 7) 
Further: 
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21v11 Dharmas do not produce dharmas 
Nor do they produce non-dharmas 
Non-dharmas do not produce dharmas, 
Nor (do they produce) non-dharmas. 
21 /11 As for ' Dharmas are not produced from dharmas' : Whether they 
disappear or reach (each other) 1 
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both are incorrect. If 
dharmas are produced from dharmas, then whether they reach 
(each other) or whether they disappear, they are independent, 
and being independent they fall into (the error of) severance 
or permanence. If a dharma is produced from a dharma after it 
has been reached, this dharma, although it has already been 
reached, is called arisen, and this would be permanence. More- 
over, having already arisen, it would be arising again, and it 
would be arising uncaused, which is not correct. 
(28c4) If a dharma is produced from another dharma after it has 
disappeared, this would mean the cause would be missing, and 
the one which arose would be uncaused. Therefore no dharma is 
produced from a dharma which disappears. 
(28c6) As for 'non-dharmas are not produced from dharmas'; 'non- 
dharma' means that there is nothing which exists. 'Dharma' 
means an existent. How can the characteristic. of nonexistence 
be produced from the characteristic of existence? Therefore, 
non-dharmas do not arise from dharmas. 
(28c7) As for 'dharmas do not arise from non-dharmas'; 'non-dharma' 
means nonexistence. How can nonexistence produce existence? 
If existence arose from nonexistence this would be causelessness, 
and causelessness would be a great error. Therefore, dharmas 
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are not produced from non-dharmas. 
(28c10) As for 'non-dharmas are not produced from non-dharmas'; 'non- 
dharma' means that there is nothing which exists. How could 
nothing which exists be produced by noth which exists? It 
is like a rabbit's horns which do not produce a tortoise's 
hair. Therefore, non-dharmas are not produced from non-dharmas. 
Question: Although you have analysed dharmas and non-dharmas 
in various ways as being non-produced, nevertheless dharmas 
surely do produce dharrnas? 
Reply: 
21v12 Dharmas are not produced from themselves, 
Nor are they produced from another. 
Nor are they produced from self and other, 
How can they be produced? 
21/12 Since nothing exists when a dharma has not yet arisen, and it 
itself has not arisen, dharmas are not self-produced. If a 
dharma has not yet been produced, there is no 'other', and 
because there is no other you cannot say that it arises from 
another. Moreover, when it has not yet arisen, it does not 
exist itself, and if no self and no other exists then it is not 
produced from the two together. Since it is not produced in 
any of these three ways, how can dharmas be produced from 
dharmas? 
Further: 
21v13 If someone accepts the existence of äharmas, 
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He falls into severance or permanence. 
You must know that for one who accepts dharmas 
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They will be either permanent or impermanent. 
21/13 Someone who "accepts dharmas" differentiates between this one 
as good, this one as not good, as permanent, as rompermanent and 
so on. Such a person inevitably falls into either a view of 
permanence or a view of severance, and why? Dharmas can be 
accepted in two ways, as either permanent or impermanent. Both 
are incorrect, and why? If (taken as) permanent, you straight- 
away fall into the extreme of permanence. If impermanent, you 
straightaway fall into the extreme of severance. 
Question: 
21v14 There are those who accept, dharmas 
And do not fall into severance or permanence. 
Since the continuity of cause and effect 
Involves neither severance norpermanence. 
21/14 There are those who accept and admit distinctions in speaking 
of dharmas, yet do not fall into severance or permanence. For 
instance, the sutras teach that the five skandhas are 
impermanent, suffering, empty and without self, 
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severance, and they teach that sins and merits are never lost 
throughout countless kalpas, yet this is not permanence, and 
why? Because such dharmas constantly arise and cease in a 
succession of causes and effects, coming and going without 
interruption. Because they arise and cease, there is no 
permanence. Because they have continuity, 
there is no 
severance. 
Reply: 
21v15 If causes and effects arise and cease 
In succession, with no cessation 
Since what has ceased does not arise again, 
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The cause should be considered extinct. 
21/15 If you say that by virtue of the continuous succession of causes 
and effects, dharmas are neither severed nor permanent, then if 
a ceased dharma has already ceased it will not arise again, and 
this is severance of the cause. If the cause is cut off, how 
can there be continuity, since what has ceased does not arise 
again? 
Further: 
21 v16 A dharm. a abiding in its own self-nature 
6otl, e1cl`sterJ- owed Should not benonexistent. 
Nirvana extinguishes the continuity 
And thus falls into severance. 
21/16 At the time when a dharma is fixed within the characteristic 
of existence, it is not without characteristics, just as a jug, 
when it is fixed in the characteristics of a jug, does not have 
the characteristics of destruction. As long as the jug exists, 
it does not have the characteristics of destruction, but when 
the jug does not exist, there are no characteristics of 
destruction either, and why? Because if there is no jug, there 
is nothing to be destroyed. Understood in this way, cessation 
is untenable. 
Without cessation there can be no production either, and why? 
Because arising and ceasing are mutually interdependent, and 
also because there would be the errors of permanence etc. 
Therefore, existence and nonexistence may not co-exist in one 
dharrna. 
(29a18) Also, your earlier assertion that because there is a succession 
of arising and ceasing of cause and effect, one can accept dharmas 
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without falling into severance and permanence, is not correct, 
and why? You say that because there is a continuity of cause 
and effect, there is continuity of characteristics of the three 
existences, 
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and that nirvana means continuity of the 
characteristic of cessation. If this were so, then at the time 
of nirvana, one ought to fall into severance and cessation, 
because of the cessation of the continuity of characteristics of 
the three existences. 
Further: 
21v17 If the first existence288 ceases 
There will be no subsequent existence. 
If the first existence does not cease 
There will also be no subsequent existence. 
21/17 'The first existence' means existence in the present time- 
period. 'Subsequent existence' means existence in a future 
period of time. If the first existence ceases and afterwards 
there is the subsequent existence, it will be uncaused, and 
this is not correct. Therefore, we cannot say that the first 
existence ceases and (then) there is the subsequent existence. 
(29a27) If the first existence does not cease, there will not be any 
subsequent existence either, and why? If the subsequent 
existence exists when the first existence has not yet ceased, 
this would be two existences existing at one time, and this is 
not correct. Therefore, if the first existence does not cease, 
there will be no subsequent existence. 
Question: The subsequent existence does not arise through the 
cessation of the first existence, nor does it arise through 
the 
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non-cessation of the first existence. It is simply produced at 
the moment of cessation. 
Reply: 
21v18 If in the moment of cessation of the first existence, 
There is a subsequent existence produced. 
The moment of cessation is one existence, 
The moment of production is another existence. 
21/18 If the subsequent existence is produced in the moment of cessation 
of the first existence, this is two existences together in one 
moment, one existence being the moment of cessation, the other 
existence being the moment of production. 
Question: It is not that the moment of cessation and the 
moment of production are two existences together, it is merely 
that we manifestly see that when the first existence-ceases, the 
subsequent existence arises. 
Reply: 
21 v19 If you say that arising and ceasing 
Take place simultaneously 
Then when these skandhas die, 
These same skandhas are born. 
21/19 If the moment of arising and the moment of ceasing are one 
moment and not two existences, and you say that in the moment 
when the first' existence ceases, the subsequent existence arises, 
then according to whatever skandhas one dies in, these skandhas 
should be (re)born, and one should not be reborn in any other 
skand. has. Why is this? Because the one who dies will be the 
same as the one who is reborn. But these dharmas of 'dying' and 
'being born' are opposites, and cannot both occupy one moment 
or one place. Therefore, your earlier statements that the 
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moment of cessation and the moment of arising are one moment 
and not two existences, and that it is merely a case of 
manifestly seeing that when the first existence ceases, the 
subsequent existence is produced, are not correct. 
Further: 
21v20 Seeking a continuity of existence in the three periods of time 
It cannot be found. 
If it is not existent in the three periods of time, 
What continuity of existence exists? 
t 
21/20 'The three existences' means desire-existence, form-existence 
and no-form existence. 
289 It is because one is unable to 
attain true insight within beginningless samsara and death, the 
three existences eternally succeed each other. Now, even if we 
earnestly seek for them in the three periods of time, 
29° they 
cannot be found, and if not within the three periods of time, 
then where can this continuous succession of existences take 
place? You should know that the continuity of existence exists 
only by virtue of delusions and perverted views. In reality, 
it does not exist. 
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Chapter 22 Contemplation of the Thus-Come (Tathä, ta) 291 
16 verses 
Question: 
22/0 Honoured in all the worlds, 
292 
only the Thus-Come has right and 
perfect knowledge. 
293 
He i, s called 'King of the Dharma' and 
'omniscient one', 
294 
so surely he exists? 
Reply: Now examine and consider this: If he exists, then he 
must be grasping. 
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If he does not exist, what is there which 
grasps? Why is this? The Thus-Come ... 
22v1 .., is neither the skandhas, nor separate from the skandhas, 
He and they are not in each other. 
The Thus-Come does not have the skandhas 
In what place does the Thus-Come exist? 
22/1 If the Thus-Come really exists, (then) either the five skandhas 
are the Thus-Come, or the Thus-Come exists separately from the 
five skandhas, or the five skandhas are within the Thus-Come, 
or the Thus-Come is within the five skandhas, or the Thus-Come 
has the five skandhas, but none of these is the case. 
(29c14) The five skandhas are not the Thus-Come, and why? Because they 
have the characteristics of arising and ceasing. Since the five 
skandhas have the characteristics of arising and ceasing, if 
the Thus-Come were the five skandhas, the Thus-Come would have 
those same characteristics of arising and ceasing. If he had 
the characteristics of arising and ceasing this would involve 
the errors of the Thus-Come being impermanent, annihilated, etc. 
Also the receiver and the dharma of receiving would be one, the 
receiver being the Thus-Come and the dharma of receiving being 
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the five skandhas. But this is not correct, and therefore the 
Thus-Come is not the five skandhas. 
(29c19) The Thus-Come does not exist separately from the five skandhas 
either. If the Thus-Come existed separately from the five 
skandhas, he would not have the characteristics of arising and 
ceasing. If this were the case, the Thus-Come vould have the 
error of permanence etc., and in addition all the functions such 
as the eye, etc., would not be able to see or know, and this 
would not be correct. Therefore, the Thus-Come does not exist 
separately from the five skandhas either. 
(29c22) The five skandhas are also not found within the Thus-Come and 
why? If the five skandhas were within the Thus-Come, this would 
be like fruit in a bowl, or fish in water; they would be different 
from each other. If they were different, this would involve the 
error of permanence etc., as above. Therefore, the five 
skandhas are not situated within the Thus-Come. 
(29c25) The Thus-Come, moreover, is not within the five- skandhas, and 
why? If the Thus-Come were within the five skandhas, this would 
be like a man being in a bed, or milk being in a bowl. They 
would thus be distinct entities, and the same errors as 
discussed above would apply. Therefore, the Thus-Come is not 
within the five skandhas. 
(29c28) The Thus-Come does not have the five skandhas either, and why? 
If the Thus-Come had the five skandhas, it would be like a man 
who has a child. They would thus be distinct entities, and 
this being the case, the same errors as above would apply, so 
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22v2 
22/2 
22v3 
this is not correct. Therefore, the Thus-Come does not have the 
five skandas. You may look for him in these five ways but you 
will not be able to grasp what kind of being this Thus-Come is. 
Question: Though one seeks for the Thus-Come in these ways and 
be unable to find him, nevertheless, by the combination of the 
five skandhas, the Thus-Come exists. 
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Reply: 
If the Thus-Come exists by the combining of the skandhas, 
Then he has no self-nature. 
If he has no self-nature 
How can he exist on account of another? 
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If the Thus-Come exists because of the combination of the five 
skandhas, then he has no self-nature, and why? Because he 
exists on account of the combination of the five skandhas. 
Question: The Thus-Come does not exist by means of a self- 
nature, but merely on account of other-natures. 
Reply: If he has no self-nature, how can he exist by virtue 
of other-natures? Why is this? Other-natures also have no 
self-nature, and since there is no reciprocal dependence, no 
other-natures can be found. 
do not constitute 'others'. 
Further: 
Since they cannot be found, they 
If a dharma arises on account of another, 
Then it has no self. 
If a dharma has no self 
How can it be the Thus-Come? 
22/3 If a dharma arises by virtue of causes and conditions, then it 
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will have no self. It is like a fist which exists by virtue of 
the five fingers, but has no own-substance. In the same way we 
speak of a 'self' on account of the five skandhas, but this 
'self' has no own-substance. 'Self' has various names such as 
living being, man, god, Thus-Come etc. If the Thus-Come exists 
by virtue of the five skandhas, then he has no own-nature, and 
since he has no own-nature he has no self. Since he has no 
self, how can you describe him as 'The Thus-Come'? This is why 
it says in the verse "if a dharma arises on account of another, 
then it has no self" and "if a dharma has no self, how can it 
be the Thus-Come? " 
Further: 
22v4 If there is no own-nature 
How can there be other-nature? 
Apart from own-nature or other-nature 
What can constitute a Thus-Come? 
22/4 If there is no own-nature, then other-nature cannot exist either, 
because it is only on account of own-nature that we refer to 
other-nature. If the one does not exist, the other will not 
exist either, and consequently neither own-nature nor other- 
nature exists. Apart from an own-nature or other-nature, who 
is there to be a Thus-Come? 
Further: 
22v5 If, independent of the five skandhas, 
A Thus-Come were pre-existent. 
By virtue of his receiving the skandhas now 
He would be described as a Thus-Come. 
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22v6 In reality there is no receiving of the skandhas now, 
Nor any dharma of a Thus-Come. 
If, by not receiving, he does not exist 
How can he receive them now? 
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22v7 When there has not yet been receiving 
We do not call what is to be received 'received'. 
Without the dharma of reception 
There is nothing to be called a Thus-Come. 
22v8 If the Thus-Come cannot be found 
In unity or in difference, 
And sought in five ways he cannot be found, 
How can he exist in receiving? 
22v9 Moreover the five receptive skandhas 
Do not exist by virtue of own-nature. 
If they have no own-nature 
How can there be an other-nature? 
22/9 If the Thus-Come already existed before receiving the five 
skandhas, then this Thus-Come would receive the five skandhas 
now, having already become a Thus-Come. But in reality a 
Thus-Come does not exist before the time when. the five skandhas 
are received, so how will he receive them now? Also, if he 
does not receive the five skandhas, the five skandhas will not 
be termed 'received', and without receiving them, there is 
nothing to be called a Thus-Come. 
(30b11) You can search for the Thus-Come within unity and difference 
but you will not be able to find him. You can search for him 
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five ways in the five skandhas but you will not find him there 
either. This being the case, how can you assert that the Thus- 
Come exists within the five skandhas? Also, the five skandhas 
which are received do not exist by virtue of any own-nature. 
You may say that they exist by virtue of other-nature, but if 
they do not come from own-nature, how can they exist by virtue 
of other-nature? Why is this? Because if there is no own- 
nature, there is no other-nature either. 
Further: 
22v10 By such interpretations 
Receiving is empty, the receiver is empty 
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But how, by means of emptiness 
Can one speak of an empty Thus-come? 
22/10 Analysed according to these ideas, receiving and the recipient 
are entirely empty. If receiving is empty, how can one speak of 
an empty Thus-come in terms of empty receiving? 
Question: You say that receiving is empty, and that the 
recipient is empty - is this not a fixed existent emptiness? 
Reply: Not so, and why? 
22v11 Emptiness cannot be expressed 
Non-emptiness cannot be expressed. 
Both, and neither, cannot be expressed 
They are discussed merely as conventional names. 
22/11 The emptiness of dharmas cannot be expressed. The non- 
emptiness of dharmas cannot be expressed either. That dharmas 
are both empty and not empty and that dharmas are neither empty 
nor non-empty cannot be expressed either and why? Because they 
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are merely for refuting their opposites and are taught only as 
conventional names. If you correctly contemplated and reflected 
in this way, then you would not make difficulties out of 
difficulties within the true character of dharmas, and why? 
22v12 Within the characteristic of calm quiescence, 
The four (view4 of permanence, impermanence etc., do not exist. 
Within the characteristic of calm quiescence, 
The four (views) of limit, no limit etc., do not exist. 
22/12 The true character of all dharmas is subtle, calm quiescence, 
but we produce four kinds of erroneous views on account of the 
past; 
30° that the world is permanent, that the world is 
impermanent, that the world is both permanent and impermanent, 
and that the world is neither permanent nor impermanent. In 
calm quiescence none of these exist at all, and why? The true 
character of all dharmas is utter clarity and purity, and 
cannot be grasped. If even emptiness is not accepted, how much 
less these four kinds of views? These four views all arise on 
account of reception, but within the real character of all 
dharmas there is nothing which is caused by receiving. 
(30c7) Through these four kinds of views we regard ourselves as noble 
and regard others as base, but in the true character of dharmas 
there is no 'you' or 'I', and this is why it is said that in 
calm quiescence the four views do not exist. 
(30c9) Just as with the four views which exist in regard to the past, 
so it is with the four views which exist in regard 
to the 
future; that the world has limits, the world has no limits, 
that the world both has and does not have limits, and 
that the 
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world neither has nor does not have limits. 
Question: If you refute the Thus-Come in this way, doesn't 
this mean that there is no Thus-Come? 
Reply: 
22v13 One whose false views are deeply entrenched 
Will say that there is no Thus-Come. 
The Thus-Come's characteristic of calm quiescence 
He will distinguish as existing, and as not. 
22/13 False views are of two kinds; the first denies worldly bliss, 
the second denies the path to nirvana. 
Denying worldly bliss is the false view of the coarse, immature 
man. He says that there is no sin and no merit, and no saints 
and sages such as Thus-Comes etc. Generating such false views, 
he forsakes good and does evil, and thus denies the bliss of 
the world. The one who denies the path to nirvana is deeply 
attached to self, and discriminates between existent and non- 
existent, developing good and extinguishing evil. Since he 
develops goodness, he obtains worldly bliss, but because he 
discriminates between being and nonbeing he does not attain 
nirvana. Therefore, if you say that the Thus-Come does not 
exist, 
301 this is a deeply entrenched false view, and you lose 
even worldly bliss - how much more so nirvana? But if you say 
that the Thus-Come exists this is also a false view, and why? 
Because the Thus-Come has the characteristic of calm quiescence 
yet you are making various distinctions, differentiating 
within the characteristics of calm quiescence, the Thus-Come as 
existing or not existing. 
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22v14 Within the emptiness of such a nature 
One may speculate yet not discover 
Whether, after the passing of the Thus-Come 
He can be distinguished as existent or non-existent. 
22/14 Since the nature of the true character of all dharmas is 
emptiness we should not speculate as to whether the Thus-Come 
exists, -or 
does not exist, or both does and does not exist 
after his passing. From the very beginning the Thus-Come 
was utterly empty; how much more so after his decease? 
22v15 The Thus-Come transcends sophistries 
Yet men still produce sophistries. 
Sophistries destroy the eye of insight, 
Such as these do not see the Buddha. 
22/15 'Sophistries' means recollected thoughts, grasping of 
characteristics, distinguishing this from that, saying that the 
Buddha is extinct or is not extinct, and so forth. Since man 
in order to pursue sophistries inverts his eye of insight, 
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he is unable to see the ibarma-body of the Thus-Come. In this 
chapter on the Thus-Come, we have considered, from beginning 
to end, (the idea of) a fixed nature of the Thus-Come, and we 
have been unable to discover one. Therefore, the verse says: 
22v16 The nature of the Thus-Come 
Is the very nature of the world 
The Thus-Come has no nature 
The world, also, has no nature. 
303 
22/16 In this chapter we have considered and earnestly investigated 
the nature of the Thus-Cume, which is in fact the nature of 
all the worlds. 
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Question: What kind of thing is this nature of the Thus-Come? 
Reply: The Thus-Come has no nature. Equally, the world has no 
nature. 
200 
23v1 
23/1 
23v2 
23/2 
23v3 
Chapter 23 Contemplation of Perverted Views 
304 
Question: 
As a result of conceptual discrimination 
Lust, anger and delusion arise 
Perverted conceptions of purity and impurity 
3r Are all produced from conditions. 
05 
. 
24 verses 
The sutras say that because of the conceptualised discrimination 
of the perverted ideas of purity and impurity, lust, anger and 
delusion arise. 
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delusion must exist. 
Reply: 
Therefore we know that lust, anger and 
If you say that perverted views of purity and impurity 
Produce the three poisons, 
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Then the three poisons are without self-nature. 
Consequently, the defilements308 have no reality. 
If the defilements arise on account of the conceptualisation 
of perverted views of purity-and impurity, then they have no 
self-nature. Consequently, the defilements are unreal. 
Further: 
Whether or not there exists a dharma of self 
Is something which can never be established 
Without a self, the existence or nonexistence of defilements 
Cannot be established either. 
23/3 Whether the self does or does not exist in causes and 
conditions cannot be established. Now, if there is no self, 
how can the existence or nonexistence of the defilements be 
established? Why is this? 
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23v4 Who has these defilements? 
Such a one cannot be established. 
If the defilements exist apart from this (self) 
Then they are not part of it. 
23/4 'Defilement' means a thing which can afflict someone. The 
afflicted one must be a sentient being, but such a sentient 
being cannot be discovered, no matter where you search for him. 
If you say that the defilements exist separately from the living 
being, then there is no entity to which the defilements belong. 
If you assert that, although there is no self, the defilements 
are located in the mind, then this is also wrong, and why? 
23v5 Just as in the five ways of viewing the body (as self 
You seek it but cannot find it 
So with the defilements in the defiled mind, 
You can seek five ways but cannot find them. 
23/5 Just as with the view of body-as-self309 - you can look for it 
in five ways in the five skandhas but cannot find it - so it is 
with the defilements in the defiled mind. You can look for them 
in five ways but you will not be able to find them. 
Further: 
23v6 The perverted views of purity and impurity 
Therefore have no self-nature 
How, then, can the defilements arise 
With these two as their cause? 
23/6 'The perverted views of purity and impurity'; 'perverted' 
means vain and illusory. Being vain and illusory 
(such views) 
have no self-nature, and since they have no nature the 
perverted views do no exist. If there are no perverted views, 
how 
20 2 
can you assert that the defilements arise on the basis of 
perverted views? 
Question: 
23v7 Form, sound, scent, taste, touch and the other dharmas31° 
Make up six kinds (of dharma) 
These six kinds (of dharma) 
Are the root of the three poisons. 
23/7 These six avenues are the root of the three poisons. Perverted 
views of purity and impurity arise because of these six avenues 
(of the senses). Desire, anger and delusion arise on account 
of perverted views of purity and impurity. 
Reply: 
23v8 Form, sound, scent, taste and touch 
And dharmas; these six kinds 
Are all empty, like flames or dreams 
Or like a magic Gandharva-city. 
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23v9 In six things of this kind, 
How can there be purity and impurity? 
They are just like an illusionary man 
Or a reflection in a mirror. 
23/9 The own-substances of form, sound, scent, taste, touch and the 
dharmas, at the time when they are not yet combined in the mind, 
are empty: there is nothing which exists. They are like 
fire, 
like a dream, like an illusory man or an image in a mirror. 
They are merely deceptions in the mind and have no fixed 
characteristics. In six avenues such as these, 
how can purity 
and impurity exist? 
Further: 
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23v10 No impurity can exist 
Independently of the characteristic of purity. 
Impurity depends on purity 
Therefore, there is no impurity. 
23/10 Independent of purity, there can be no pre-existing impurity, 
for on what basis could one speak of impurity? 
2 
Therefore 
31 
impurity does not exist. 
Further: 
23v11 There is no purity 
Except in relation to impurity 
Purity exists on account of impurity 
Therefore purity does not exist. 
23/11 There can be no pre-existent purity, independent of impurity. 
How can you assert (the existence of) purity? Therefore, 
there is no purity. 
Further: 
23v12 If there is no purity 
How can there be lust? 
If there is no impurity 
How can there be anger? 
23/12 Where there is no purity and impurity, lust and anger do not 
arise. 
Question: The Sutras teach that there are four perverted views313 
of permanence, etc. If we see permanence within impermanence, 
this is called a perverted view. If we see impermanence in 
impermanence, this is not a perverted view, and the same goes 
for the other three perverted views. Since the perverted views 
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exist, the one who has perverted views must exist. 
say that none of this exists? 
Reply: 
23v13 To cling to permanence in impermanence 
Is called perverted perception. 
There is no permanence in emptiness, 
Why do you 
So where can the perverted perception of permanence exist? 
23/13 If you cling to permanence in impermanence, this constitutes 
perverted perception. But in the emptiness of dharmas' 
natures, 
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there is no permanence. What place is there in 
this for a perverted view of permanence? The other three (views) 
are also like this. 
23v14 If clinging to impermanence 
Within impermanence is not a perverted view, 
Since there is no impermanence in emptiness, 
Why is this not a perverted view? 
23/14 Suppose that a person clings315 to impermanence, 
saying that this impermanence is not to be termed 
a perverted view; in the emptiness of dharmas' natures, there 
is no impermanence. Since impermanence does not exist there, 
who is there to call it a non-perverted view? 
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It is the 
same with the other three views. 
Further: 
23v15 That which is clung to, the clinger and the clinging317 
And also the dharma which clinging emp Sys; 
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All these have the characteristic of calm quiescence. 
How can clinging possibly exist? 
23/15 'That which is clung to' means the object. 'The clinger' means 
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the doer. 'Clinging' means the deed. The dharma is the thing 
which clinging employs. All these things are empty in nature 
and have the characteristic of calm quiescence, as explained in 
the chapter on the Thus-Come, 
319 
and therefore there is no 
clinging. 
Further: 
23v16 If there is no dharma of clinging 
Incorrectly speaking, these are perverted views. 
Correctly speaking, they are not perverted views, 
For who is there to have these things? 320 
23/16 'Clinging' means discriminative conceptualising of this and that, 
being and non-being, and so on. 
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If none of this clinging 
exists, who is there to have wrong and perverted views, and 
who is there to have correct and non-perverted views? 
Further: 
23v17 Existing perverted views do not produce perverted views 
Nonexistent perverted views do not produce perverted views. 
The perverted viewer does not produce perverted views, 
Nor does the non-perverted produce them. 
23v18 Since perverted views are not produced 
In the moment of perversion either, 
You can see for yourselves; , 
Who is there to produce perverted views? 
23/18 Someone who already has perverted views does not produce them 
again, since he already has perverted views. One who does not 
have perverted views does not produce perverted views either, 
because he has no perverted views. There are no perverted 
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views in the moment of perverted viewing either, because this 
involves both errors. You should now abandon your proud and 
arrogant mind and perceive things properly322 for yourself. 
Who is there to have perverted views? 
Further: 
23v19 'Perverted views which are not-produced'. 
How could this have any meaning? 
When perverted views do not exist 
How can there be a perverted viewer? 
23/19 Because we have refuted perverted views on various grounds, you 
fall into non-production. Clinging to non-production you assert 
that 'non-production' is the true characteristic of perverted 
views. Therefore the verse says, how can you term perverted 
views non-produced'? Not even non-outfiowing dharmas are 
regarded as having the characteristic of non-arising; how much 
less are the perverted views non-arising? 
323 And since the 
perverted views do not exist, how can the perverted viewer 
exist? The perverted viewer only exists by virtue of perverted 
views. 
Further: 
23v20 If permanence, self, bliss and purity 
In reality exist 
Such permanence, self, bliss and purity 
Will not be perverted views. 
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23/20 If these four permanence, self, bliss, and purity, have real and 
existent natures, 
325 then permanence, self, bliss and purity are 
not perverted views, and why? Because they are fixed, existent, 
real things, so how could you call them perverted views? 
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If you say that these four - permanence, self, bliss and purity - 
do not exist, then impermanence, suffering, non-self and 
impurity326 - these four will exist as realities, and will not 
be termed perverted views; since they are the opposites of 
perverted views they will be called non-perverted views. But 
this is not correct, and why? 
23v21 If permanence, self, bliss and purity 
In reality do not exist, 
Impermanence, suffering and impurity 
Should also not exist. 
23/21 If these four - permanence, self, bliss, and purity - are in 
reality nonexistent, then because they do not exist the other 
four, impermanence etc., ought not to exist either, and why? 
Because there is no reciprocal dependence. 
Further: 
23v22 When perverted views cease in this way 
Ignorance also ceases. 
By the cessation of ignorance 
Predispositions and so forth327 cease. 
23/22 'In this way' means by this kind of interpretation. When 
perverted views are extinguished, ignorance which is at 
the 
root of the twelve causes and conditions328 is also 
extinguished. Through the extinction of ignorance 
the three 
kinds of predispositions and actions etc. 
329 
up to old age and 
death and so forth are all extinguished. 
23v23 If the defilements have a real nature 
And there is someone to whom they belong, 
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How can they be cut off 
And who can cut off that nature? 
23/23 If the defilements are perverted views, and have a real, existent 
nature, how can they be cut off?, and who can cut off that nature? 
If you say that the afflictions are false deceptions and have 
no nature, and can nevertheless be cut off, this is also wrong 
and why? 
23v24 If the afflictions are false deceptions 
With no nature, and belonging to no-one. 
How can they be cut off? 
For who can cut off a non-nature? 
23/24 If all the afflictions are false deceptions with no nature, then 
there is no-one to whom they belong. How can they possibly be 
cut off? For who can cut off a dharma without a nature? 
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Chapter 24 Contemplation of the Four Truths330 40 verses 
24/0 The questioner says: 'By destroying the four perverted views 
one penetrates the four truths and attains the four sramana - 
fruits. 331 
24v1 If ever,; thing is entirely empty 
With no arising and no ceasing 
Then there will be 
No Dhai a of the four holy truths. 
24v2 And since there are no four truths, 
Perception of suffering, cutting-off of the accumulation of 
Karma 
Realising cessation and practising the Way; 
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Such things will not exist. 
24v3 Because these are nonexistent, 
There will be no four fruits of the Way. 
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And because there are no four fruits 
There will also be none. who attains, or aspires. 
334 
24v4 If there are not the eight (types of) holy person335 
336 
Then there will be no Sangha-jewel. 
And because there are no four truths 
There will be no Dharma-jewel either. 
24v5 With no Dharma - or sangha-jewels 
There will also be no Buddha-jewel. 
Thus, one who teaches emptiness 
Destroys the three jewels. 
24/5 If everything in the world was entirely empty with nothing 
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existing, there would be no arising and no ceasing, and because 
of no arising and no ceasing there would be no four holy truths. 
Why is this? The truth of suffering arises from the truth of 
accumulation (of karma), the truth of accumulation being the 
cause, and the truth of suffering the effect. The truth of the 
cessation of suffering and accumulation is called the truth of 
cessation, and that which enables one to arrive at the truth of 
cessation is called the truth of the Way, the truth of the Way 
being the cause, and the truth of cessation the effect. 
(32b27) Thus the four truths involve cause and effect. If there were 
no arising and no ceasing there would be no four truths, and if 
there were no four truths, there would be no perception of 
suffering, cutting-off of accumulation, realisation of cessation 
or cultivation of the Way, and without perception of suffering, 
cutting-off of accumulation, realisation of cessation and 
cultivation of the Way there would not be the four sramana- 
fruits. 
(32c1) Without the four sramana-fruits there could not be the four 
types of aspirants and the four types of attainers, and if 
these eight categories of holy people did not exist there would 
be no jewel of the Sangha. Also, if the four holy truths did 
not exist there would be no jewel of the Dharma, and if the 
jewels of the Dharma and the jewel of the Sangha did not exist, 
how could there possibly be a Buddha? 'Buddha' means to have 
obtained the Dharma, so if there is no Dharma, how can there be 
a Buddha? Your (Nagarjuna's) teaching that all dharmas are 
entirely empty, consequently destroys the three jewels. 
Moreover: 
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24v6 The doctrine of emptiness destroys cause and effect, 
It also destroys sin and merit. 
And further, you utterly destroy 
All ordinary worldly dharma337 (affairs). 
24/6 If you accept the doctrine of emptiness, then you deny sin and 
merit, and the retributions and rewards of sin and merit. You 
also negate all conventional worldly dharmas. Since all these 
kinds of errors ensue, dharmas cannot be empty. 
Reply: 
24v7 You really cannot understand338 
Emptiness, or the reasons for emptiness, 
Or understand the meaning of emptiness. 
Therefore you create difficulties for yourself. 
24/7 You do not clearly understand what the characteristics of this 
'emptiness' are, or for what reasons it is taught, and you do not 
understand the meaning of emptiness. Since you lack the capacity 
to know it for what it really is, you create these doubts and 
difficulties. 
Moreover: 
24v8 All Buddhas rely on two types of truth 
In order to teach the Dharma of living beings. 
One is conventional worldly truth, 
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The other is the truth of the ultimate meaning. 
24v9 If a person is unable to perceive 
The distinction between these two truths 
Then he will not know the real meaning 
Of the profound Buddha-Dharma. 
24/9 As for Iconventional worldly truth': all dharmas are empty 
in 
their nature, but because of our worldly perverted perceptions 
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we produce false and illusory dharmas, and this is worldly 
reality. Since the saints and sages know the true nature of 
these perverted perceptions, they know that all dharmas are 
utterly empty and that there is no arising, and this is the 
truth of the ultimate meaning which constitutes reality for the 
saints. 
(32c23) All the Buddhas rely on these two truths in order to teach the 
dharma to living beings. A person who is unable to distinguish 
properly between these. two truths does not know the real meaning 
of the extremely profound Buddha-Dhazma. To say that 'dharmas 
are non-arising' is the truth of the ultimate meaning and that 
the other conventional truth is not necessary, is not correct, 
and why? 
24v10 Unless you rely on the conventional truth 
You will not attain the ultimate meaning. 
Unless you attain the ultimate meaning 
You will not attain nirvana. 
24/10 The ultimate meaning is entirely dependent on words and 
expressions, and words and expressions are mundane and 
conventional. Therefore, without reliance on the conventional 
and the mundane, the ultimate meaning cannot be expounded. 
Unless one attains to the ultimate meaning, how can one attain 
nirvana? Therefore, although dharmas are non-arising, 
there 
are these two (levels of) truth. 
Further: 
24v11 If he is unable to perceive emptiness correctly, 
A dull-witted man will injure himself. 
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It is like a spell unskilfully-invoked 
Or a poisonous snake unskilfully-grasped. 
24/11 If a man is dull-witted and does not clearly understand the 
doctrine of emptiness, there will be errors in (his under- 
standing of) emptiness and he will produce wrong views. It is 
like cleverly catching hold of a poisonous snake: if you are 
unable to hold it skilfully it will turn on you, and you will 
be hurt. Or it is like a spell. If you want it to be performed 
but lack the capacity to accomplish it skilfully you will injure 
yourself instead. It is the same with a dull-witted man 
contemplating the doctrine of emptiness. 
Further: 
24v12 The World-Honoured One knew that this Dharma, 
Extremely profound and subtle in character. 
Could not be approached by the dull-witted. 
This is why he was unwilling to teach. 
34° 
24/12 Because the dharma was extremely profound and subtle and would 
not be clearly understood by the dull-witted, the Buddha was 
reluctant to teach. 
Further: 
24v13 You say that we are attached to emptiness 
And you produce and attribute errors to us. 
But the errors which you are expounding 
Do not exist in emptiness. 
24/13 Because you say that we are attached to emptiness, you produce 
errors and attribute them to us. But the emptiness of natures 
There of which we speak - this emptiness is itself empty. 
34 
are no such errors. 
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Moreover: 
24v14 By virtue of the principle of emptiness 
All dharmas are established. 
If there were no principle of emptiness 
Nothing would be established. 
24/14 By virtue of the principle of emptiness, all dharmas within the 
world and outside the world are established. If there were no 
principle of emptiness, then nothing at all would be established. 
Further: 
24v15 You yourselves are in error 
Yet you turn these errors against us. 
Like a man riding a horse 
Who forgets what he himself is mounted on. 
24/15 You are wrong about the existence of dharmas but are not 
conscious of it yourselves, yet you can see faults in emptiness. 
It is like a man riding a horse who forgets that which he is 
riding on. Why is this: 
24v16 If you perceive all dhazmas 
As having fixed, existent natures, 
Then you will see all dharmas 
As without causes and without conditions. 
24/16 You teach that all dharmas have fixed natures. This being the 
case, you will see all d. harmas as being without causes and 
without conditions, and why? If dharmas have fixed, existent 
natures, then they must be non-arising and non-ceasing, and 
what use would such dharmas have for causes and conditions? If 
you say that dharmas arise from causes and conditions, then 
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24v17 
24/17 
24v18 
24v19 
24/19 
they will have no nature. Therefore, dharmas with fixed, 
existent natures have no causes and conditions. If you say that 
dharmas abide, fixed and settled in their own-nature, this is 
not correct, and why? 
This constitutes a negation of cause and effect, 
Of doing, doer and thing done. 
And moreover it denies 
The arising, and ceasing of all the myriad things. 
If dharmas have fixed natures then there will be no such things 
as cause and effect etc. As the verse says: 
Dharmas produced by causes and conditions 
We say are nonexistent. 
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And constitute conventional names34' 
And this is the meaning of the middle path. 
There has never existed a single dharma 
Which did not arise from causes and conditions. 
Therefore no dharma exists 
Which is not empty. 
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Causes and conditions produce dharmas, and we say that they are 
empty. Why is this? It is entirely through the combination 
of causes that things are produced. Since these things 
depend 
upon causes and conditions they have no own-nature and since 
they have no own-nature, they are empty. 
(33b17) Emptiness moreover is itself empty. 
345 But in order to guide 
all beings, it is taught by means of conventional 
designations. 
Because it is separate from the extremes of both existence and 
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nonexistence, it is called the middle path. Since draimas have 
no own-nature we cannot say that they exist, and since they are 
not vac, aous3a5 we cannot say that they are nonexistent. If 
dharmas possessed the characteristics of natures then they would 
exist independently of causes and conditions, but then if they 
did not depend on causes and conditions they would not be dharmas. 
Therefore, there are no non-empty dharmas. As. for the errors 
which you discoursed on above347 in regard to the doctrine of 
emptiness, these errors now rebound on you, and why? 
24v20 If everything were not empty 
There would be no arising or ceasing 
And thus there would not be 
The dharma of the four holy truths. 
24/20 If every dharma each had its own individual existent nature 
and was not empty, then there would be no arising or ceasing, 
and because of no arising or ceasing there would be no dharma 
of the four holy truths. Why is this? 
2q 121 If suffering did not arise from conditions 
Then now could there possibly be suffering? 
The meaning of suffering is impermanence348 
fixed nature is not im-permanent. 
21/21 Suffering which does not arise from cond_ ions is not suffering. 
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How could it arise from accumulation? 
Therefore there is no accumulation 
Through denial of the principle of emptiness. 
24/22 If suffering had a fixed nature, then it would not arise, being 
already existent. If this were so, there would be no truth of 
accumulation, 
349 
because of the denial of the principle of 
emptiness. 
24v 23 If suffering had a fixed nature 
350 There would be no cessation 
Through your attachment to fixed natures 
You deny the truth of cessation. 
24/23 If suffering had a fixed nature, it would not cease. Why? 
Because natures do not cease. 
Further: 
24v24 If suffering had a fixed nature 
There would be no cultivation of the Way. 
If the Way can be cultivated 
Then it does not have a fixed nature. 
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24/24 If dharmas had a fixed existence, then there would be no 
cultivation of the Way, and why? If dharmas had reality, then 
they would be permanent, and what is permanent cannot be 
augmented. If the Way can be cultivated, then the Way does not 
have a fixed nature. 
Further: 
24v25 If there were no truth of suffering 
And no truths of accumulation and cessation, 
What could be achieved 
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By a Way to extinguish suffering? 
24/25 If all dharmas had a pre-existent fixed nature, there would be 
no truths of suffering, accumulation or cessation. Then what 
state of extinction of suffering could the Way to the extinction 
of suffering achieve? 
Fmrfintr : 
24v26 If suffering had a fixed nature 
Which was not previously perceived 
How could it be perceived now 
Since its nature would not have changed? 
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24/26 If previously, when you were unenlightened, you were unable to 
perceive the nature of suffering then you ought not to be able 
to perceive it now either, and why? Because its nature would 
be fixed as 'not perceived'. 
Further: 
24v27 Just as perception of suffering would not occur, 
353 
So cutting-off accumulation, realising cessation, 
Cultivation of the Way, and the four fruits354 
Would also not occur 
24/27 Just as, if the nature of the truth of suffering was not 
perceived previously it would not be perceived subsequently, 
so in the same way there would be no cutting-off of accumulation, 
realisation of cessation or cultivation of the Way, and why? 
If accumulation's nature was not cut-off before, it could not 
be cut off now either, because a nature cannot be cut off. If 
cessation was not realised previously, it could not be 
realised now either, because it was not realised before. If 
the Way was not previously cultivated, it could not be 
cultivated now, because it was not cultivated before. 
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Therefore none of the four holy truths or the four activities 
of perceiving, cutting-off, realising and cultivating would 
exist, and if these four activities did not exist, the four 
fruits of the Way would not exist either. Why is this? 
24v28 The natures of these four fruits of the Way 
Being formerly unattainable, 
If all dharmas had fixed natures, 
How could they possibly be attained? 
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24/28 If all dharmas had fixed natures, and the four sramana-fruits 
had not yet been attained, how could they be attained now? If 
they can be attained, their natures are not fixed. 
Further: 
24v29 If there were no four fruits 
There would be none who attained or aspired 
And without the eight kinds of holy person 
There would be no jewel of the Sangha. 
24/29 If the four sramana-fruits did not exist, there would be none 
who attained the fruits and none who aspired to them. Without 
the eight types of saints and holy people there would be no 
jewel of the sangha. But the sutras say that these eight 
types of saints and holy people constitute the sangha-jewel. 
Further: 
24v30 Because there are no four holy truths 
There is no jewel of the Dharma either 
And without the Dharma-jewel and sangha-jewel 
How can there be the Buddha-jewel? 
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24/30 Putting into practise357 the four holy 
truths one attains the 
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dharma of nirvana. If there were no four truths there would 
be no jewel of the Dharma. If these two jewels did not exist, 
how could the jewel of the Buddha possibly exist? By such 
reasonings as these, asserting that dharmas have fixed natures, 
you destroy the three jewels. 
Question: Although you have refuted all dharmas, surely the 
ultimate state (Tao) of anuttara-samyak-sambodhi exists, 
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since it is by virtue of this state that we call someone 
'Buddha'. 
Reply: 
24v31 You are saying that the Buddha exists 
But independently of bodhi 
And again, that independently of a Buddha 
Bodhi nevertheless exists. 
24/31 If, as you say, all dharrnas have a fixed nature, then there 
should be B. iddhahood independently of bodhi, and bodhi 
independently of Buddhahood, since the nature of these two will 
be permanent and fixed. 
Further: 
24v32 Although one diligently and singlemindedly sets forth 
Cultivating and practising the bodhi-path 
If he previously has the nature of a non-Buddha, 
He cannot accomplish Buddhahood. ... 
24/32 .. e because 
he does not already have that nature. It is like 
iron which does not have the nature of gold. Even though you 
repeatedly refine it in various ways, it will never become gold. 
Further: 
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24v33 If all dharmas were not empty 
There would be no-one who did good or bad (deeds)359 
If not empty, what could be done 
Since their natures would be fixed? 
24/33 If dharmas were not empty, there would never be people doing 
good and bad (deeds), and why? Because the natures of good and 
bad (deeds) would be already fixed, and also because there would 
be no doing or doer. 
Further: 
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24v34 According to you, in sin and merit 
There is no production of retribution and rewards 
Such retribution and rewards exist, 
But they are separate from sin and merit. 
24/34 If, as you claim, there are no rewards and retributions inherent 
in the good and bad deeds which are their causes and conditions, 
then the rewards and retributions must exist separately from 
the good and bad actions which are their causes and conditions. 
Why is this? Because the rewards and retributions do not rely 
on causes to emerge. 
Question: Good and evil rewards and retributions cannot exist 
apart from sin and merit. Good and evil rewards and retributions 
simply arise out of sin and merit. 
Reply: 
24v35 If you say that reward and retribution 
Arise out of sin and merit; 
If rewards arise from sin and merit 
How can you say they are not empty? 
24/35 If there are no good and evil rewards apart from sin and merit, 
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24v36 
how can you say that rewards are not empty? If they are so 
then there will be no sin and merit apart from the doer. Your 
previous assertion that dharmas are not empty is not correct. 
Further: 
Your denial of the idea of emptiness, 
Of the causality of all dharmas360 
Is a denial of all worldly conventions 
And all other dharmas that exist. 
24/36 If you deny the doctrine of causality, (and) the highest meaning 
of emptiness, then you deny all worldly dharmas, and why? 
24v37 If you reject the idea of emptiness 
Then there will be nothing which is done, 
There will be doing without doing 
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And a non-doer will be called a doer. 
24/37 If you reject the idea of emptiness, then all (karmic) effects 
will be without a doer and without a cause. There would be 
doing without an doing, and there would be doers but nothing 
which was done. There would also be actions, rewards and 
retributions and reception without any doer. 
362 But this is 
not correct, and therefore one should not deny emptiness. 
Further: 
24v38 If they had fixed, existent natures 
The various characteristics in the world 
Would be non-arising and non-ceasing 
permanently abiding and imperishable. 
363 
24/38 If dharmas had fixed natures, then all 
the various 
characteristics364 in the world, 
(of) gods and men, animals, 
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and all things, would neither arise nor cease, and would abide 
eternally without perishing, and why? Because that which has a 
real nature cannot be altered. But we can manifestly see that 
all things have the characteristic of change, arising, ceasing, 
and undergoing transformations. Therefore, they cannot have 
fixed natures. 
Further: 
24v39 If there is not emptiness 
One who has not yet attained will never attain 
Nor will the defilements365 be cut off, 
Nor will there be termination of suffering. 
24/39 If there were no dharma of emptiness, then those of merit and 
virtue, both in this world and in the worlds beyond, who had 
not yet attained (nirvana) would all be unable to attain it, 
and there could be none who cut off the defilements, and no 
termination of suffering, and why? Because of fixed natures. 
24v40 This is why it is said in the sutras 
That if you perceive the dharma of causality 
Then you can perceive the Buddha. 
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And perceive suffering, accumulation, cessation and the Way. 
24/40 If a person perceives that all dharmas arise from causes and 
conditions, such a, person can perceive the Buddha's dharma-body 
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and augment his insight. He can perceive the four holy truths 
of suffering, accumulation, cessation and the Way, and 
perceiving the four holy truths he can attain the four frei ,s 
and extinguish all the afflictions. Therefore, you should not 
deny the principle of emptiness. If you deny the principle of 
emptiness then you deny the doctrine of causality, and if you 
224 
deny the doctrine of causality you deny the three jewels. And 
if you deny the three jewels, you deny yourself. 
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25/0 
25v1 
Chapter 25 Contemplation of Nirvana3o8 
Question: 
If all dharmas are empty 
24 verses 
With no arising and no ceasing 
What is cut off, what extinguished 
Which could be called nirvana? 
25/1 If all dharmas are empty, then there is neither arising nor 
ceasing. Since there is nothing which arises and ceases, what 
is it that is cut off, or what is it that is extinguished, that 
would be called nirvana? Therefore, dharmas cannot be empty. 
Because dharmas are not empty, cutting-off of the affl±, Lions 
and extinction of the five skandhas is called nirvana. 
Reply: 
25v2 If dharmas were not empty 
Then they would neither arise nor cease. 
What would be cut off, what extinguished 
Which could be called nirvana? 
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25/2 If everything in the world were not empty, there would be 
neither arising nor ceasing. What would be cut off, and what 
extinguished, which could be called nirvana? Therefore neither 
existence nor nonexistence370 is the gate that leads to nirvana. 
That which is called nirvana ... 
25v3 ... Is neither attained nor arrived at371 
Neither cut off nor permanent 
Neither arisen nQr ceased 
This is what is called nirvana 
25/3 'Not attained' means that there is nothing in terms of either 
action or reward, which is attained. 'Not arrived at' means 
that it is not a place which can be arrived at; 'not cut off' 
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means that since the five skandhas have been utterly empty from 
the beginning, when one attains the 'day and enters nirvana with- 
out residue372 there is nothing which is cut off. As for 'not 
perranent'; if there were dharmas that could be distinguished 
from each other these would be termed permanent, but since in 
the calm quiescence of nirvana there are no separately 
distinguishable dharmas, they are not termed permanent, and it 
is the same with arising and ceasing. Something which has 
characteristics such as these is called nirvana. Moreover, 
the sutras say that nirvana is neither existent, nor non- 
existent, nor both existent and non-existent, nor neither 
existent nor nonexistent. 
Nirvana means non-reception of all dharmas373 and inner peace 
and quiescence. Why is this? 
25v4 Nirvana does not mean 'existent' 
Existence has the characteristics of old age and death. 
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No existent dharrna ever exists 
Without the characteristics of old age and death. 
25/4 Since, as we see with our eyes, all the myriad things arise 
and cease, these have the characteristics of old age and death. 
If nirvana were an existence, then it would have the 
characteristics of old age and death, but this is not the case, 
and this is why nirvana is not termed 'existent'. Also, we do 
not see any distinct fixed dharmas, free from arising and ceasing 
and old age and death, which could be called nirvana. If 
nirvana is an existence then it ought to have the characteristics 
of arising and ceasing, old age and death, but it is because it 
is free of the characteristics of old age and death, that we 
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call it 'nirvana'. 
Further;. 
25v5 If nirvana were existent 
Then nirvana would be active 
Not one dharma ever exists 
Which is an inactive one. 
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25/5 Nirvana is not an existence, and why? All the myriad things 
arise from conditions; they are all active. There is not a 
single dharma which may be termed an inactive one. Although 
permanent dharmas are conventionally designated 'inactive', if 
we investigate their reality, we find that even impermanent 
dharrnas do not exist; how much less permanent dharmas which are 
neither visible nor conceivable? 
Further: 
25v6 If nirvana were existent 
How could it be termed 'non-receiving'? 
There is no dharma which is called existent 
And yet has not arisen from reception. 
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25/6 If, as you say, nirvana is an existent dharma, then the sutras 
ought not to state that nirvana is non-receiving, and why? 
There are no dharmas which are non-receiving and yet exist. 
Therefore, nirvana is not existent. 
Question: If nirvana is not existent, then surely nirvana is 
nonexistent? 
Reply: 
25v7 Nirvana is not even an existence 
How much less could it be nonexistence? 
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If nirvana does not exist as an existence, 
Where could it exist as a nonexistence? 
25/7 If nirvana is not an existence, how could nonexistence be 
nirvana? Why is this? Nonexistence exists because of 
existence. Where there is no existence, how can there be non- 
existence? As the sutras tell us, nonexistent means something 
formerly existent that is now nonexistent. Nirvana is not like 
this, and why? Because it is not an existent dharma changing 
and becoming nonexistent. Therefore, nonexistence does not 
constitute nirvana either. 
Moreover: 
25v8 If nirvana is nonexistence 
Why is it called non-receiving? 
There has never yet been a dharma 
Which is non-receiving and is termed nonexistent. 
25/8 If you say that nirvana is nonexistence then the sutras ought 
not to teach that nirvana means non-receiving, and why? There 
is no nonexistent dharma which is termed non-receiving. There- 
fore we know that. nirvana is not nonexistence. 
Question: If nirvana is neither existent nor nonexistent, 
- what kind of thing is nirvana? 
Reply: 
25v9 Because we receive causes and conditions 
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We revolve in samsara 
Not receiving causes and conditions 
Is what constitutes nirvana. 
25/9 Because we do not know our perverted views for what they really 
are, we wander in samsara, on account of the five receptive 
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skandhas. When we recognise our perverted views for what they 
really are, then we no longer wander in samsara on account of 
the five receptive skandhas. When there is no longer any 
succession of the nature-less five skandhas, this is said to be 
nirvana. 
Further: 
25v10 As the Buddha tells us in the sutras; 
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'Cut off from existence, cut off from nonexistence'. 
Therefore we know that nirvana 
Is neither existent nor nonexistent. 
25/10 'Existence' means the three existences, 
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and 'nonexistence' 
means the cutting off and cessation of the three existences. 
Because the Buddha teaches that both of these things should be 
cut off, we know that nirvana is neither existent nor non- 
existent. 
Question: If nirvana is neither existent nor nonexistent, is 
nirvana not a combination of existence and nonexistence? 
Reply: 
25v11 If, as you say, nirvana 
Is a combination of existence and nonexistence 
Then liberation will be existence and nonexistence 
And this is not correct. 
25/11 If you say that nirvana consists of a combination of existence 
and non existence, then these two elements of existence and 
nonexistence in combination will constitute 
liberation, but 
this is not correct, and why? Because the two elements, 
existence and nonexistence are opposite to each other. 
How 
can they exist in the same place? 
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Further: 
25v12 If you say that nirvana consists in 
A combination of existence and nonexistence 
Nirvana will not be non-reception 
These two arise from reception. 
25/12 If, as you say, nirvana consists in a combination of existence 
and nonexistence, then the sutras ought not to teach that 
nirvana means 'non-receiving', and why? Because the two 
elements of existence and nonexistence arise from reception, 
and exist interdependently. Therefore, nirvana cannot be a 
combination of these two elements of existence and nonexistence. 
Further: 
25v13 If established by a combination of existence and nonexistence 
How can you call it nirvana? 
Nirvana means inactive 
Existence and nonexistence are active. 
25/13 A combination of the two elements of existence and nonexistence 
cannot be termed nirvana. Nirvana means 'inactive', whereas 
existence and nonexistence are active. Therefore nirvana is 
not both-existent-and-nonexistent. 
Further: 
25v14 How can existence and nonexistence 
In combination, be nirvana 
These two cannot exist in the same place 
Just as light and darkness are never together. 
25/14 The two elements of existence and nonexistence cannot 
be termed 
nirvana, and why? Existence and nonexistence are opposite 
to 
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each other and cannot exist in the same place, just as light 
and darf ess are not found together. Therefore, -, here there is 
existence there is no nonexistence, and where there is non- 
existence there is no existence. How could existence and non- 
existence combined be te=ed nirvana? 
Question: If nirvana is not a combination of existence and 
nonexistence, surely nirvana must be neither existence nor 
nonexistence? 
Reply: 
25v15 If nirvana is to be termed 
Neither existence nor nonexistence 
How can we distinguish 
This 'neither existence nor nonexistence'? 
25/15 If nirvana is neither existent nor nonexistent, by what means 
would we distinguish this 'neither existent nor non existent'` 
Therefore, it is not the case that nirvana is neither existeni 
nor nonexistent. 
Further: 
25v16 As for distinguishing neither existence nor nonexistence 
And. calling this nirvana; 
1L existence or nonexistence is established 
: Teilher existence nor nonexistence is established. 
25/16 i you distinguish 'neither existence nor nonexistence' as 
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existence' has already been refuted in the third proposition. 
Since there is no 'existence and nonexistence' how can there be 
'neither existence nor nonexistence'? 
'neither existence nor nonexistence'. 
Further: 
25v17 The Thus-Come, 380 after his decease 
Is neither said to exist, nor not exist 
Therefore nirvana is not 
Nor said to be both existent and nonexistent 
Nor nonexistent and not nonexistent. 
25v18 The Thus-Come in the present 
Is neither said to exist, nor not exist 
Nor said to be both existent and nonexistent 
Nor nonexistent and not nonexistent. 
25/18 Whether after the death of the Thus-Come, or while he is present, 
an existent Thus-Come does not receive, and a nonexistent Thus- 
Come does not receive either. 
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A both existent and non- 
existent Thus-Come does not receive, nor does a neither- 
existent nor nonexistent Thus-Come receive. Since he does not 
receive, he does not discriminate nirvana as existent, non- 
existent and so forth. 
Apart from a Thus-Come, who could possibly attain nirvana? 
382 
In what time, in what place and by means of what dharma would 
we speak of nirvana? Therefore, though you may seek for the 
characteristics of nirvana everywhere and in all kinds of ways, 
you will not be able to find them. 
Further: 
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25v19 Between nirvana and the world 
There is not the slightest distinction 
Between the world and nirvana 
There is not the slightest distinction. 
383 
25/19 On account of the succession of the five skandhas, and the causes 
and conditions of coming and going we refer to 'the 'world' , but 
the nature of the five skandhas is utterly emptiness, non- 
reception and calm quiescence. This idea has already been 
expounded earlier. 
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Since all dharmas are non-arising and 
non-ceasing, there is no distinction between the world and 
nirvana, and there is no distinction between-nirvana and the 
world. 
Further: 
25v20 The real limit of nirvana 
And the limits of this world 
Between these two limits 
There is not the least distinction 
25/20 If one exhaustively investigates the real limit of this world 
and nirvana and the limit of non-arising of this world and 
nirvana, you will not find the least difference between them 
because they are equal and inconceivable. 
Faro-er 
25v21 Whether there is existence or nonexistence after death, etc., 
The boundaries of existence, etc. and permanence etc., 
All such views depend on 'nirvana' 
On 'future' and on 'past'. 
25/21 That after the death of the Thus-Come the Thus-Come exists, or 
the Thus-Come does not exist, or the Thus-Come both exists and 
does not exist, or the Thus-Come neither exists nor does not 
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exist; that the world is bounded, the world is unbounded, the 
world is both bounded and unbounded, and the world is neither 
bounded nor unbounded; that the world is permanent, the world 
is impermanent, the world is both permanent and impermanent 
and that the world is neither permanent nor impermanent - these 
are twelve views of three kinds. 
(36a20) The four views about whether or not the Thus-Come exists or 
does not exist etc, after his death arise as a consequence of 
(the concept of) nirvana. 
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The four views about whether the 
world is bounded or unbounded etc. arise as a consequence of 
(the concept of) the future. 
386 
The four views about whether 
the world is permanent or not permanent arise as a consequence 
of (the concept of) the past. 
387 
The existence or nonexistence of the Thus-Come after death is 
inconceivable, and it is the same with nirvana. Just as in the 
case of the original and ultimate limits of the world; 
388 
it is 
inconceivable whether it is bounded or unbounded, permanent or 
impermanent, and the same goes for nirvana. This is why it is 
said that there is no difference in status389 between nirvana 
and the world. 
Further: 
25v22 Since all dharmas are empty 
What is bounded, and what unbounded, 
Both bounded and not bounded, 
Or neither bounded nor not bounded? 
25v23 Why regard things as one or different? 
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What is permanent, impermanent, 
Both permanent and impermanent, 
Or neither permanent nor impermanent? 
25v24 All dharmas are inconceivable. 
390 
Extinguish all futile thoughts. 
391 
There is no person, and no place 
And there is nothing taught by the Buddha. 
25/24 Since all dharmas at all times and of all kinds are produced 
from conditions, and since they are utterly empty, they have nc 
own-nature. Withing such dharmas, what is there to be bounded, 
and who is there to regard boundaries as existing? What could 
be unbounded, or both bounded and unbounded, or neither bounder 
ki 
t 
nor unbounded? What would be permanent, and who is there to 'a Is VIA 
"v regard things as permanent? What would be impermanent, both 
ou'vae 
? 
permanent and impermanent, or neither permanent nor impermanent 
and who is there to regard things as being neither permanent nc 
impermanent? 
(36b9) What body is there to be the same as soul, and what body to be 
different from soul? It is the same with all of the sixty-two 
wrong views ; 
392 
within utter emptiness they are all untentable. 
When every existence which is conceived is at rest, futile 
thoughts entirely cease, and when futile thoughts cease one 
penetrates into the true character of dharmas and attains the 
Way of calm serenity. 
393 
(36b12) As already seen from the chapter on causality394 if we 
discriminatingly investigate dharmas we find that they are 
neither existent, nor nonexistent, nor both existent and non- 
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existent, nor neither existent nor nonexistent. This is what 
is meant bI 'the true character of all dharmas' and it is also 
termed thusness, dharma-nature, real-limit and nirvana. 
This is why the Buddha, at no time and in no place, ever taught 
anyone any fixed characteristics of nirvana, and this is why we 
say395 that when every existence which is conceived is at rest, 
all futile thoughts are extinguished. 
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Chapter 26 Contemplation of the Twelve Causes and Conditions396 
9 verses 
26/0 Question: You have expounded the Way of the ultimate meaning 
according to the Mahayana. 
397 
Now we want to hear you discuss 
how the Sravaka-dharma398 enters into this Way of the ultimate 
meaning. 
399 
Reply; 
26v1 Living beings, obscured in delusion400 
Subsequently give rise to the three actions401 
And through producing these three actions 
According to their predispositions they fall into the six 402 destinies. 
26v2 Conditioned by the predispositions 
Consciousness receives a body of the six ways 
When consciousness becomes attached 
Name and form develop. 
26v3 Name and form developing 
Cause the six avenues403 to arise 
When senses, objects and consciousness combine404 
There arises six-fold contact. 
405 
26v4 On account of the six contacts 
The threefold reception406 arises 
On account of the threefold receiving 
Craving is produced. 
26v5 On account of craving there are the four graspings407 
And because of grasping there is existence. 
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If the grasper would not grasp 
There would be liberation, and no existence. 
26v6 From existence there is birth 
From birth comes old age and death 
Because of old age and death there are 
0 All the afflictions of sorrow and ill. 
26v7 All such things as these 
Arise from birth 
Only through these causes and conditions 
Does the great suffering of the skandhas408 accumulate. 
26v8 The basis of birth and death 
And predispositions just described 
Is created by the unenlightened man 
The man of insight does not create it. 
26v9 When these things cease 
They do not arise 
This suffering assemblage of the skandhas 
Thus simply ceases. 
26/9 Because the ordinary man is deluded by ignorance, he creates 
by his actions of body, speech and mind409 his subsequent body, 
and gives rise to predispositions towards the six destinies. 
According to the predispositions which he has generated he 
(ýýý1dleý 
becomes higher, the same'or lower. His consciousness, 
entering into the six destinies according to its predispositions 
receives a body. With the attachment of consciousness as their 
basis name and form accumulate, and because of the accumulation 
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of name and form there are the six avenues. With the six 
avenues as their cause, the six contacts ensue, and on account 
of the six contacts there is threefold reception. With the 
three receptions as its cause craving arises, and because of 
craving there are the four graspings. When the four graspings 
grasp, sin and merit are generated by the actions of body, 
mind and speech, and these cause the subsequent succession of 
the three existences. 
410 
(36c15) From existence comes birth, from birth come 
9 r'e F and from old age and death come sorrow, , 
old age and death, 
suffering and all 
the various evils, and there simply exists the great accumulation 
of suffering of the skandhas. 
Hence we know it is that the ignorance of the ordinary man 
generates the foundation of the predispositions to birth and 
death here. They are not generated by one who has insight, who 
by seeing things as they really are, puts an end to ignorance. 
(36c19) When ignorance ceases, all the predispositions also cease, and 
because the causes have ceased, the effects also cease. Thus by 
assiduously cultivating insight which views the arising and 
ceasing of the twelve causal conditions, these things cease, and 
because they cease, all of them including birth, old age and 
9ýiEf 
death, sorrow, , and the great suffering of 
the skandhas 
really and completely cease. 
'Completely ceased' means utterly ceased. The meaning of the 
arising and ceasing of these twelve causal conditions is just 
412 
as explained in detail in the Abhidharma-sutra. 
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Chapter 27 Contemplation of Wrong Views413 30 verses 
27/0 We have heard your refutation of wrong views in the Mahayana 
Dharma. Now we wish to hear you refute wrong views in the 
S ravaka-Dharma . 
414 
27v1 Views of self existing or not existing 
In the past, 
And of the world being permanent, etc. 
All depend on the past. 
415 
27v2 Whether self will continue or not continue 
In the future, 
And views about boundedness, etc., 
All depend on the future. 
27/2 Whether self existed in the past, or did not exist, or both 
existed and did not exist, or neither existed nor did not 
exist - these are termed 'views of permanence depending on the 
past'. Whether self will continue, or will not continue, or 
will both continue and not continue, or will neither continue 
nor not continue in the future - these are termed 'vieews of 
boundedness or non-boundedness which depend on the future'. 
On what grounds are such wrong views as these termed 'wrong 
views'? This we shall now explain. 
27v3 'In the past, I existed'. 
This is untenable. 
The self which existed in the past 
Does not constitute the present self. 
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27v4 If you say that the self is the same, 
Only the body has different characteristics; 
Apart from within a body 
Where could 
GMot e 5e(t be f 4.47 
27v5 No self exists apart from a body 
This fact has already been establishpd416 
If you say that the body is the self, 
If it is all, then there is no self. 
27v6 The body alone does not constitute the self, 
Since the body's characteristics arise and cease 
How could receiving possibly 
Constitute the receiver? 
417 
27v7 Suppose the self existed apart from the body; 
This would not be correct. 
Without receiving, there would be a self, 
But in reality this is never found. 
27v8 Now the self is not separate from receiving 
Nor is it the receiving 
non - 
Neither non-receiving, nordexistent; 
This is its fixed meaning. 
27/8 If you say that the self existed in the past, this is not 
correct, and why? The self of an earlier period does not 
constitute the present self, since this would involve the 
error of permanence. If one admits permanence, then the errors 
will be countless, and why? Take the case of a man who, on 
account of his good deeds, becomes a god and then afterwards 
becomes a man again. 418 If the former self were the same as 
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the self of the present time, then the god would be a 
man. Or again, it is like a man who, because of evil deeds 
becomes a candäla419 and subsequently becomes a brahman. If 
the former self were the same as the present self, the candala 
would be the brä, hman. 420 
(37a25) It is like, for example, a brahman from Sr vasti421 called 
Devadatta, 422 travelling to the City of the King's Residence 
(Ra. jagrha). 23 He remains known as Davadatta - he has not been 
changed. by arriving at the City of the King's Residence. If 
someone who had previously been a god subsequently became a man, 
then the god would be the same as the man, and a candäla would 
be the same as a brahman, but this is not so, and why? A god is 
not the same thing as a man, and a candala is not the same thing 
as a brahman, because this would involve the error of 
permanence. 
(37bl) You may say that the former self is not the present self, in the 
same way that a man is called a washerman when he is washing 
clothes, but a reaper when he is reaping. Although there is 
no difference between the washerman and the reaper, neverthe- 
less the washerman is not the same thing as the reaper, and in 
the same way, you may say, the self receiving the body of a god 
is called a god, and the self receiving the body of a man is 
called a man. The self is not different, only the 
bodies are 
different. This however is not correct, and why? Because if 
it (the individual) is the same, then we ought not to say that 
the god becomes a man. 
(37b6) Is there no difference between the washerman and the reaper, 
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or is there a difference? If there is no difference, then the 
washerman should be identical with the reaper, and in the same 
way the former god should be identical with the man, and the 
candala the same as the brähmam, and here again there would be 
the error of permanence. If there is a difference, then the 
washerman would not be the same as the reaper, and the god 
would not be the man, and the self would not be permanent. 
Being impermanent, it would not have the characteristic of 
'self' and therefore it could not be said to be the same. 
(37blo) Question: Self is the same; it is merely that we make 
distinctions, because of reception, between 'being a god', owu 
aid VIA- /AVe being. a man' 'being a candala' , /1 being a brabman', but the sel 
ýy 
5. TA in reality is neither god nor man, neither candala nor brat an 
Therefore, there are no such errors. 
"9 Krsý 
P! ý e, V( ýI 
Reply: 
ýJd 
LcLh ' (37b14) This is not correct, and why? If the body makes onea god or a 
man, a candala or a brahman, iF it is not the self f týsvº °i-be 
must be another distinct self which exists apart from the body 
Now, sin and merit, birth and death, going and coming, are all 
of the body and not of the self . Because of our sins we 
fall 
into the three evil paths. 
424 Because of our meritorious 
actions we are reborn in the three good paths. If pain and 
pleasure, anger and bliss, grief, 
ftor are 
entirely of the body and not of the self, what use do they hav( 
1""O, *, b ei º. 9 seº,, 4-e4. ced 
ý-- leis cr 
for a self? It would be like a 
u. ý as ý-- wý ºý 
ke. t$e. 1c ewýKt 4- . 426 Wit] 
the causes and conditions of the five skandhas continuing to 
succeed each other and sin and merit not disappearing, 
there 
would nevertheless be liberation. If all this were of 
the bod-, 
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(37b21 ) 
(37b29) 
and not the self, what need would there be for a self? 
Question: Sin and merit, etc. are based and rely upon the 
self, because the self is that which knows, but in the body 
there is nothing which knows. Surely the knower is the self. 
It initiates the causes and conditions of action, and sins 
and merits are the things done. We must recognise that there 
is a doer, and that doer is the self. The body is what the self 
employs, and is the place in which the self resides. As an 
analogy, the master of a house constructs his house using straw, 
wood, mud and plaster. Because it is for his own body, 
427 
he 
builds a good or bad house according to what he uses. It is 
the same with the self, for one acquires an attractive or ugly 
body according to whether one performs good or bad deeds. The 
six paths of samsara are all created by the self, and this is 
why the body of sin and merit entirely depends upon the self. 
By way of analogy, it is like a house, which belongs only to the 
master of the house and not to any other person. 
Reply: 
This analogy does not work, and why? The master of the house 
can build the house because he has shape, is tangible and has 
strength. Since the self which you are describing has no form 
and is intangible, it has no creative power, 
428 
and having no 
creative power of its own it cannot cause anything else to act. 
If there were one single dharma in the world which, though with- 
out shape, and intangible, nevertheless had the capacity to do 
things, then we could accept and believe this and know that there 
is a doer, but this is not the case. 
(37c4) If the self were the doer then there would be no self-created 
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suffering, for if such a thinker429 could be attached to 
pleasurable things then he would never forsake them. If the self 
does not create suffering and yet suffering inexorably arises, 
then all other things are also produced automatically, and not 
created by the self. 
(37c7) If the one who sees is the self, then since the eye can see 
forms, the eye should be the self. If the eye sees and yet is 
not the self, this contradicts what you said before about the 
seer being the self. 
430 
If the seer is the self, then the self 
ought not to be able to hear or smell objects, such as sounds, 
etc., and why? Because the eye is that which sees; it cannot 
hear or smell objects, such as sounds. Therefore, to say that 
that which sees is the self, is not correct. 
(37c11) If you say 'it is like a reaper using a sickle to cut grass; it 
the same way the self is able to do things using the hands, etc 
this is not correct, and why? Because the reaper exists quite 
separately from the sickle, but there is no separate doer apart 
from the various faculties of body and mind. 
(37c14) If you say 'although the doer is not the faculties of eye and 
ear, etc., the doer does exist', then things could be done by a 
barren woman's child, for if this were so all the faculties 
If you say 'the left eye would be entirely without a self. 
4 
sees things but the right eye cognizes them, and we must accept 
that there is a separate seer' this is not correct, for the 
right hand performs actions which the left hand is unable 
to 
perform, and therefore there is no separate doer. 
If a 
separate doer existed, the left hand could also perform actions 
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carried out by the right hand, but in reality it cannot, and 
therefore no doer exists. 
4 
(37c2o) Again, if those who hold that a self exists say that when we see 
another person eating, saliva is produced in our mouth and this 
is a mark of self, this is not correct, and why? Because this 
is power of a thought, not power of a self. Moreover, this 
denies the causes and conditions of self. A man who is in 
company may be ashamed to salivate, yet the saliva inexorably 
comes forth and he cannot control it, so we know that there is 
no self . 
(37c24) Again, there is the evil error of the perverted view432 that 
when one who has been a father in a previous life becomes a soi 
in the present life, the self of the father and son is one, on'. 
the bodies are different. It is like moving from one house to 
another house; since he is a father, a father does not become 
any different by entering a different house. If there were a 
self, then these two (father and son) would be one, and thus a 
great error would be involved. 
(37c28) If you say that this error also applies in the case of the 
continuity of the five skandhas which are without a self, this 
is not correct, and why? Even though the five skandhas are 
continuous, they sometimes function, and sometimes do not 
function. It is like grape juice, 
433 
which one who holds to tr 
precepts is allowed to drink. He should not 
drink grape wine, 
but if it turns and becomes vinegar then he may again drink it. 
It is the same with the continuity of the five skandhas; they 
434 
function, and then do not function. 
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(38a3) If You say that there is only one self from beginning to end 
this is wrong, for within the continuity of the five skandhas 
there is no such error, it is me-rely that through the combin- 
ation of the five skandhas there is a temporary designation of 
'self', which however has no fixedness. It is like beams and 
rafters combining to form a house, where there is no separate 
house apart from the beams and rafters. In the same way the 
self exists through the combining of the five skandhas. Since 
there is in fact no self apart from the five skandhas, 'self' 40 
is merely a temporary designation with no fixed reality. 
(38a8) You earlier said435 that there is a separate receiver apart 
from reception, and that we can distinguish the receiver, 
according to his receiving, as a god or as a man, etc., but thL 
is all wrong. You should know that only receiving existsq with 
no separate receiver. If you say 'a self exists, distinct from 
receiving' this is incorrect. If there were a self apart from 
receiving, how could we speak of the characteristics of such a 
self? Since its characteristics could not be described, there 
is no self apart from receiving. 
(38al 2) If you say that there is no self apart from the body, and that 
the self is simply the body, this is not correct either, and 
why? Because the body has the characteristics, of arising and 
ceasing, and this is not the, case with the self. 
Moreover, how can you call something a receiver by virtue of 
receiving? If you say that there is a receiver who exists 
distinct from receiving, this is also incorrect. If the five 
skandhas were non-receptive and yet a receiver existed, this 
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would have to be a separate receiver apart from the five skandhasq 
and the functions of eye, etc., ought to reach itq 
436 
but in 
fact they do not reach it. Therefore self is not separate from 
reception, nor is it the same as reception, nor is it non- 
reception, nor again is it nonexistent. These are definite 
principles, 
437 
so you must recognise them. 
To say that self existed in the past is not co=ect, and WhY? 
27v9 That self did not operate438 in the past; 
This is incorrect. 
That the self in the past was different 
From present self, is also incorrect. 
27v10 If you say that they are different 
The one now should exist separately from the other one. 
Self abiding in the past, 
And the present self being self-produced. 
27v11 This would be severance, cessation, 
Loss of action and reward. 
That one acting, this one receiving 
And other such errors as these. 
27v12 Previously nonexistent, now existent; 
There are errors in this as well. 
Self would create dharmas 
And this would 'oe causelessness. 
27/12 'The self in the past does not constitute the present self' is 
not correct, and why? The past self is not different from 
the 
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present self. If the present self were different from the past 
selfq then the present self ought to exist quite separately 
from that other self. Also, the past self, would abide in that 
(body), and this body would have to produce itself anew, and if 
so, this would fall into the extreme of severanceg losing all 
karmic action and reward. 
Also that person would sin, while this person would receive 
the retribution, and there would be countless other such errors 
Also this self, having been inexistent previouslyq would now be 
existent, and this would also be an error. Self would create 
dharmas, and this would be causelessness. Therefore it is not 
correct to say that the past self does not constitute the 
present self. 
Further: 
27v13 Just like the views of self 
As existent, or nonexistent in the past; 
Whether it is both, or neither 
These are all incorrect. 
27/13 Just as in seeking f or self in the past, there are the wrong 
views that it existed or did not exist, so too the views that 
it both exists and does not exist, or neither does nor does not 
exist are also wrong views. These are all wrong, 
for the same 
reasons as the errors previously discussed. 
27v14 Whether the self will operate 
Or not operate, in the future; 
Such views as these 
Are the same as those of the past. 
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24/14 The four Propositions about whether the self will or will not 
operate in the future are like the errors relating to the pastv 
and should be discussed along with them. 
Fwr4---eý -. 
I 
27vl 5 If the god were the same as the man 
This would fall into the extreme of permanence 
The god would be non-arising 
Because permanent dharmas do not a-rise. 
27/15 If you hold that the god is the same as the man, this is 
permanence, for unless the god is reborn as a man, how can you 
call him a man? Since permanent dharmas do not arise, permanence 
is not correct either. 
Further: 
27v16 If the god is different from the man 
This is impermanence 
If the god differs from the man 
There is no continuity between them. 
27/16 If the god is different from the man, then this constitutes 
impermanence, and impermanence implies the errors of severance 
and cessation, etc. It is like the errors previously discussed; 
if the god and the man are different, then there is no continuity 
between them, whereas if there is continuity then they cannot be 
said to be different. 
Further: 
27v17 If half-god and half-man, 
Then you fall into both extremes 
Of permanence and impermanencej 
And this is not correct. 
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27/17 
27v18 
27/18 
27v19 
Suppose that half of the body of the living being were divine , 
and half of the body were human. If this were so, then it would 
be both permanent and impermanentg the god-halfbeing permanent 
and the human half impermanent, but this would not be right, 
and why? Beca-use of the error of one body having -two 
characteristics. 
Further: 
If both permanence and impermanence 
Are established together, 
In this case 'neither permanence 
Nor impermanence' should be established. 
If both permanence and impermanence can be established together 
it naturally follows that 'neither permanence nor impermanence' 
can be established,, but since permanence and impermanence are 
opposites, permanence and impermanence are never in fact 
established together, and therefore 'neither permanence nor 
impe: rmanencel is not established either. 
Moreover, it is also Licorrect to say that birth and death 
(samsara) has no beginning, and why? 
If dharmas had a fixed 'coming' 
And a fixed 'going' 
Birth and death would have no beginning 
439 
But in reality there are no such things. 
27/19 If dharmas were fixed and there were places from which they 
came and to which they went, then birth and death would have no 
beginningg but if we investigate these dharmas with prajna- 
, nsight440 we cannot find anywhere whence they came, or anywhere 
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w1lither they go. It is therefore not correct to say that birth 
and death have no beginning. 
Moreover: 
27v2O Now, if there is no permanence 
How can there be impermanence 
Or both permanence and impermanence 
Or neither permanence nor impermanence? 
27/20 If it is the case that, if we investigate with prajna-insight, 
we find no dharma that can possibly be permanent, then what 
co-uld be impermanent, since impermanence exists only by virt-ue 
of permanence? If neither of these two exists, how can there 
be 'both permanence and impermanence', and if 'both permanence 
and impermanence' does not exist how can 'neither permanence 
,;, 1+ ec. "ýC nor impe=anencel exist. of 'both permanence and 
impermanence 
Therefore, the four propositions regarding permanence, etc. 
which are based and rely upon the past are untenable. Also 
untenable are the four propositions based and relying on the 
future regarding whether the world is bounded or not bounded, 
etc., which we shall now discuss. Why is this? 
27v2l If the world is bounded 
How can there be a subsequent world? 
If the world is unbounded 
How can there be a subsequent world? 
441 
27/21 If the world had boundariesq there could not be any subsequent 
world, but in reality there are subsequent worlds9 and therefore 
it is not correct to say that the world has boundaries. 
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If the world had no boundaries there would be no subsequent 
world either, but in fact there are subsequent worlds and it 
is therefore incorrect to say that the world does not have 
boundaries. Moreover, both of these extremes is untenable, 
and why? 
27v22 The constant succession of the five skandhas 
Is like the flame of a lamp 
Beca-use of this the world, 
Can be neither bounded nor unbounded. 
27/22 Out of the five skandhas again a-rise the five skand-has. The 
five skandhas s-ucceed each other in seqiaence, like the flame of 
a lamp which exists through the combination of its conditions. 
If the conditions are not exhausted, the lamp does not go out, 
biat if they are exhausted it goes out. Theref ore, it ca=ot 
be said that the world either has or does not have boundaries. 
Moreover: 
27v23 If, the previous skand-has having perished, 
Independently of these five skandhas 
The subsequent skandhas were to arise, 
The world would have boundaries. 
\ 
27v24 If. the previous skandhas not having perished, 
Also independently of these five skandhas 
The s-ubseqiaent five skandhas were to arise 
The world would be boundless. 
27/24 if, after the previous five skandhas have perished, the 
subsequent five skandhas arise, independently of the earlier 
five skandhas, then the world has boundaries. Where no further 
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five skandhas are produced after the previous five skandhas have 
ceased, this is called a boundary. 'Boundaxyl means the final 
body. 442 
(39al 1) If , the previous f ive skandhas not yet having perished, the 
subsequent five skandhas arose independently of these five 
skandhas, then the world would have no boundaries, and this 
would be permanence. But in reality this is not so, and 
therefore to hold that the world does not have boundaries is 
not correct. Worlds are of two kinds; the worlds of countries 
and the worlds of living beings. This refers to a world of 
living beings. Moreover, as is said in the 'Four Hundred 
Contemplations' 443 
(39a16) "Since the true Dharma, the teacher 
And the hearer are diff-icult to obtain 
Thus birth and death 
Are neither bounded nor unbounded"0444 
Because we have not attained the true Dharma our birth and 
death and going and coming are unbounded. Since we may at 
some time manage to hear the true Dhama and attain 
the Way, 
we cannot say that the world is unbounded. 
'both bounded and unbounded'. 
27v25 'If the world were half bounded 
And half unbounded 
Then it would be both bounded 
And unbounded: Not so. 
We shall now refute 
27/25 If the world were half bounded and 
half unbounded then it would 
be 'both bounded and unbounded', but if this were Sol 
then one 
dharma would have two characteristics, and this 
is not correct. 
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Why is this? 
27V26 How could one part of that recipient 
Of the five skandhas be destroyed 
While one part is -undestroyed 
This is not co=ect. 
27v27 IRLeceiving is also like this; 
How can one part be destroyed 
And one part not destroyed? 
This is not correct. 
27/27 How could one part of the 'recipient of the five skandhas' be 
destroyed and the other part not destroyed? One entity cannot 
be both permanent and impermanent. It is the same with 
reception; how could one part be destroyed whilst the other. -. 
part was not destroyed, since this would involve the error of 
the dual characteristics of permanence and impermanence? 
Therefore it is not the case that the world is both bounded 
and unbounded. 
We shall now refute the view that the world is neither bounded 
nor unbounded: 
27/28 If both bounded and unbounded 
Can be established together 
Then 'neither bounded nor unbounded' 
Would also be established. 
27/28 'Unbounded' exists by virtue of being the opposite of 'bounded', 
in the same way that short exists as the opposite of long. The 
opposite of being or not being is 'both being and not being' and 
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the opposite of 'both being and not being' isý 'neither being 
nor not being'. If 'both bounded and unbounded' were 
definitely established then there would be 'neither bounded 
nor unbounded I, and why? Because they depend upon each other. 
In what has gone bef ore we have already refiated the third 
proposition 'both bounded and unbounded' , so how can there 
possibly be 'neither bounded nor unbounded', since there is no 
interdependence? 
Upon investigation, the four views of the world having 
boundaries, etc., which rely upon the future are found to be 
entirely untenable. 
Further: 
27v29 Since all dharmas are empty 
Views about the permanence, etc. of the world - 
In what place, and at what time, 
AA )- 
And by whom, would such views be generated? I' 
27/29 In the above, he (Nagarjuna) has refuted all views in the 
Sravaka-Dharma, and now he states that in the Great Vehicle 
Dharma all dharmas have had from the beginning the nature of 
utter emptiness. Within this empty nature of dharmas 
there 
are no persons and no Dharma, so there can be no production of 
wrong views or right views. 
446 'Place' means location. 'Time' 
means a particular day, month or year. 'whom' means a person. 
'Such' means the substance of all views. 
(39b18) If there are fixed views of permanence, impermanence etc., there 
must be a person who generates these views. When self 
is 
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27v3O 
destroyed there is no production of such views by a person. 
There must be a place for manifestly observed dharmas to be 
negated; how much more a time? If all these views exist they 
I 
should have a fixed reality, but if they were fixed they could 
not be destroyed, and we have already negated them on various 
grounds in what has gone before; theref ore you should know 
that views have no fixed s-ubstance; how can they a-rise? As 
the verse says: 'In what place, and at what time, and by whom 
would such views be generated? ' 
To Gautama. 447 Great Sage and Xaster, 
Who from pity and compassion preached this Dha=a, 
Entirely cutting off all views; 
We now bow our heads in reverence. 
27/30 'All views' means, if the teaching is summarisedq five viewsq 
or if detailed, sixty-two views. 
448 It was in order to cut off 
all these views that He preached the Dharma. The 
Great Sage and 
Master Gautama, has immeasurable, unbounded and inconceivable 
wisdom and irlsights and this is why we bow our 
heads to him in 
reverence. 
